From pycyn@aol.com Wed Sep 26 16:44:29 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_3_2_2); 26 Sep 2001 23:44:29 -0000 Received: (qmail 87217 invoked from network); 26 Sep 2001 23:44:29 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 26 Sep 2001 23:44:29 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-r09.mx.aol.com) (152.163.225.105) by mta2 with SMTP; 26 Sep 2001 23:44:27 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-r09.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v31_r1.7.) id r.f7.ff08894 (25715) for ; Wed, 26 Sep 2001 19:44:24 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 19:44:23 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_f7.ff08894.28e3c257_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10535 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 11088 --part1_f7.ff08894.28e3c257_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 9/26/2001 3:49:43 PM Central Daylight Time,=20 jcowan@reutershealth.com writes: > Your examples are thought-provoking, but unfortunately for you > tend to push me in the other way: "believe" is just inherently a > fuzzy notion, I now think, and there's simply no way to draw > the line between "X believes p" and "X would believe p if he > had a clue" and "X will come to believe p if jogged a bit." I think this misses the point a little:"had a clue" is way short of what=20 epistemologists seem to want (indeed, they tend to go unconditional on this= ):=20 "follows from what he believes" really does seem to be it. And I don't thi= nk=20 there are any cases. A more interesting contrast is between the ones we ar= e=20 willing to concede he knew all along once we get him to say (or do) the=20 appropriate thing and the ones that we insist he just figured out, even=20 though the premises were there all along. But basically I fall in with you= r=20 next line: <> In short, "{p | John believes p} is a prototypical category. > Prototype beliefs include "Aristarchus believed the > sun was at the center of the universe" and "I believe I have > money in my pocket", but what to do with "Jim (a mouse) > believes that Tom (a cat) will catch him and eat him" is a puzzlement.> The answer seems to lie in Dennett's notion of a belief, that is, a=20 behavioral category, more or less, plus some anthropomorphism: Jim behaves= =20 the way I would if I believed that and was Jim's size and savor -- and othe= r=20 faculties. > Dennett makes some distinction between beliefs and opinions, > which is not krici/jinvi, but if I understand it is about what > we act on vs. what we are willing to assent to: Jim has > beliefs but not opinions (Mickey has both); I have both; > there are many more beliefs than opinions; almost all > beliefs are true, on pain of nonsurvival; opinions can be true > or false without very grave consequences much of the time. >=20 Actually, when Dan is consistent (and coherent) he would admit that most=20 believes may well be false but they fit together to give a good functional= =20 grasp of the world -- different falsehoods cancelling one another out, as i= t=20 were. He can be a fairly intelligible Pragmatist when pressed and not on=20 display (so, of course, what he means by true is something else again too -= -=20 I am translating). this belief-opinion distinction is a nice one and worht= y=20 of Lojbanization, but I don't know just how to do it efficiently. <> Suppose we=20 > did have a good indirect test for beliefs so that we could check out=20 > your belief about a jack-tax without calling the issue to your mind [...] Shades of Smullyan's experimental epistemologist, whose machine gives him access to the physiological correlates of people's brain states.=A0 With the machine, he knows whether or not something seems red to you -- but he gets into trouble when he applies the machine to his own mind, and learns that he may be going crazy.> Ray likes to push stock characters to the extreme. I assume one aspect of h= is=20 going crazy is that he thinks he can tell when something seems red to you o= r=20 rather when someone may be going crazy. --part1_f7.ff08894.28e3c257_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 9/26/2001 3:49:43 PM Central Daylight Time, jcowan@reu= tershealth.com writes:


Your examples are thought= -provoking, but unfortunately for you
tend to push me in the other way:  "believe" is just inherently a
fuzzy notion, I now think, and there's simply no way to draw
the line between "X believes p" and "X would believe p if he
had a clue" and "X will come to believe p if jogged a bit."


I think this misses the point a little:"had a clue" is way short of wha= t epistemologists seem to want (indeed, they tend to go unconditional on th= is): "follows from what he believes" really does seem to be it.  And I= don't think there are any cases.  A more interesting contrast is betw= een the ones we are willing to concede he knew all along once we get him to= say (or do) the appropriate thing and the ones that we insist he just figu= red out, even though the premises  were there all along. But basically= I fall in with your next line:

<
In short= , "{p | John believes p} is a prototypical category.
Prototype beliefs include "Aristarchus believed the
sun was at the center of the universe" and "I believe I have
money in my pocket", but what to do with "Jim (a mouse)
believes that Tom (a cat) will catch him and eat him" is a puzzlement.&= gt;

The answer seems to lie in Dennett's notion of a belief, that is, a beh= avioral category, more or less, plus some anthropomorphism: Jim behaves the= way I would if I believed that and was Jim's size and savor -- and other f= aculties.

Dennett makes some distin= ction between beliefs and opinions,
which is not krici/jinvi, but if I understand it is about what
we act on vs. what we are willing to assent to:  Jim has
beliefs but not opinions (Mickey has both); I have both;
there are many more beliefs than opinions; almost all
beliefs are true, on pain of nonsurvival; opinions can be true
or false without very grave consequences much of the time.

Actually, when Dan is consistent (and coherent) he would admit that mos= t believes may well be false but they fit together to give a good functiona= l grasp of the world -- different falsehoods cancelling one another out, as= it were.  He can be a fairly intelligible Pragmatist when pressed and= not on display (so, of course, what he means by true is something else aga= in too -- I am translating).  this belief-opinion distinction is a nic= e one and worhty of Lojbanization, but I don't know just how to do it effic= iently.

<> Suppose we=20
> did have a good indirect test for beliefs so that we could check o= ut=20
> your belief about a jack-tax without calling the issue to your min= d [...]


Shades of Smullyan's experimental epistemologist, whose machine
gives him access to the physiological correlates of people's brain
states.=A0 With the machine, he knows whether or not something seems
red to you -- but he gets into trouble when he applies the machine
to his own mind, and learns that he may be going crazy.>

Ray likes to push stock characters to the extreme. I assume one aspect = of his going crazy is that he thinks he can tell when something seems red t= o you or rather when someone may be going crazy.

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