From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Tue Oct 30 07:20:51 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_0_1); 30 Oct 2001 15:20:50 -0000 Received: (qmail 61367 invoked from network); 30 Oct 2001 15:20:49 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 30 Oct 2001 15:20:49 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3) by mta2 with SMTP; 30 Oct 2001 15:20:49 -0000 Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer); Tue, 30 Oct 2001 14:57:09 +0000 Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Tue, 30 Oct 2001 15:31:38 +0000 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2 Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 15:30:57 +0000 To: jjllambias , lojban Subject: Re: [lojban] a construal of lo'e & le'e Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline From: And Rosta X-Yahoo-Profile: andjamin X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 11771 >>> Jorge Llambias 10/30/01 02:01am >>> #la pycyn cusku di'e #> > I am not commenting on the lo'e/le'e construal because I agree #> > with it completely. #> #>With whose version, and if with And's, can you explain it, please? # #I doubt I could make a better job of it than he did, I found #his exposition clear enough. # #> (The last #>round he said that {lo'e broda} was abstract # #Is {lo'e broda}, construed as "the typical", abstract? I think #the prototype/myopic-singular is as abstract or not as is the typical. #I have no problem with {lo'e tanxe cu dacti}, "boxes are material #objects", and I suppose you wouldn't object to saying that "the #typical box is a material object", so are they material objects #or are they abstract? On the other hand, there certainly is #abstraction going on when thinking of the generic/prototype/ #myopically singular box, as much as in thinking of the average #box. This is what I meant. The referent of {lo'e tanxe} is something you can see and touch, so is not abstract, unlike anything that is {du'u ce'u tanxe}, but one way of arriving at a conceptual representation of {lo'e tanxe} is through a process of *abstracting* away from the differences between individual boxes. So if I said that {lo'e broda} is an abstraction (I can't remember whether I did, but I might have done), I meant that it can be cognized through a process of abstraction, not that it is not concrete.=20 #>but did not have properties that #>no broda had!) # #I think it can have properties that no broda has by itself. #For example, we can talk about it when not talking about #any broda by itself. Personally, I'm agnostic on this one. Are there properties Jorge can have that no particular version of Jorge (e.g. the young Jorge, the tired Jorge) has? If yes, then yes. If no, then no. But I do think the answer from prototype theory (and I have to say that I don't know of (m)any attempts to create formal logics of prototype theory) would say that every property of the prototype would be a property of some instance of it, if it has instances, and that in the case of apparent counterexamples, like being talked about, the thing being talked about is the concept/idea of the prototype, rather than the prototype itself. --And.