From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Wed Sep 26 05:36:08 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_3_2_2); 26 Sep 2001 12:36:08 -0000 Received: (qmail 98634 invoked from network); 26 Sep 2001 12:36:07 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l9.egroups.com with QMQP; 26 Sep 2001 12:36:07 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3) by mta1 with SMTP; 26 Sep 2001 12:36:07 -0000 Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer); Wed, 26 Sep 2001 13:13:32 +0100 Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Wed, 26 Sep 2001 13:44:32 +0100 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2 Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 13:44:05 +0100 To: lojban Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline From: And Rosta X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 11059 >>> 09/25/01 10:28pm >>> #arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: #> #Well, it is quite possible that John knows that Bill went, without know= ing=20 #> #that "Bill" is the answer to the question "Who went?" for the very reas= on=20 #> you=20 #> #note later, that he never thought of the question. It is also not at a= ll=20 #> #clear that the equation of the two things John knows works intensionall= y. #>=20 #> As I said in my previous message, the problem applies to djuno and=20 #> jinvi/krici #> generally -- the "John knows/believes Bill is not king of France" ambigu= ity. #> So I won't accept this as a fault specifically of the extension-claim=20 # #The point is that the set-of-answers theory does not have this problem in = the=20 #case of questions -- or, at least, has it in what seems a more tractable=20 #form. This needs a bit more work, perhaps, but it can deal with some of = the=20 #indirect question problems that seem to raise this issue on the=20 #extension-claim view, without raising the messy questions. An advantage, = I=20 #think. # # # #I am not perfectly sure about that, though it seems likely. But I think i= ts=20 #likelihood is Gricean, full disclosure of all relevant information you kno= w.=20=20 #I have no trouble imagining situation where I would give a "know" for less= =20 #than perfect information (knowing where someone lives if it get the right= =20 #town, for example). And isn't it nice of Lojban to allow for these useful= =20 #distinctions that are so hard in English? # #<#Notice that there appears to be no de-intensionalization problem here. # #True, but the deintensionalization problem is a general one, and the gener= al #solution will extend to the extension-claim analysis.> # #I'm not sure it will, since you keep having to fall back into intensional= =20 #context "is a property/ proposition that..." and set-of-answers does not. # #<#Notice that there appears to be no de-intensionalization problem here. # #True, but the deintensionalization problem is a general one, and the gener= al #solution will extend to the extension-claim analysis.> # #But the old, "does John really have thoughts about the extensions of=20 #properties?" problem is still there, and it doesn't arise if all that is=20 #claimed is that there is something that is in fact an answer to "Who is Bi= ll=20 #father to?" and that John knows. # # #You'll be reieved to know that I am not and do not. And worry a bit about = you. I understand & agree that the intensionality problem does not arise with th= e set of answers analysis. However, since this problem is a general problem of all cognitive predicates, it is hardly a defect of the extension-claim a= nalysis that it patterns with other cognitive predicates and, accordingly, suffers = from the intensionality problem. # # Well, this is not a problem about indirect questions, since it does not s= eem=20 #to arise for my theory, so I think I'll skip it, after asking "in what=20 #language am I to render these?" since that seems a crucial question for ho= w=20 #to do it.=20=20 render in Lojban #Notice, by the way, that if John knows that Bill is not the king=20 #of France, that is enough to guarantee that Bill is not the king of France= .=20=20 #So the issue is about belief only. But then I do not understand it, for=20 #clearly, if John's belief that Bill is not the king of France is true, the= n=20 #Bill is not the king of France. My turn to be missing something here. = =20 #Expatiate, please. For example, if John believes that there is no king of France and if that belief is true, then it follows that Bill is not king of France. So in the 'extensional' sense Bill believes that Bill is not king of France, even if John has never thought "Bill is not king of France". For John to believe that in the 'intensional' sense, J must have thought "B is not king of France". Likewise for the example "J believes/knows 34567891234234521234353642 is not prime". --And.