From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Tue Sep 25 10:14:54 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_3_2_2); 25 Sep 2001 17:14:53 -0000 Received: (qmail 87336 invoked from network); 25 Sep 2001 17:01:29 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by 10.1.1.222 with QMQP; 25 Sep 2001 17:01:29 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3) by mta1 with SMTP; 25 Sep 2001 17:01:29 -0000 Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer); Tue, 25 Sep 2001 17:39:05 +0100 Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Tue, 25 Sep 2001 18:10:05 +0100 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2 Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 18:09:38 +0100 To: pycyn , lojban Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline From: And Rosta X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 11031 pc: #arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: #> #But then next morning, looking at it again, I see that it is very=20 #> different,=20 #> #for I doubt that John (even this one) even thinks about "the extension = of=20 #> "=20 #> #some property. In fact, I doubt that most people, who use indirect=20 #> question=20 #> #all the time, would even understand the locution. So, if the property = is=20 #> #within the scope of the believing, where, because of intensioonality, = it=20 #> has=20 #> #to be that property and not something incidentally equivalent to it, th= en=20 #> I=20 #> #would say that it was very rarely the case that anyone had an opinion=20 #> about=20 #> #who the first American President was. But, of course, the other versio= n,=20 #> #which moves the property outside still works ok. #>=20 #> Jorge raised this objection at the time that I originally made the propo= sal. #> My answer is that if the extension-claim analysis correctly characterize= s #> the logic of indirect questions, then if John knows that 'Bill' is the=20 #> answer #> to 'Who went', then John knows that {Bill} is the extension of the #> category of goers. # #Well, it is quite possible that John knows that Bill went, without knowing= =20 #that "Bill" is the answer to the question "Who went?" for the very reason = you=20 #note later, that he never thought of the question. It is also not at all= =20 #clear that the equation of the two things John knows works intensionally. As I said in my previous message, the problem applies to djuno and jinvi/kr= ici generally -- the "John knows/believes Bill is not king of France" ambiguity= . So I won't accept this as a fault specifically of the extension-claim analy= sis. #The first problem does offer some evidence for the set-of-answers theory,= =20 #since even if John never thinks of the question "Who went?" he does know t= he=20 #answer to that question, since "Bill went" is just that answer. I suspect= =20 #that this fact can be mechanically transformed into an extension-claim=20 #version, though doing so makes the analysis more wordy apparently. (The=20 #second problem does not arise for set-of-answers.) # # # #This seem complex compares to {la djan djuno lo du'u la bil patfu makau},= =20 True, but I don't accept complexity and wordiness as a valid standard of comparison. We've already discussed the incommensurability of the analyses. #which says he knows some, but not necessarily all, the answers. That it m= ay=20 #turn out to be all is an open case.=20=20 Okay. "Bill knows who went" normally means Bill knows every answer, i.e. {la djan djuno ro du'u la bil patfu makau}, on the set-of-answers inte= rpretation. #I suppose the simplicity is in the lack=20 #of unpacking, but set-of-answers doen't need much unpacking, since it stay= s=20 #at about the same level, without metalanguage: da poi cmima lo'i du'u la b= il=20 #patfu makau zo'u la djan djuno da #Notice that there appears to be no de-intensionalization problem here. True, but the deintensionalization problem is a general one, and the genera= l solution will extend to the extension-claim analysis. # # #Your version seems to say merely that John knows "Bill is the father of ..= ."=20 #has an extension, which seems a) not likely to be somehting John thought o= f,=20 #and, b) if he did -- or if you want it not to matter that he did, is too=20 #trivial to help explain what "John knows who Bill is the father of" means.= I=20 #think that something ahs to be done with that floating {de} to make any se= nse=20 #at all and I don't feel comfortable enough with the extesnion-claim format= to=20 #suggest what that something might be. You're right. It should be: de da poi ke'a du'u de -extension tu'odu'u la bil patfu ce'u zo'u la djan= =20 djuno da But let's not get too hung up on this, or accept it as a valid solution. Fi= rst off I want to know how to render the two readings of "John knows/believes t= hat Bill is not king of France" -- the intensional reading (which is the curren= t Lojban one) and the extensional reading, where John's beliefs are such that were t= hey true, Bill would not be king of France. --And.