Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 3 Oct 2001 18:32:47 -0000 Received: (qmail 71721 invoked from network); 3 Oct 2001 18:32:46 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 3 Oct 2001 18:32:46 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-d01.mx.aol.com) (205.188.157.33) by mta1 with SMTP; 3 Oct 2001 18:32:46 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-d01.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v31_r1.7.) id r.117.5954490 (4000) for ; Wed, 3 Oct 2001 14:32:39 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <117.5954490.28ecb3c6@aol.com> Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2001 14:32:38 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_117.5954490.28ecb3c6_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10535 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 11319 Content-Length: 3064 Lines: 55 --part1_117.5954490.28ecb3c6_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 10/3/2001 11:50:14 AM Central Daylight Time, arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: > I presume then that you no longer consider > > John believes p such that p is true just in case Tully is a great roman > orator > > to be unproblematic. I'd go so far as to say I think it is just flat hopelessly wrong. As noted, under really minimal real-world conditions it is always true. > > What sort of remedies can you see? My instinct would be to go for > possible worlds (x is a world of which p is true iff x is a world of which > y is > Alas, all the possible world notions are themselves intensional (they are *possible* worlds after all), so this doesn't help with an extensional reading. I am inclined at the moment to go with questions as a primitive notion and take two things that successfully answer (are true members of) the same question as being intersubstitutable. But even as I say this I start seeing problems, so I am gong to pass for this round. --part1_117.5954490.28ecb3c6_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 10/3/2001 11:50:14 AM Central Daylight Time, arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes:


I presume then that you no longer consider

 John believes p such that p is true just in case Tully is a great roman orator

to be unproblematic.


I'd go so far as to say I think it is just flat hopelessly wrong. As noted, under really minimal real-world conditions it is always true.


What sort of remedies can you see? My instinct would be to go for
possible worlds (x is a world of which p is true iff x is a world of which y is
true?), but you're an old hand at this stuff, so I'll wait on your suggest


Alas, all the possible world notions are themselves intensional (they are *possible* worlds after all), so this doesn't help with an extensional reading.  I am inclined at the moment to go with questions as a primitive notion and take two things that successfully answer (are true members of) the same question as being intersubstitutable.  But even as I say this I start seeing problems, so I am gong to pass for this round. --part1_117.5954490.28ecb3c6_boundary--