Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 18:46:08 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802192346.SAA29628@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: Logical Language Group Sender: Lojban list From: Logical Language Group Subject: Re: Summary of summaries on DJUNO X-To: a.rosta@uclan.ac.uk X-cc: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan X-UIDL: 2f9b7f826cc335819e6e9185f8f8fa97 X-Mozilla-Status: 8011 X-From-Space-Date: Thu Feb 19 18:42:22 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - >> >Lojbab has no response to 2.1. >> >> No, I have a different paradigm in mind, and I see the differences implicit >> in krici/jinvi/djuno, including in their place structures, to render this >> particular contrast invalid. > >Could you (re-)spell this out more clearly? I ahve done so in a recent message respoding to Jorge, but you may be missing much list traffic - AC.UK has been sending bounce messages like crazy the last few days. The contarst I was referring to was working from krici to birti to djuno. >Asserting "John knows X" DOES assert only that John knows X. However, >for all speakers of English with the implausibly self-proclaimed exception >of you, the relationship "know" denoted by the word _know_ is such >that John cannot know X if X is false. It therefore follows >inescapably that asserting only that John knows X includes an >assertion that X is true. > >This is said for the 100th time. I simply cannot comprehend that you >still don't see what I and others are saying. true under what metaphysics (and to whom if that is relevant). If John is using a metaphysics that i accept and you do not (and presumably he accepts it), you would seem to be saying that, to me, John knows X, and to you John cannot know X. But djuno does not include a metaphysics place so we have no way of knowing other than by implication from the epistemology. But as to John's knowing, who decides? I was thinking that Jorge was arguing that the speaker decides based on his presumption of truth, but am not sure that Jorge still feels this way based on recent responses. Other areas of Lojban pragmatic prescription have tried to make the onus on the speaker to make things plain to the listener, which would suggest that the speaker must defer to the listener's metaphysics if known. The bottom line is that we need to agree as to what it means for John to djuno le du'u la jegvo cu broda where broda is any number of religious assertions that a religious person would assert that they "know" and not merely "believe", but which an atheist would assert that they cannot "know". But can they djuno by x4 their religion (I note int passing that there are people who would claim to know certain religious beliefs because they practice their religion, but in fact do not really "believe", certainly not in the krici sense of pure faith. For them the religious beliefs are "true" so they can "know" them, but when they subject their beliefs to rational analysis, all of a sudden they don't believe - they are using a different epistemology.) The bottom line is that I recognize that "truth" is not universally agreed upon, and I want a definition of "djuno" that people can understand without necessarily agreeing on whether le se djuno is true. If le djuno presumes it is true (when using the stated epistemology) that should be sufficient, even if I as speaker or listener do not so presume. >Even if you had your way and {djuno} were defined as you would wish, >the definition that others are adovcating for {djuno} could be >assigned to some other brivla with exactly the same place structure. >Remember that. No - they need a metaphysics place tied to the x2 instead of or in addition to the x4 place that you have agreed is tied mnore strongly to x1 (recognizing that some epistemologies imply certain metaphysics and vice versa). >> krici and jinvi do not have epistemology places, > >This may be so. What do you think the difference is between jinvi's >x4, the "grounds" for the opinion, and djuno's x4, the "epistemology" >--More-- >for the opinion? Well first of all, le jinvi can hold an opinion without "knowing" that it is true by any epistemology. It is my opinion that Saddam Hussein should be removed from power. I can justify this opinion, but I can recognize that there are counterarguments EVEN UNDER MY EPISTEMOLOGY, but the weight of argument to me leads to the conclusion. In general, we use "thinks" and "opines" for propositions that we recognize are arguable - that others do not accept as true. A certain person haas argued on misc.education that taxes for public education are "coercion at the point of a gun " to support something he doesn't believe in. He bases this on certain assumptions that I associate with libertarianism, coupled with the penalty for tax evasion being imprisonment (which might require that one be arrested by a policeman who typically carries a firearm). Now I can see, given his odd collection of assumptions, how he reaches his conclusion. I would call this lo se jinvi. I would not call it lo se krici. I am not sure that I would call it lo se djuno be ko'a - he is quite unclear in distinguishing his argued opinions from the "facts" he uses to justify them. He probably is not of an open mind about the truth of his statements so HE probably consides that he knows/djuno this as "truth". In contrast, I clearly jinvi that he is wrong. I would not claim to djuno that he is wrong - our differences are based on differences in definitions of words and assumptions, and how we prioritze evidence. On the other hand, because I am certain (emotionally) that his assumpotions and definitions are non-standard, I could also say that mi birti that he is wrong. Do these examples help? lojbab