Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_7_4); 20 Aug 2002 16:14:09 -0000 Received: (qmail 16036 invoked from network); 20 Aug 2002 16:14:08 -0000 Received: from unknown (66.218.66.217) by m5.grp.scd.yahoo.com with QMQP; 20 Aug 2002 16:14:08 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-d05.mx.aol.com) (205.188.157.37) by mta2.grp.scd.yahoo.com with SMTP; 20 Aug 2002 16:14:08 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-d05.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v33.5.) id r.42.2c0fcc46 (18707) for ; Tue, 20 Aug 2002 12:14:03 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <42.2c0fcc46.2a93c4ca@aol.com> Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2002 12:14:02 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] Re: I like chocolate To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_42.2c0fcc46.2a93c4ca_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 7.0 for Windows US sub 10509 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Group-Post: member; u=2455001 X-Yahoo-Profile: kaliputra X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 15159 Content-Length: 4004 Lines: 64 --part1_42.2c0fcc46.2a93c4ca_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 8/20/2002 10:31:01 AM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes: << > if you say {lo broda cu brode} then the claim is that > when you examine brodas one by one, there will be at > least one for which the claim "it is broda" is true. > This is what quantifiers do, they "run over" the members > of a set one by one. >> Obviously, "it is brode" is meant. << An intensional reference, on the other hand, does not care about each member of the set. It only draws on what it takes to be a member of the set. When you say "I like chocolate", there is no quantity of chocolate such that you are making a claim about it. >> The first part of this is correct, strictly, only for {le/o ka cakla} (not how I would say it, but it seems to be on float again -- {le/o du'u ce'u cakla}). Technically, what is involved in all intensional cases is reference to imaginary/logically possible worlds (or stories or situations or however you want to describe them) and the things in them. In the case of properties, the reference is oblique: the property of broda is the function over worlds that identifies the class of broda in each world (or something like that, details may vary from theory to theory). For events and propositions the line is more direct, since the things of the other world are mentioned explicitly. The crucial point is that what is referred to in that context -- objects and properties -- need not be the same as those in this world and so moving them into this world or moving them about because of facts in this world are not guaranteed to work. Indeed, if the notion is broad enough, are guaranteed not to work. --part1_42.2c0fcc46.2a93c4ca_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 8/20/2002 10:31:01 AM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes:

<<

if you say {lo broda cu brode} then the claim is that
when you examine brodas one by one, there will be at
least one for which the claim "it is broda" is true.
This is what quantifiers do, they "run over" the members
of a set one by one.

>>
Obviously, "it is brode" is meant.

<<
An intensional reference, on the other hand, does not
care about each member of the set. It only draws on
what it takes to be a member of the set. When you
say "I like chocolate", there is no quantity of
chocolate such that you are making a claim about it.
>>
The first part of this is correct, strictly, only for {le/o ka cakla} (not how I would say it, but it seems to be on float again -- {le/o du'u ce'u cakla}). Technically, what is involved in all intensional cases is reference to imaginary/logically possible worlds (or stories or situations or however you want to describe them) and the things in them. In the case of properties, the reference is oblique: the property of broda is the function over worlds that identifies the class of broda in each world (or something like that, details may vary from theory to theory). For events and propositions the line is more direct, since the things of the other world are mentioned explicitly. The crucial point is that what is referred to in that context -- objects and properties -- need not be the same as those in this world and so moving them into this world or moving them about because of facts in this world are not guaranteed to work. Indeed, if the notion is broad enough, are guaranteed not to work. --part1_42.2c0fcc46.2a93c4ca_boundary--