Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 10:30:45 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802231530.KAA00674@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: And Rosta Sender: Lojban list From: And Rosta Organization: University of Central Lancashire Subject: Re: Summary so far on DJUNO X-To: Logical Language Group X-cc: lojban@cuvmb.cc.columbia.edu To: John Cowan X-UIDL: 64f167674f1b45c5178b3b77c51dca59 X-Mozilla-Status: 8011 X-From-Space-Date: Mon Feb 23 11:59:48 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - Lojbab: > >1. Why are three distinct notions conflated into the x2 of jetnu? > >They should have been separated out. As it stands, if "ko`a jetnu > >ko`e", you don't know whether ko`e is a metaphysics, a standard, or > >an epistemology. Okay, that works, but it seems a bit weird to have a > >common or garden *gismu*, rather than an abstruse philosopher's > >jargon lujvo, meaning "x2 is either a metaphysics, a standard or an > >epistemology for the truth of x1"! > > 1) because I was unclear on the terminology when I wrote the place > structure > > 2) because I was sloppy on the terminology when I wrote the place > structure > > 3) because using a standard or epistemology in that position may or may not > implicitly indicate a metaphysics. But is this actually defining for {jetnu}, or is it like your use of "know" in the definition for {djuno} - nondefining, and misleading due to your pardonable and relative lack of competence when writing the documentation? > >2. Why does {jetnu} have a standard-or-metaphysics place and {mlatu} > >not? It seems to me (at least at the moment, but mi jinvi gi`e na > >birti) that {mlatu} has an equally good claim to such a place. > > I am presuming that whatever goes into that x2 (wihtout compromising > terminology by further misusing it) is that which resolves the truth of x1 > given the acknolwedgement that truth is or can be subjective. Recent > discussion leads me to believe that the term for this is "metaphysics" > and not "epistemology" with the difference being shown by djuno - that a > metaphysics would be tied to the x2 whereas an epistemology is tied to x1. > > If I am now correctly understanding, then the use of a standard or an > epsitemology in the x2 would be a metonymy or metaphor for a metaphysics. > Since we have no clear idea how to state standards, epistemologies, and > metaphysics's as sumti, I am not sure how we would tell the difference in > any event. Although I would presume that "tu'a mi > in the x2 would indicate that thespeaker is acknowledging that the standard > of truth or perhaps the metaphysics being relied upon is perhaps subjective > and limited only to the speaker. But how about an answer to my question, which has also independently been posed by Jorge a number of times? > >> In "la djan. djuno X" there is no need to resolve "mi", nor to know who > >> the speaker is, to understand the claim. Therefore the truth-belief of > >> the speaker should be irrelevant to the truth of "la djan djuno X". > > > >I agree. I have been saying this all along. Indeed, it's exactly what > >I say in the quoted stuff you were replying to. > > > >It is only you who somehow thinks that the true-x2 version of djuno > >somehow peculiarily requires a place for the speaker. > > Somewhere in the discussion, this idea crept through to me as being what you > guys were arguing about. I now have heard from both you and Jorge that this > is NOT what you were taking issue with. > > On the other hand, what you are apparently taking issue with is the > necessaity for x2 to be true (you and Jorge are claiming that it has to be > while I am claiming that because truth can be subjective, that only le > djuno can decide the basis for determining the truth of x2). This is better than your previous understanding, but still not quite right. I am arguing that if {djuno} is to be usefully distinct from other {gismu}, then, in the current absence of alternative distinctions [an absence which I hope to rectify in a later message], a useful distinction is for x2 of {djuno} to be true. I am NOT arguing that {djuno} MUST be defined in such a way that its x2 is true. Just that, other things being equal, {djuno} SHOULD be so defined. You, though, seem to be arguing that the true-x2 version of {djuno} is somehow inherently flawed, and I strongly contest that. If you did turn out to be correct then your argument would pertain not to {djuno} in particular but to the entire vocabulary. > In English, I will admit that we would not normally say "John knows X" > unless we ourselves consider X to be true (the earlier statement of this > may be how I got the idea that the non-x1 speaker was relevant to the truth > standard). But if we acknolwedge the possibility that John may be using > a metaphysics different than one we would choose, and