From pycyn@aol.com Mon Feb 19 18:43:58 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_3); 20 Feb 2001 02:43:54 -0000 Received: (qmail 83187 invoked from network); 20 Feb 2001 02:43:54 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by l7.egroups.com with QMQP; 20 Feb 2001 02:43:54 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-d01.mx.aol.com) (205.188.157.33) by mta3 with SMTP; 20 Feb 2001 03:44:59 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-d01.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v29.5.) id r.5f.111b106f (25104) for ; Mon, 19 Feb 2001 21:43:43 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <5f.111b106f.27c333df@aol.com> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2001 21:43:43 EST Subject: Re: [lojban] RE: Orcutt (again?!) To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_5f.111b106f.27c333df_boundary" Content-Disposition: Inline X-Mailer: 6.0 sub 10501 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 5529 --part1_5f.111b106f.27c333df_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 2/19/2001 5:56:55 PM Central Standard Time, a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com writes: > Eliott cases] is that intensional contexts were (arguably) one reason for > wanting names to have senses, and another reason for wanting names to have > senses is shown by the Maggie Fatcher, George Eliot examples, which attempt > to be part of an argument that (a) there is a distinction between > knowledge/belief > about (all members of) a category and knowledge/belief about what > characterizes its intension (= "knowing what word X means"), and (b) this > distinction applies also to names.> > I missed this point (these points?) in reading through the latest accumulation. Let's see. In this world, "George Eliot" refers to Mary Anne Evans (to the standard referent of that name), who is female and wrote Middlemarch, etc. "George" is conventionally a male's name (or was in the 19th century anyhow -- I think the conventions are now a lot weaker) and so part of the connotation of the name is "male," though not part of its sense (any more than "Farmer" is part of its sense, though occasionally for some folks -- the third English king of that monicker, for example -- part of its connotation, and always part of the etymology, allowing the usual jokes -- which need looking at). There pretty clearly worlds in which the person who in this world is George Eliot is male and worlds in which the person called "George Eliot" is male and yet wrote Middlemarch (even the very Middlemarch we have in this world). And yet others in which the person so-called, while male, did not write any thing at all. And so on. I wonder what we can translate the ignoramus's belief as. I suspect that xorxes is right as usual, that the unknower is going just on the name and relying on some such rule as "Anyone named 'George' is a guy." So, here the name is really a disguised description {le se cmene zo djordjeliyt}. And the sense of that is on its face (except for the "selected" part, which is not important for this case -- well, maybe it is, if no one has selected a George Eliot that fits into his world). The Margaret Thatcher case is different, because it is important for the conspiracy theorist that virtually everything true of Margaret Thatcher's public life continue to be true but that some bits of biology (and so of her private life) are not. So again, we have not the sense of the name but a description -- definitely with {le} since the natural way to put this is "the woman who was PM from whenever to thenever and ....". I tend to think that the senses of names are going to turn out to be pretty uninteresting things about conventions and the like and the interesting things about the uses of names in intensional contexts is going to be about what descriptions they are doing duty for -- or, to put it another way, what connotation the believer is taking as the sense of the name (even though it really isn't its sense). This seems to have some effect upon exportation as well: the ignoramus probably does not belief of George Eliot that she is a man, because the sense of the expression "the person conventionally named 'George Eliot'" does not apply to George Eliot (she was so named in an unconventional manner). On the other hand, the conspiracy theorist's use exports, since the description does apply. (??) So I guess we are dealing with essential properties (of what, though) and accidental ones. Hans believes that whales are fish (because, as a German native speaker, he calls them "Walfisch," which says they are fish [trying to make the case like George Eliot's above]) His point rests solely upon what the thing is called (well, maybe some incidental facts -- are they really? -- like that they are aquatic). So maybe not about the category at all. The professor believes that whales mate for life (based on inadequate research, say, or, better, a kind of romantic notion of natural moral purity -- not unheard of, though now less common than conspriracy theories). So, the sense OH! If the subjects are not exportable, in what way is it that the belief is wrong? And what are the conditions under which they are exportable. Maybe, if we want to call a belief wrong, we have always to put its subject(s?) in the prenex position. For, if "George Eliot" is not exportable, than the ignoramus's belief that George Eliot is a man is not wrong, but just not about this world. Which is, come to think of it, why names are usually taken as rigid designators, even though that does not make sense for a bunch of other cases. And what about categories? Usually not rigid and not so easily exported anyhow. I still don't exactly see where the {ckaji} comes in. "th" was treated as "t" in forming Lojban words (I think -- maybe even some ds?), but for many native speakers of English (not the most educated, traditionally) and apparently also for Russians, "f" seems a more natural phonetic equivalent. (Haven't we been here before?) --part1_5f.111b106f.27c333df_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 2/19/2001 5:56:55 PM Central Standard Time,
