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Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2001 17:48:23 EST
Subject: Re: [lojban] Random lojban questions/annoyances.
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In a message dated 3/20/2001 3:42:33 PM Central Standard Time,=20
rlpowell@csclub.uwaterloo.ca writes:


> <Am I the _only_ person here who doesn't believe in this whole 'objective
> reality' thing?  Or, at least, that no human being can percieve
> 'objective reality', even if it does exist?>
>=20
Well, no, since I am on this list too.  But the problem probably is to figu=
re=20
out what each of us means by "objective reality" -- and "perceive," for tha=
t=20
matter. I expect xod would join in, but with yet another set of definitions=
.=20=20
Our perceptions are influenced by a range of factors that are not now=20
external to us, but also seem, at least, to be influenced by things that ar=
e=20
external to us.  What those things are in themselves we cannot, in a sense,=
=20
know, though in another sense they have to be pretty generally what they se=
em=20
to be.  If we stress the latter point then objective reality is just the=20
agreed upon reality of the community.  If we stress the former, then=20
objective reality is unknowable and thus, may not exist (the apparently=20
external factors in perception being part of our vast unconscious).  The=20
first position turns out to make life a lot easier.

In a message dated  20 Mar 2001 14:33:24 EST xod@sixgirls.org  writes:

<assertion that "a belief without any evidence never occurs", I won't.>
>
> Again, it is not clear which point you mean, especially since none of the=
m
> seem to support your assertion.=A0 One point was that some beliefs have c=
auses
> but no evidence, another was that among those causes are other beliefs
> (typically about how to identify certain experiences), which are also not
> evidence.
Well, you cut the text away again! I can't refresh my memory! Please, take
it easier with the snipping and cutting!>

Actually, by comparison with what I sent, you cut off two lines of mine,=20
which probably contained what you wanted.  Keep copies and don't clutter th=
e=20
box with repetitions (I just got a message with 39 lines of quote and one=20
added comment, less than a line -- and it was not terribly relevant to the=
=20
quote even.  Bad form!  I now violate my own strictures in the interest of=
=20
full disclosure)

<I believe you were telling me how beliefs are based on evidence, and
evidence is always informational. And even if a belief is triggered by
sense data, it gets combined with some information before it generates a
belief. Well, this supports my assertion that "a belief without any
evidence never occurs". If you're willing to accept subliminal, unspoken,
and trivial "facts" as evidence for beliefs, then I'm home free. For
instance, the proposition that "If I see an insect fly through the air,
it's really there".

Furthermore, the English in the definition of krici is not clear if it
uses technical meaning of "evidence", not the common one. Commonly, sense d=
ata
is taken as "evidence" for a belief. For instance - belief in UFOs because
I saw 2 of them, or belief that a fly landed on my arm because I felt and
saw it land there.

In conclusion:

Using the common English definition of "evidence" (sense data or
information), there is never any belief without evidence.

Using the technical epistemological definition of "evidence"
(propositions), which includes subliminal "obvious facts", there is never
any belief without evidence.

The gismu "krici" is meaningless and should be ignored.>

Well, for starters, neither seeing a UFO nor seeing a fly or feeling it lan=
d=20
on my arm are strictly sense data.  Having a yellow patch in my visual fiel=
d=20
is -- if it ever happens, which I doubt.  And even it is not adequate to=20
justify (as evidence must) the claim that I have a yellow patch in my visua=
l=20
field, since that the patch is yellow is not a given in the experience.  Th=
e=20
belief that it is yellow then arises spontaneously: if you want to justify=
=20
it, you cannot without getting into a very short circle.Trying to push back=
=20
from this to something more basic always leads to worse problems yet, but w=
e=20
know that there must be a more basic else there would be an infinite regres=
s=20
of justifications and thus no belief would be in fact justified.  So whethe=
r=20
we use the technical or the non-technical sense, there must be beliefs that=
=20
are not justified.

But, of course, the high-seas ship-repair metaphor offers a way out.  Every=
=20
belief has a justification somewhere, but not every belief has a=20
justification that we are alowed to examine at this time.

None of this has much of anything to do with {krici}, which explicitly is=20
about the state of believing and explicitly NOT about whether the content o=
f=20
that state is justified or not, even whether it is true or not.  That it=20
might have something to do with these other factors arise from 1) the fact=
=20
that when we disagree with what someone claims to know, we fall back on=20
"believes" as a way to describe their state, since a large part of what=20
"know" adds to belief -- truth and justification, at least -- have been=20
stripped away, but not, presumably, the underlying cognitive state. And 2)=
=20
the fact that {krici} has the same grammar as {sruma} which is a very=20
different sort of critter -- though still not one that involves evidence or=
=20
truth, at least not in the same way.
{krici} is needed for psychological description and nothing else in the=20
language will do its work.  But it may not do all the work that English=20
"believe" might be made to do.



