Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 17:46:20 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <199802232246.RAA19085@locke.ccil.org> Reply-To: "Erik W. Cornilsen" Sender: Lojban list From: "Erik W. Cornilsen" Subject: Re: Summary so far on DJUNO X-To: Lojban List To: John Cowan X-UIDL: 242839bd1f2bf15732163f0441412814 X-Mozilla-Status: 8011 X-From-Space-Date: Mon Feb 23 17:33:23 1998 X-From-Space-Address: - I'm sorry if this muddies the waters further, but what would djuno mean if any requirement of truth of the predication was divorced from x2? With neither x1 nor the speaker required to believe in the truth or falsity of x2? It would seem to me that this would result in a statement of knowledge of some subject with that knowledge produced by some epistemology. Whether anyone believes the predication of x2 to be true becomes another matter, leaving simply a statement relating a predication, a subject, an epistemology producing that predication, and the person(s) who is aware of how that epistemology produced that predication relating to that subject. The only requirement on x2 is that it be produced by x4. All IMHO. I'm just raising a point I don't recall having been raised previously. Thoughts? -- Erik W. Cornilsen (who's taken too many philosophy courses) thanatos@dimensional.com