perhaps even one that > we cannot choose, then djuno would be useful for reporting John's > perception of reality without committing with regard to our own. OK. So the next step is to distinguish this satisfactorily from {birti} and {jinvi} [cf. e.g. a future message from me], and I at least am content to go along with you. > I no longer think that the true-x2 version requires a place for the speaker, > but it does require a place, corresponding to jetnu, that ties to the > x2 as the epistemology ties to the x1. I think that Cowan wrote indicating > understanding and agreement with this within the last couple of days, > and saying that djuno should then have had such an x5, but it doesn't. I think I missed those messages. At any rate, as I've said elsewhere, I don't see why x2's being true requires a metaphysics place while x2's being, say, feline doesn't. So, to repeat, I deny that there is anything intrinsically problematic with the true-x2 version of {djuno}. > >So what we disagree on is on whether > > > > ko`a jetyju`o ko`e [where jetyju`o = true-x2 version of djuno] > > > >has a truth-value that is as independent of the speaker as {ta > >mlatu}. > > I certainly have no problem with there being a jetyju'o limited only to > x2 beuing true. I also agree that in most cases, djuno would suffice Good. So if it works for {jetyju`o} then it could work for {djuno}. > >> But I also realize that in such media, the speaker cannot know who his reade > >> will be, and it makes a lot better sense for the standard of djuno to be > >> le djuno. > > > >What "standard of djuno" do you mean? > > The choice of x4 and the choice of metaphysics by which x2 is to be judged > unless they are explicitly stated. Now the x4 is called out in the place > structure, and hence can easily be used and specified, thereby restrciting the > knowledge claim. As baselined, djuno has no way for a speaker to specify > any metaphysical basis as being distinct from that which le djuno might > choose. {djuno} doesn't even specify the metaphysics according to which x1 judges x2 to be true. Anyway, I would be content to define the true-x2 version of {djuno} as "... and x2 is true by the metaphysics according to which x1 judges x2 to be true". That would side-step the problem you raise. > I think thatthe usefulness of all this comes out in the possibility of a > lujvo jifydjuno (false-knowledge) which would be used for example to > talk about things that the ancient Greeks "knew" (i.e. they would have > reported it legitimately as "mi djuno" using typical epistemologies for the > time), but which later learning has proven false because our view of > reality has changed. Right. > If one can have false-knowledge, then one can also talk about true-knowledge, > those truths held by the ancient Greeks that we still recognize today. Right. > But I worry about the *necessity* of lo se jifydjuno, for which the ancient > Greeks used djuno, being false today even with all places specified, > including a tense - ca le dzexelso that was true then, merely because our > concept of reality has changed, WITHOUT being forced to recognize that > two different realities are involved. Can't quite follow you here, but I don't think it;s crucial. > I don't think (jinvi) that this applies to "ta mlatu" on its own > provided that mlatu has not changed meaning. Ditto. > >OK. So if there are multiple realities each accessible only by a > >different observer, and the observer actually cognizes the reality, > >then what you'd need is > > > > x1 cognizes that x2 is true of x3 by observer-dependent metaphysics x5 > >with > > epistemology x4 > > > >You might then define {djuno} as: > > > > x1 cognizes that x2 is true of x3, by a possibly x1-dependent > > metaphysics, with epistemology x4 > > > >Now my question would be this: if x1 is in error - if x1 thinks that > >x2 is true of x3, by a possibly x1-dependent metaphysics, with > >epistemology x4, but x1 is in fact mistaken and x2 is, by the > >metaphysics, not true, *would this count as djuno*? > > Going back to this, I think that djuno requires a metaphysics by which x1 > could conclude that x2 is true. Could *correctly* conclude that x2 is true? I think you will want to answer No. To this, and also to my original question. > Since the metaphysics is not stated or > even statable in the place structure, then it would not count as djuno > only if there existed NO metaphysics consistent with the other elements. > But we are now in the epicycles within epicycles, and I am not sure that > I can conceive of an x1-dependent metaphysics that would generate truths > that x1 would consider false (or flasehoods that x1 would consider true). If you can't conceive of these then it won't serve as a test-case. Anyway, I can work out what I think your answers should be according to your views stated elsewhere. --And.