           
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<HTML><FONT FACE=3Darial,helvetica><BODY BGCOLOR=3D"#ffffff"><FONT  SIZE=3D=
2>In a message dated 3/20/2001 3:42:33 PM Central Standard Time,=20
<BR>rlpowell@csclub.uwaterloo.ca writes:
<BR>
<BR>
<BR><BLOCKQUOTE TYPE=3DCITE style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; MARGIN=
-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px">&lt;Am I the _only_ perso=
n here who doesn't believe in this whole 'objective
<BR>reality' thing? &nbsp;Or, at least, that no human being can percieve
<BR>'objective reality', even if it does exist?&gt;
<BR></BLOCKQUOTE>
<BR>Well, no, since I am on this list too. &nbsp;But the problem probably i=
s to figure=20
<BR>out what each of us means by "objective reality" -- and "perceive," for=
 that=20
<BR>matter. I expect xod would join in, but with yet another set of definit=
ions. &nbsp;
<BR>Our perceptions are influenced by a range of factors that are not now=20
<BR>external to us, but also seem, at least, to be influenced by things tha=
t are=20
<BR>external to us. &nbsp;What those things are in themselves we cannot, in=
 a sense,=20
<BR>know, though in another sense they have to be pretty generally what the=
y seem=20
<BR>to be. &nbsp;If we stress the latter point then objective reality is ju=
st the=20
<BR>agreed upon reality of the community. &nbsp;If we stress the former, th=
en=20
<BR>objective reality is unknowable and thus, may not exist (the apparently=
=20
<BR>external factors in perception being part of our vast unconscious). &nb=
sp;The=20
<BR>first position turns out to make life a lot easier.
<BR>
<BR>In a message dated &nbsp;20 Mar 2001 14:33:24 EST <I>xod@sixgirls.org <=
/I>&nbsp;writes:
<BR>
<BR>&lt;assertion that "a belief without any evidence never occurs", I won'=
t.&gt;
<BR>&gt;
<BR>&gt; Again, it is not clear which point you mean, especially since none=
 of them
<BR>&gt; seem to support your assertion.=A0 One point was that some beliefs=
 have causes
<BR>&gt; but no evidence, another was that among those causes are other bel=
iefs
<BR>&gt; (typically about how to identify certain experiences), which are a=
lso not
<BR>&gt; evidence.
<BR>Well, you cut the text away again! I can't refresh my memory! Please, t=
ake
<BR>it easier with the snipping and cutting!&gt;
<BR>
<BR>Actually, by comparison with what I sent, you cut off two lines of mine=
,=20
<BR>which probably contained what you wanted. &nbsp;Keep copies and don't c=
lutter the=20
<BR>box with repetitions (I just got a message with 39 lines of quote and o=
ne=20
<BR>added comment, less than a line -- and it was not terribly relevant to =
the=20
<BR>quote even. &nbsp;Bad form! &nbsp;I now violate my own strictures in th=
e interest of=20
<BR>full disclosure)
<BR>
<BR>&lt;I believe you were telling me how beliefs are based on evidence, an=
d
<BR>evidence is always informational. And even if a belief is triggered by
<BR>sense data, it gets combined with some information before it generates =
a
<BR>belief. Well, this supports my assertion that "a belief without any
<BR>evidence never occurs". If you're willing to accept subliminal, unspoke=
n,
<BR>and trivial "facts" as evidence for beliefs, then I'm home free. For
<BR>instance, the proposition that "If I see an insect fly through the air,
<BR>it's really there".
<BR>
<BR>Furthermore, the English in the definition of krici is not clear if it
<BR>uses technical meaning of "evidence", not the common one. Commonly, sen=
se data
<BR>is taken as "evidence" for a belief. For instance - belief in UFOs beca=
use
<BR>I saw 2 of them, or belief that a fly landed on my arm because I felt a=
nd
<BR>saw it land there.
<BR>
<BR>In conclusion:
<BR>
<BR>Using the common English definition of "evidence" (sense data or
<BR>information), there is never any belief without evidence.
<BR>
<BR>Using the technical epistemological definition of "evidence"
<BR>(propositions), which includes subliminal "obvious facts", there is nev=
er
<BR>any belief without evidence.
<BR>
<BR>The gismu "krici" is meaningless and should be ignored.&gt;
<BR>
<BR>Well, for starters, neither seeing a UFO nor seeing a fly or feeling it=
 land=20
<BR>on my arm are strictly sense data. &nbsp;Having a yellow patch in my vi=
sual field=20
<BR>is -- if it ever happens, which I doubt. &nbsp;And even it is not adequ=
ate to=20
<BR>justify (as evidence must) the claim that I have a yellow patch in my v=
isual=20
<BR>field, since that the patch is yellow is not a given in the experience.=
 &nbsp;The=20
<BR>belief that it is yellow then arises spontaneously: if you want to just=
ify=20
<BR>it, you cannot without getting into a very short circle.Trying to push =
back=20
<BR>from this to something more basic always leads to worse problems yet, b=
ut we=20
<BR>know that there must be a more basic else there would be an infinite re=
gress=20
<BR>of justifications and thus no belief would be in fact justified. &nbsp;=
So whether=20
<BR>we use the technical or the non-technical sense, there must be beliefs =
that=20
<BR>are not justified.
<BR>
<BR>But, of course, the high-seas ship-repair metaphor offers a way out. &n=
bsp;Every=20
<BR>belief has a justification somewhere, but not every belief has a=20
<BR>justification that we are alowed to examine at this time.
<BR>
<BR>None of this has much of anything to do with {krici}, which explicitly =
is=20
<BR>about the state of believing and explicitly NOT about whether the conte=
nt of=20
<BR>that state is justified or not, even whether it is true or not. &nbsp;T=
hat it=20
<BR>might have something to do with these other factors arise from 1) the f=
act=20
<BR>that when we disagree with what someone claims to know, we fall back on=
=20
<BR>"believes" as a way to describe their state, since a large part of what=
=20
<BR>"know" adds to belief -- truth and justification, at least -- have been=
=20
<BR>stripped away, but not, presumably, the underlying cognitive state. And=
 2)=20
<BR>the fact that {krici} has the same grammar as {sruma} which is a very=20
<BR>different sort of critter -- though still not one that involves evidenc=
e or=20
<BR>truth, at least not in the same way.
<BR>{krici} is needed for psychological description and nothing else in the=
=20
<BR>language will do its work. &nbsp;But it may not do all the work that En=
glish=20
<BR>"believe" might be made to do.
<BR>
<BR>
<BR></FONT></HTML>
           
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