From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Wed Oct 31 07:51:32 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_0_1); 31 Oct 2001 15:51:32 -0000 Received: (qmail 17894 invoked from network); 31 Oct 2001 15:51:31 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l7.egroups.com with QMQP; 31 Oct 2001 15:51:31 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3) by mta1 with SMTP; 31 Oct 2001 15:51:31 -0000 Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer); Wed, 31 Oct 2001 15:28:07 +0000 Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Wed, 31 Oct 2001 16:02:41 +0000 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2 Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 16:02:37 +0000 To: lojban Subject: Re: [lojban] observatives & a construal of lo'e & le'e Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline From: And Rosta X-Yahoo-Profile: andjamin X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 11807 >>> 10/31/01 01:20am >>> # # #Since the normal meaning of {zo'e} (if that locution has any sense at all)= is=20 #"the obvious thing," the observative use seem perfectly normal. Context = may=20 #force the "currently observed" meaning or some other, just as it always do= es. But in this case we do not need to say that there is any observative convention for elided x1 of main bridi. We can say simply that overt and covert/elided zo'e mean "the obvious thing" -- and of course sometimes (and perhaps the default in the absence of prior textual context) the obvious thing will be something in the immediate environment of the discourse. #<#{lo gerku} could mean "Lo! A dog", while {le gerku} could mean ##"Lo! The dog".> ## ##Well, it is not a sentence, and I suspect a bit of subconscious punning t= o=20 ##get to this reading (it was surely present when the idea was first presen= ted=20 ##-- so far as I know -- in '76 or so).=20=20 # #I don't understand the punning.> # #Lo (gadri and voici) doh! #<#Oddly, the object of observation is always {le} by definition, so the pu= n=20 #fails. # #"lo! the dog" =3D "le gerku is here" #"lo! a dog" =3D "here, da gerku" # #For the latter, the object of observation is not a dog but a soa of there= =20 #being a dog.>=20=20 #MMfpfhmpf! I'm sure you meant something by this but the combination of=20 #macreons and impossible translations and the word "soa" (in what language = or=20 #short for what I cannot tell) lost the point completely. Sorry -- I was tired and being lazy. "soa" =3D state-of-affairs. For my part, I don't know what a macreon is. I've checked oed online and m-w.com & find nothing. And there were no macrons in my text, so the obvious typo sheds no light. "Macaronics" might make some sense, but that would require some seriously bad fingerwork on the keyboard... #=20=20 # #Well, I'm glad we agree on how it works and whether it is good that it doe= s.=20=20 #As to whether it is exceptional, that is going to depend on things we just= =20 #don't agree on, like where there are bridi in sentences and what is in the= m=20 #and what the rules are about quantifiers in them (indeed, whether there ar= e=20 #rules of this sort). However, a flip through some notes shows that the po= int=20 #about sumti with {tu'a} has been made repeatedly since the invention of=20 #{tu'a} (and before as part of the argument for it, once subject rasing was= =20 #acknowledged) in threads with topics like "subject raising", "intensional= =20 #contexts," "unicorn hunting," "I want a nail," and probably many others. If you think that it was a settled point, pointers to the messages that set= tled it would be helpful. But I think it's better to leave it till the Elephant,= because it's a big topic. # # #Since those topics tend to occur at least once a year, "relatively attenti= ve"=20 #seems unsupported (the more so since you were often a participant in the=20 #discussions). I have more faith in my attentiveness than in my memory. I usually have a good grasp & memory of the very recent history of current discussions, but am aware that this fades. I find it very hard to get useful results from s= earching the=20 archives; for example, I tried searching on "tu'a" and "quantifier" and "sc= ope" but found nothing relevant. Google seems to do slightly better, but still t= urns up=20 nothing relevant. # # #Others have done significantly better and you might have copied them or at= =20 #least referenced them. Most of them actually do agree with me on the cruc= ial=20 #point, that what separates the occasional good prototype theory from the=20 #dreck is having a clear sense of what the relation is between prototype an= d=20 #version, something you have singularly failed to provide.=20=20 What's the point of me referencing a literature that you seem to be familia= r with? Anyway, off the top of my head I can't think of anything that has str= uck me as a really good intro to prototype theory, the sort of intro that would make sense to people imbued with logic and traditional categorization. #As for having=20 #their own gadri, they may well have their own predicates but it remains to= be=20 #shown that there is any need for a special gadri for prototypes: why not j= ust=20 #{lo prototype of}? {lo pa prototype of lo'i broda} or {lo pa prototype of tu'o du'u ce'u broda= }, I suppose. Well, the answer to "Why not just that" is the frequent one: becau= se it's too verbose. It gives {le} and {lei} an unfair advantage, and nobody's going to bother saying {lo pa prototype of tu'o du'u ce'u broda}. Also, {lo= 'e} and {le'e} are effectively spare, because they're poorly understood, little used and in little demand, and I opine that my construal at one and the same time is both pretty compatible with the official line and turns them i= nto gadri that would be very useful and often used (by those with a taste for them). #<# ## ##Whoa! You can (or could in certain situations) see, touch and smell ME, = but=20 ##I am not a me prototype in any interesting sense.=20=20 # #Yes, you are.> # #Of what? Me? No, I am all of me, not a prototype or a version either. Y= ou=20 #can call worm theory prototype theory if you want, but calling a dog's tai= l a=20 #leg doesn't make it a leg. They are structurally very different. Then use a search-and-replace editor to change "leg" to "tail". Or make the necessary mental adjustments. I don't know "worm theory" and indeed have never heard of it. I simply assumed that you were talking about the constru= al of individuals as strands of spacetime. By my understanding of things, every individual has versions of it. Anythin= g that has versions is a prototype. Every prototype is an individual. So ther= e is no=20 distinction between an individual and a prototype or a prototype of an individual.