a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com writes:

<The connection [between the porpoise cases and the maggie Thatcher/George
Eliott cases] is that intensional contexts were (arguably) one reason for
wanting names to have senses, and another reason for wanting names to have
senses is shown by the Maggie Fatcher, George Eliot examples, which attempt
to be part of an argument that (a) there is a distinction between
knowledge/belief
about (all members of) a category and knowledge/belief about what
characterizes its intension (= "knowing what word X means"), and (b) this
distinction applies also to names.>

I missed this point (these points?) in reading through the latest
accumulation. Let's see. In this world, "George Eliot" refers to Mary Anne
Evans (to the standard referent of that name), who is female and wrote
Middlemarch, etc. "George" is conventionally a male's name (or was in the
19th century anyhow -- I think the conventions are now a lot weaker) and so
part of the connotation of the name is "male," though not part of its sense
(any more than "Farmer" is part of its sense, though occasionally for some
folks -- the third English king of that monicker, for example -- part of its
connotation, and always part of the etymology, allowing the usual jokes --
which need looking at).
There pretty clearly worlds in which the person who in this world is George
Eliot is male and worlds in which the person called "George Eliot" is male
and yet wrote Middlemarch (even the very Middlemarch we have in this world).
And yet others in which the person so-called, while male, did not write any
thing at all. And so on. I wonder what we can translate the ignoramus's
belief as. I suspect that xorxes is right as usual, that the unknower is
going just on the name and relying on some such rule as "Anyone named
'George' is a guy." So, here the name is really a disguised description {le
se cmene zo djordjeliyt}. And the sense of that is on its face (except for
the "selected" part, which is not important for this case -- well, maybe it
is, if no one has selected a George Eliot that fits into his world). The
Margaret Thatcher case is different, because it is important for the
conspiracy theorist that virtually everything true of Margaret Thatcher's
public life continue to be true but that some bits of biology (and so of her
private life) are not. So again, we have not the sense of the name but a
description -- definitely with {le} since the natural way to put this is "the
woman who was PM from whenever to thenever and ....". I tend to think that
the senses of names are going to turn out to be pretty uninteresting things
about conventions and the like and the interesting things about the uses of
names in intensional contexts is going to be about what descriptions they are
doing duty for -- or, to put it another way, what connotation the believer is
taking as the sense of the name (even though it really isn't its sense).
This seems to have some effect upon exportation as well: the ignoramus
probably does not belief of George Eliot that she is a man, because the sense
of the expression "the person conventionally named 'George Eliot'" does not
apply to George Eliot (she was so named in an unconventional manner). On the
other hand, the conspiracy theorist's use exports, since the description does
apply. (??)
So I guess we are dealing with essential properties (of what, though) and
accidental ones. Hans believes that whales are fish (because, as a German
native speaker, he calls them "Walfisch," which says they are fish [trying
to make the case like George Eliot's above]) His point rests solely upon
what the thing is called (well, maybe some incidental facts -- are they
really? -- like that they are aquatic). So maybe not about the category at
all. The professor believes that whales mate for life (based on inadequate
research, say, or, better, a kind of romantic notion of natural moral purity
-- not unheard of, though now less common than conspriracy theories). So, the
sense
OH!
If the subjects are not exportable, in what way is it that the belief is
wrong? And what are the conditions under which they are exportable. Maybe,
if we want to call a belief wrong, we have always to put its subject(s?) in
the prenex position. For, if "George Eliot" is not exportable, than the
ignoramus's belief that George Eliot is a man is not wrong, but just not
about this world. Which is, come to think of it, why names are usually taken
as rigid designators, even though that does not make sense for a bunch of
other cases. And what about categories? Usually not rigid and not so easily
exported anyhow.
I still don't exactly see where the {ckaji} comes in.
"th" was treated as "t" in forming Lojban words (I think -- maybe even some
ds?), but for many native speakers of English (not the most educated,
traditionally) and apparently also for Russians, "f" seems a more natural
phonetic equivalent. (Haven't we been here before?)
--part1_5f.111b106f.27c333df_boundary--