From pycyn@aol.com Tue Mar 20 07:23:54 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_4); 20 Mar 2001 15:23:53 -0000 Received: (qmail 39191 invoked from network); 20 Mar 2001 15:23:52 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l9.egroups.com with QMQP; 20 Mar 2001 15:23:52 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m09.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.164) by mta2 with SMTP; 20 Mar 2001 15:23:52 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m09.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v29.5.) id r.c.12d096cd (3896) for ; Tue, 20 Mar 2001 10:23:42 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2001 10:23:42 EST Subject: RE: krici (and hath been slave to thousands) To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_c.12d096cd.27e8cffe_boundary" Content-Disposition: Inline X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10501 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 6061 --part1_c.12d096cd.27e8cffe_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit English is actually better than Lojban for distinguishing belief from assumption. Two idioms serve to point toward the difference. We *have* beliefs, we *make* assumptions. There is nothing odd about saying "I am assuming that," whereas "I am believing that," when said by a native speaker rather than an Indian (dot) can almost only be a Method actor describing his preparation for playing the part of a believer. The short of all this is that believing is a state, assuming is an activity. Furthermore (and not quite as a consequence), assuming is volitional, believing is not. We can choose to assume and be doing it immediately. We cannot exactly choose to believe at all, though we use that locution for choosing to come to believe. But it takes working at to achieve the state (see the comments by Pascal in The Wager pensee and GO Archbishop Michael's advice to a priest who could not honestly say the Creed: "Say the Creed." Also all of Existentialism). In other cases, we believe whether we want to or not-- the yellow patch, for example. Thirdly, assumptions have purposes, generally to help understand something, but often more precise ones ("for the sake of argument" we say, to "to prove the contrary", etc.). Beliefs don't. The problem with Lojban is that {sruma} lacks a place for the purpose, giving it the same place structure as {krici} (I pass over the picky-ass problem that the third place is just a subject-raising from the second as irrelevant at the moment. And equally applicable to both preds.) That means that an assumption is justified by its success, while a belief is justified by its evidence, if it has any, or by its foundational nature (i.e., that it is caused by a primary experience). An assumption is rejected (given up), if it doesn't do its job; a belief is rejected if the evidence doesn't support it (but, notice, this may not stop our believing -- it may just throw us into a credal oscillation or lead us to reject the evidence). To be sure, what counts as evidence for a belief may be important for an assumption, since it may be that the explanation the assumption (probably called a hypothesis by now) is trying to facilitate involves the integration of these facts into a greater whole. But this is a very different role from being a support, which is the relation between evidence and belief. --part1_c.12d096cd.27e8cffe_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit English is actually better than Lojban for distinguishing belief from
assumption. Two idioms serve to point toward the difference. We *have*
beliefs, we *make* assumptions. There is nothing odd about saying "I am
assuming that," whereas "I am believing that," when said by a native speaker
rather than an Indian (dot) can almost only be a Method actor describing his
preparation for playing the part of a believer.
The short of all this is that believing is a state, assuming is an activity.
Furthermore (and not quite as a consequence), assuming is volitional,
believing is not. We can choose to assume and be doing it immediately. We
cannot exactly choose to believe at all, though we use that locution for
choosing to come to believe. But it takes working at to achieve the state
(see the comments by Pascal in The Wager pensee and GO Archbishop Michael's
advice to a priest who could not honestly say the Creed: "Say the Creed."
Also all of Existentialism). In other cases, we believe whether we want to
or not-- the yellow patch, for example.
Thirdly, assumptions have purposes, generally to help understand something,
but often more precise ones ("for the sake of argument" we say, to "to prove
the contrary", etc.). Beliefs don't. The problem with Lojban is that
{sruma} lacks a place for the purpose, giving it the same place structure as
{krici} (I pass over the picky-ass problem that the third place is just a
subject-raising from the second as irrelevant at the moment. And equally
applicable to both preds.) That means that an assumption is justified by its
success, while a belief is justified by its evidence, if it has any, or by
its foundational nature (i.e., that it is caused by a primary experience).
An assumption is rejected (given up), if it doesn't do its job; a belief is
rejected if the evidence doesn't support it (but, notice, this may not stop
our believing -- it may just throw us into a credal oscillation or lead us to
reject the evidence). To be sure, what counts as evidence for a belief may
be important for an assumption, since it may be that the explanation the
assumption (probably called a hypothesis by now) is trying to facilitate
involves the integration of these facts into a greater whole. But this is a
very different role from being a support, which is the relation between
evidence and belief. --part1_c.12d096cd.27e8cffe_boundary--