From pycyn@aol.com Fri Mar 23 05:32:21 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_4); 23 Mar 2001 13:32:21 -0000 Received: (qmail 6530 invoked from network); 23 Mar 2001 13:32:20 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 23 Mar 2001 13:32:20 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m01.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.4) by mta3 with SMTP; 23 Mar 2001 14:33:25 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m01.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v29.5.) id r.c1.cabaf80 (7319) for ; Fri, 23 Mar 2001 08:31:50 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2001 08:31:50 EST Subject: Re: [lojban] krici To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_c1.cabaf80.27ecaa46_boundary" Content-Disposition: Inline X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10501 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 6140 --part1_c1.cabaf80.27ecaa46_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 3/22/2001 4:58:59 PM Central Standard Time, xod@sixgirls.org writes: > "evidence" has two usages. > > Usage one is the informational basis for a belief. (velji'i?) > > Usage two is the quality of the informational basis for a belief. > (jezvelji'i?) This is invoked chiefly when criticising the evidence of > another. People will say "you have no evidence for that"; a sentence > which, using usage one reads "the evidence you are using has insufficient > quality".> > Nope. For the criticism to be effective, the word has to be used in the same meaning. And here it clearly is. x is evidence for y requires at least that x be true and that it be in a support relationship to y. What the critic is saying is that one or the other of these conditions is not met. Typically, of course, it will be that the critic thinks that the claimed evidence is false, but, as in my argument here, he may also hold that the "evidence" does not support the claim, even if it is true. I freely admit that people do act as xod describes, but don't agree that that is evidence of two meanings. Indeed, the disagreement xod presents is surely going to go about the truth of the putative evidence and its logical relationship to the claim, showing that the two disputants are on the same page. Were they using different meanings, the argument would diverge radically as they pursued different relevances. What will emerge in this argument is that they simply believe different things to be true. This will become more apparent in Lojban than in English, of course, since the epistemologies involved in {jetnu} will become the focus fairly early on. I suppose you could argue that "evidence" has a different meaning for the two, but it is a "for you" / "for me" difference, not the one xod describes (though later noting that it is a "to you"/ "to me" point). xod also has an overly optimistic view of the relationship between evidence and belief (and we, in opposition, have taken an overly pessimistic one). For many people on many issues (I would say for everybody on some issues) beleive comes without (even despite) evidence, though, if pressed later, as xod does, they will come up with some piece they take to be good evidence for a position they held before they ever heard of it. Belief often leads to a search for evidence, as often as the other way round. You might find it interesting to read some of the works of Arthur Peacocke, who just won this year's Templeton Prize. He is a rather prestigious scientist and also an Anglican priest and theologian (there seem to be quite a few of those lately -- and earlier on too) and he lays out the scienist's case for theism rather well. It is, of course, the old Design Argument with all the latest frills, but it is a rather pretty case for all that. As often, xorxes has made a valuable distinction: we all agree, I think, that people almost always can give reasons for their beliefs, what they take as evidence, but xod wants to claim further that the reasons that they give the causes of their beliefs or, at least, explain why they have the beliefs they have. This, as xorxes' examples show, is often pretty clearly not the case. --part1_c1.cabaf80.27ecaa46_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 3/22/2001 4:58:59 PM Central Standard Time,
xod@sixgirls.org writes:



<Specifically, the word
"evidence" has two usages.

Usage one is the informational basis for a belief. (velji'i?)

Usage two is the quality of the informational basis for a belief.
(jezvelji'i?)  This is invoked chiefly when criticising the evidence of
another. People will say "you have no evidence for that"; a sentence
which, using usage one reads "the evidence you are using has insufficient
quality".>



Nope.  For the criticism to be effective, the word has to be used in the same
meaning.  And here it clearly is.  x is evidence for y requires at least that
x be true and that it be in a support relationship to y.  What the critic is
saying is that one or the other of these conditions is not met.  Typically,
of course, it will be that the critic thinks that the claimed evidence is
false, but, as in my argument here, he may also hold that the "evidence" does
not support the claim, even if it is true.  I freely admit that people do act
as xod describes, but don't agree that that is evidence of two meanings.  
Indeed, the disagreement xod presents is surely going to go about the truth
of the putative evidence and its logical relationship to the claim, showing
that the two disputants are on the same page.  Were they using different
meanings, the argument would diverge radically as they pursued different
relevances.  What will emerge in this argument is that they simply believe
different things to be true.  This will become more apparent in Lojban than
in English, of course, since the epistemologies involved in {jetnu} will
become the focus fairly early on.  I suppose you could argue that "evidence"
has a different meaning for the two, but it is a "for you" / "for me"
difference, not the one xod describes (though later noting that it is a "to
you"/ "to me" point).

xod also has an overly optimistic view of the relationship between evidence
and belief
(and we, in opposition, have taken an overly pessimistic one).  For many
people on many issues (I would say for everybody on some issues) beleive
comes without (even despite) evidence, though, if pressed later, as xod does,
they will come up with some piece they take to be good evidence for a
position they held before they ever heard of it.  Belief often leads to a
search for evidence, as often as the other way round.

You might find it interesting to read some of the works of Arthur Peacocke,
who just won this year's Templeton Prize.  He is a rather prestigious
scientist and also an Anglican priest and theologian (there seem to be quite
a few of those lately -- and earlier on too) and he lays out the scienist's
case for theism rather well.  It is, of course, the old Design Argument with
all the latest frills, but it is a rather pretty case for all that.

As often, xorxes has made a valuable distinction:  we all agree, I think,
that people almost always can give reasons for their beliefs, what they take
as evidence, but xod wants to claim further that the reasons that they give
the causes of their beliefs or, at least, explain why they have the beliefs
they have.  This, as xorxes' examples show, is often pretty clearly not the
case. --part1_c1.cabaf80.27ecaa46_boundary--