From a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com Sun Oct 28 11:11:09 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_0_1); 28 Oct 2001 19:11:09 -0000 Received: (qmail 25514 invoked from network); 28 Oct 2001 19:11:07 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by m8.onelist.org with QMQP; 28 Oct 2001 19:11:07 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO mta05-svc.ntlworld.com) (62.253.162.45) by mta3 with SMTP; 28 Oct 2001 19:11:03 -0000 Received: from andrew ([62.255.41.139]) by mta05-svc.ntlworld.com (InterMail vM.4.01.03.00 201-229-121) with SMTP id <20011028191100.XOMO490.mta05-svc.ntlworld.com@andrew> for ; Sun, 28 Oct 2001 19:11:00 +0000 Reply-To: To: "Lojban@Yahoogroups. Com" Subject: RE: [lojban] a construal of lo'e & le'e Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2001 19:10:13 -0000 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 From: "And Rosta" X-Yahoo-Profile: andjamin X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 11707 John: > And Rosta scripsit: > > > The definition > > of some brivla includes a specification of the individuating properties > > of a single instance of the category, while the definition of others > > does not not include such a specification, and these are the 'intrinsic > > masses'. So yes, "djacu" is not "water" but "a portion of water", but > > there is no specification of what does or does not count as, say, two > > portions of water. > > It's true that tigers have skins that delimit them, whereas water generally > doesn't, but when one says "le djacu" it is, or should be, fairly clear > what sort of volume is intended: a drop, a cup, a lake, or what have you. > It would be tres bizarre to talk of "lo djacu" to mean some > cubic meter of water in the North Atlantic as of June 24, 1999, > unless of course there was some reason to talk about it particularly (= le). The point I was making that any arbitrary subdivision of loi djacu counts equally well as pa djacu, re djacu, ci djacu, truthconditionally, while this is not true for remna. Hence we have no trouble in thinking of loi djacu as an individual djacu, while the idea of thinking of loi remna as an individual remna is one that is hard to grasp. > > (b) JCB's conception of these matters has not transferred to the > > Lojban (or even Loglan, maybe) community in general. > > Well, it's transferred to me, and so much the worse for the community. :-) In your descriptions, as in current Loglan documentation, only the collectivity interpretation is presented, not the categorial individual/myopic singular interp. I only encounter mention of the latter from veterans of Loglan days. > > "Man". "man" in English can't mean much besides output of what > > Jackendoff calls the 'universal grinder' -- "after the traffic > accident there > > was man all over the pavement". Bare count nouns can't usually be generics: > > "Man" is a lexically-specific exception. > > Seems more bizarre than that: "The lion lives in Africa" can be generic, but > "The man lives in Africa" has to be specific. True. > > Typo. Should have been {re da kanla loi remna}. > > As I think someone pointed out, that doesn't quite fly either, > because the da is > bound too early, so all of loi remna ends up sharing just two eyes. > loi remna cu se kanla re da probably works. I gave the example as false statement, in contrast to {re da kanla lo'e remna}, which is true. > > "le'e" does NOT mean "the stereotypical"; the mahoste is wrong. > > Also, altho Woldy says "le'e is to le'i as lo'e is to lo'i", the actual > > examples are wrong: they're consistent with the meaning "the stereotypical", > > Ah, but that's the gimmick: stereotypes, in the ordinary sense, are > generally true of *some* subset of the total set. For example, it is > a stereotype about poodles that they are small. In fact, this is only > true of miniature poodles: so-called "standard poodles" are rather large dogs. > But it is fair to say that le'e -poodle cu cmalu, because the > categorial individual *of the in-mind poodle category* is, in fact, small. > Ditto with the Greek-Americans etc. I will grant you that every reference to a stereotype could be said with le'e, but not vice versa. Not every le'e broda is the stereotype of lo'i broda (or "lo'e du'u ce'u broda", or however it is we refer to categories). > > And another important point: conceptualizing lo'e/le'e as "the typical" > > (or "the statistically average") creates scope contrasts that arise when > > they are conceptualized as a myopic singulars/categorial individuals: > > > > lo'e cinfo cu xabju le friko > > mi'a tavla fi lo'e cinfo > > > > Both these are true on the myopic singular conceptualization, because there > > is only one lion, but on the statistical average conceptualization there > > is a difference, in that for every lion Africa is the best bet as to where > > it lives, while it is not the case that for every lion it is > probable that we > > talked about it. > > A fair cop, your honor. I feel there is something wrong with your second > sentence. It's appropriate to attribute to me the property of > talking-about-the-average-lion (we've been doing it), but absurd to attribute > to attribute to the-average-lion the property of being discussed by me. > Or is it? Right. So my position is that "lo'e" doesn't *strictly* mean "the typical/average member", and hence those two sentences as equally valid as la nelson cu xabju le friko mi'a tavla fi la nelson are. To say "typical/average member" uae a lujvo like, say: x1 is an instance of x2, a category whose defining properties are the typical/average properties of category x3 lo'e -average be fi lo'e cinfo cu xabju le friko mi'a tavla fi lo'e se -average be fi lo'e cinfo --And