From pycyn@aol.com Thu Oct 11 08:42:41 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 11 Oct 2001 15:42:41 -0000 Received: (qmail 66795 invoked from network); 11 Oct 2001 15:42:40 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l9.egroups.com with QMQP; 11 Oct 2001 15:42:40 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-d03.mx.aol.com) (205.188.157.35) by mta1 with SMTP; 11 Oct 2001 15:42:40 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-d03.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v31_r1.8.) id r.91.11ac2304 (4320) for ; Thu, 11 Oct 2001 11:16:53 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <91.11ac2304.28f711e4@aol.com> Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2001 11:16:52 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] "knowledge as to who saw who" readings To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_91.11ac2304.28f711e4_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10535 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 11502 --part1_91.11ac2304.28f711e4_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 10/10/2001 10:35:50 PM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes: > la pycyn cusku di'e > > >(is this where knowing a=b and Fa means you > >ought to know Fb?). > > You shouldn't be able to get away with this type of bamboozzlement > in Lojban. Knowing that something is equal to itself only requires > that you understand the meaning of 'equal'. Knowing that what is > referred to by 'a' is the same as what is referred to by 'b' is > a different issue, and of course requires to know what 'a' refers > to and what 'b' refers to. {la djan djuno le du'u ko'a du ko'e} > should not require at all that John knows who is being referred > to by the prosumti {ko'a} and {ko'e}, which is something that only > concerns the speaker and the listener. It is something that John > can know only if {ko'a du ko'e} is true and all it requires is that > John understands the meaning of identity. If he does understand it, > then of course he knows that anything is equal (=) to itself. > > Unfortunately we probably won't succeed in avoiding the > bamboozzlement in Lojban. Indeed, apparently we can't even agree > that {le broda} has to be a meaningful description for the speaker > and listener only, not for the knower. > I don't understand what bamboozlement you are talking about. 'a=b' tells us that the thing called by the name 'a' is identical with the thing called by the name 'b,' that is, that they are the same thing, despite their names. This is a significnat claim and different from the claim 'a=a', which is totally trivial. See, Frege on sense and reference "How is a=b, if true, different from a=a?" The answer, of course, is that the two names have different senses ("morning star", "evening star" are the traditional examples) even though that have the same reference, and it is the senses that guide the selection of references, so, in another world, these two names might attach to different things. Identity, however, is just about reference. As for the case of {le}, this is not a problem only for knowers, but for all reporters -- and even for listeners. It is clear that the speaker has to know whaat he means, and the hearer does too, if the communication is to be successful. No one else does, apparently. But when one reports a person's speech *indirectly* -- or their thoughts -- it is not clear what forms are permitted for the sake of accuracy: should the indirect use the {le} form, even though the reporter does not know what the thinker means by it or must (even "may") the reporter unpack the form in some way? Sticking with the speaker's own form seems safest, but ti is not perfectly clear what the consequences of the alternate approaches are, except that they probably violate intensionality. --part1_91.11ac2304.28f711e4_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 10/10/2001 10:35:50 PM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes:


la pycyn cusku di'e

>(is this where knowing a=b and Fa means you
>ought to know Fb?).

You shouldn't be able to get away with this type of bamboozzlement
in Lojban. Knowing that something is equal to itself only requires
that you understand the meaning of 'equal'. Knowing that what is
referred to by 'a' is the same as what is referred to by 'b' is
a different issue, and of course requires to know what 'a' refers
to and what 'b' refers to. {la djan djuno le du'u ko'a du ko'e}
should not require at all that John knows who is being referred
to by the prosumti {ko'a} and {ko'e}, which is something that only
concerns the speaker and the listener. It is something that John
can know only if {ko'a du ko'e} is true and all it requires is that
John understands the meaning of identity. If he does understand it,
then of course he knows that anything is equal (=) to itself.

Unfortunately we probably won't succeed in avoiding the
bamboozzlement in Lojban. Indeed, apparently we can't even agree
that {le broda} has to be a meaningful description for the speaker
and listener only, not for the knower.


I don't understand what bamboozlement you are talking about. 'a=b' tells us that the thing called  by the name 'a' is identical with the thing called by the name 'b,' that is, that they are the same thing, despite their names.  This is a significnat claim and different from the claim 'a=a', which is totally trivial.  See, Frege on sense and reference "How is a=b, if true, different from a=a?"  The answer, of course, is that the two names have different senses ("morning star", "evening star" are the traditional examples) even though that have the same reference, and it is the senses that guide the selection of references, so, in another world, these two names might attach to different things.  Identity, however, is just about reference.
As for the case of {le}, this is not a problem only for knowers, but for all reporters -- and even for listeners.  It is clear that the speaker has to know whaat he means, and the hearer does too, if the communication is to be successful.  No one else does, apparently.  But when one reports a person's speech *indirectly* -- or their thoughts -- it is not clear what forms are permitted for the sake of accuracy: should the indirect use the {le} form, even though the reporter does not know what the thinker means by it or must (even "may") the reporter unpack the form in some way?  Sticking with the speaker's own form seems safest, but ti is not perfectly clear what the consequences of the alternate approaches are, except that they probably violate intensionality.    --part1_91.11ac2304.28f711e4_boundary--