From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Mon Feb 12 10:30:59 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_3); 12 Feb 2001 18:30:25 -0000 Received: (qmail 69560 invoked from network); 12 Feb 2001 18:30:24 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l8.egroups.com with QMQP; 12 Feb 2001 18:30:24 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3) by mta2 with SMTP; 12 Feb 2001 18:30:24 -0000 Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer); Mon, 12 Feb 2001 18:13:49 +0000 Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Mon, 12 Feb 2001 18:29:59 +0000 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2 Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2001 18:29:47 +0000 To: cowan Cc: lojban Subject: Re: [lojban] RE:su'u Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline From: And Rosta X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 5421 #>>> John Cowan 02/10/01 06:29pm >>> #And Rosta scripsit: # #> > We can if you #> > like replace all talk of Socrates with talk of the Socratizer, where #> > "x1 is a Socratizer" is a predicate that is (intensionally) true of #> > Socrates and nobody else. But does this really change anything? #>=20 #> Yes it does. # #If you mean "Yes, because I can't understand (I) except by taking it #as a synonym for (II)", then I understand. If you mean that (I) has #graspably different consequences from (II), then I have not yet #grasped them. [BTW, don't you think your parsimony in quoting is sometimes excessive? Nobody but me is going to remember what '(I)' [names as labels] and '(II)' [names with senses] are.] I am satisfied to assert merely "Yes, because I can't understand (I)=20 except by taking it #as a synonym for (II)", but in fact as we have debated off-list in the past, I also think that (I) has graspably=20 different consequences from (II). IIRC, the main arguments were that intensional contexts, such as Ortcutt espionage sentences, and -- more controversially -- cross-world identification of individuals work only under (II). (Those are the philosophical arguments. There are further linguistic arguments that pertain to English and other natlangs but not to Lojban.) #> I forget what rigid designation is. # #The predicate "married to Gale McGhan" non-rigidly designates me, since #there are many possible worlds in which it isn't true. But "first son #of Thomas Cowan and Marianne Schultz" rigidly designates me, since it #refers to me in every possible world in which I exist at all, and where #I don't exist it designates nobody. #I could have married someone else and still been me (hard as that is to #believe after 20+ years), but the first son of some other parents could #*not* have been me -- that would be somebody else altogether. OK. I understand . (I could quibble with your example of the property that \llegedly rigidly designates you, but I presume it is merely an explanatory= =20 example.) #> At any rate, I see no difference #> between Socratizer and Cat and Gold. It's also the case that Socratizer #> is, like all (?) categories, fuzzy, so one can find worlds in which #> something sort of is Socrates/Socratizer but isn't completely. # #Sharp/fuzzy, of categories, is quite different from rigid/non-rigid, #of designations.=20=20 If properties that rigidly designate are taken as defining properties of intensions, then the fuzziness enters the picture in that intensions are fuzzy (in the sense that 'membership' -- saisfaction of the criterial properties -- is a matter of degree). #But in fact I think all of these categories are sharp. #Socratizer holds of *that* particular person and nobody else;=20 But, I contend, in other worlds, Socratizer may hold of person X to 95%, of person Y to 5%, and of nobody to 100%. #Cat holds of the cat individual and nothing else;=20 I delay a response pending further explanation of this. #Gold holds of aggregates #of atoms with 79 protons and nothing else.=20=20 How about 'mud'? So in a world in which a blue liquid is composed of atoms with 79 protons (-- not at all far fetched for a Star Trek episode), this blue liquid is gold? #Linguistician, now *that's* a fuzzy category. At least you admit they exist. (Fuzzy categories, I mean.) #> I was just seeking an example #> of something that is a mere label, but am not committed to arguing that #> mere labels exist. # #Aaaak. I may start using this as my .signature. O dear. As an example of egregiously jesuitical casuistry, I fear, rather than of coruscating wit. Anyway, that Aaaak is a bit unfair. After all, if I'm trying to explain a philosophical position that I myself disagree with, I have no choice but to give examples of things that some people, but not necessarily me, believe to exist. --And.