=20 #<#That works for an individual, but not for a natural kind (let=20 ##alone a {le} group). This is not coming across as an ontology now, so muc= h=20 as=20 ##a verbal formula that covers several ontologies that inherently have noth= ing=20 ##to do with one another. That judgment may turn out to be wrong (see=20 ##Lesniewski's mereology), but it sure needs a lot of work to make it=20 #plausible. # #I think you're setting unreasonably high philosophical standards here.> # #My standard is about as low as possible and still be a standard. Tell me = how=20 #prototype theory works to explain {lo'e gerku} in a way that gets it right= =20 #and that does not depend upon alaready knowing everything needed about lo'= e=20 #gerku. That is, show me that prototype theory provides an explanation,=20 #rather than an obfuscation. If this is the lowest possible standard, then you are setting too many stan= dards. I will restate the essence of my proposals: 1. In an ontology without categories that are distinct from individuals, lo= 'e/le'e give you a way to refer to individuals that don't exist in the ontology exp= ressed by the other gadri. 2. In trying to grock the categoryless ontology, it's quite easy to see how= things=20 we normally think of as individuals can be conceptualized as categories, an= d then to reverse that perception, but its harder to see how things we normal= ly think of as categories can be conceptualized as individuals. 3. Nevertheless, that ontology has many adherents, and it's not hard to gra= sp the essence of, even if it is hard to reason about. Furthermore, it is usef= ul in linguistic expression and, in other languages, used. # #Where? Not in any of your remarks so far. And it certainly does not seem= ot=20 #be {lo'e} # #A large part of the reason for the negative answer above # #< Is their conceptual essence adequately understood? Yes.>=20 #Again, aside from your assurance (poorly evidenced) that you understand it= --=20 #and a bunch of other anonymous folk do too -- no evidence has been present= ed,=20 #not even a coherent description (though several incompatible partial ones)= . I don't see how I could reply to any of this except by repeating myself. So= we will have to leave it at you being unpersuaded. #<#What is the relation between the prototype and the version by virtue of= =20 which=20 ##the version is a version of the prototype, rather than something else. # #Ah. Resemblance, is the usual answer.> # #Yes, it has been since Plato, and has been recognizably inadequate since=20 #then, too (even Flatsy his own self noticed it). Any two things resemble = one=20 #another -- and are different from one another, what describes the relevant= =20=20 #resemblance and dfifferences here? Responding, rather than replying, I think part of the problem is that you a= re a philosopher rather than a linguist. So our exchange can be caricatured as: LINGUIST: X occurs in language and is useful in them. Therefore let us have X in Lojban. PHILOSOPHER: But X makes no sense. Therefore let us not have X in Lojban. LINGUIST: It makes enough sense for it to be useful in linguistic expressio= n, and therefore it merits a place in Lojban. The philosophical investigation = of it can follow. PHILOSOPHER: Nothing so imperfectly (incoherently and incompletely) understood merits a place in Lojban. In fact, the actual debate is not about meriting a place in Lojban but about meriting a place in Lojban as a *gadri*. #<#<#and of course means that=20 ###the individual has properties that none of its versions has and=20 ##conversely).=20=20 ## ##I think this is held (by prototype theorists) to not be the case. I would= =20 ##favour ##going along with that view in the interpretation of {lo'e broda}, and tak= ing ##{lo'e/tu'o du'u ce'u broda} to be the Platonic essence.> ## ##Yes, but HOW would they do it?=20=20 # #sorry -- do what?> #Explain the relation between prototype and version, such that the differen= ces=20 #did not matter. I still don't understand what exactly you're asking, but I think it is safe= to say that whatever the question, I could not supply any answer you would find=20 satisfactory. # #Well, I use what I need. Notice that set-of-answers question theory invol= ves=20 #a nice chunk of prototypes essentially -- the answers which syntactically= =20 #match the question and factually meet the preconditions: the versions are = (as=20 #usual) all the semo-pragmatic contextuallly licit variants -- maybe includ= ing=20 #translations (let's leave them out). # # # #Maybe if I know what the capital letter and the odd syntax meant, I would = be=20 #a bit better off. Can you explain that at least? The short answer in=20 #Lojban, as you know, is that you don't avoid quantifiers but treating a=20 #category as an individual is dirt simple (at least compared to treating an= =20 #individual as an individual). Finding a gadri that really caught a real=20 #individual (assuming that there are some) seems much more pressing than th= e=20 #other problems. Sets seem to be the only idnividuals that are recotnized= =20 #unequivocally in Lojban. What is the dirt simple method of treating a category as an individual? You want me to explain what the capital letter and odd syntax mean. The best I can do is give you an example and (in vain) hope you can accept=20 that in principle it could be analogized from even if in practise that migh= t=20 be difficult in some cases. Take the predicate cuktrxamleta, "is a textual version of the play Hamlet". Well then, lo'e cuktrxamleta refers to the play Hamlet. It is synonymous with the English word _Hamlet_. # # #But then context has to decide. You keep moving in cases where context sa= ys=20 #we aren't shifting at all (and, indeed, where there is no context and henc= e=20 #no movement). #People do need to brush up on their Grice a bit in these discussions, rath= er=20 #than picking examples out of the blue and insisting that they show somethi= ng=20 #"on certain construals". What do they mean in the context provided or in = the=20 #normal context? I don't know which examples you mean. The "on certain construals" move is a normal gambit among linguists; it is assumed in such cases that one's=20 interlocutor will find it reasonably easy to cast around in their mind for = a=20 context that makes the construal plausible. If you cast around and can't find such a context it is reasonable to ask for one. --And.