From pycyn@aol.com Tue Sep 17 09:30:18 2002 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_1_1_3); 17 Sep 2002 16:30:18 -0000 Received: (qmail 54470 invoked from network); 17 Sep 2002 16:30:18 -0000 Received: from unknown (66.218.66.218) by m15.grp.scd.yahoo.com with QMQP; 17 Sep 2002 16:30:18 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-r05.mx.aol.com) (152.163.225.101) by mta3.grp.scd.yahoo.com with SMTP; 17 Sep 2002 16:30:17 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-r05.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v34.10.) id r.c1.27009f66 (4584) for ; Tue, 17 Sep 2002 12:30:05 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2002 12:30:05 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] Re: I like chocolate To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_c1.27009f66.2ab8b28d_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 7.0 for Windows US sub 10509 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Group-Post: member; u=2455001 X-Yahoo-Profile: kaliputra X-Yahoo-Message-Num: 15763 --part1_c1.27009f66.2ab8b28d_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 9/16/2002 10:28:36 AM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes: << > >Sorry, I thought you meant an accurate picture of a generic boa, because, > >once you get away from that, it gets hard to keep up the claim that it is > a > >pictue of a generic boa rather than something else that it is an accurate > >picture of. > > Right. I don't want to claim that there is anything that it is > a picture of. I don't want to make the claim: {da poi ... zo'u > ta pixra da}. Using "generic" as an adjective can be misleading, > as if boas could be divided into generic and non-generic, which > has nothing to do with what we want here. It is a picture of a > boa, but there is no boa such that it is a picture of that boa. > >> I agree that "generic" might be misleading. Is it your term or mine -- or And's? In any case, can you suggest a better? It seems to be mainly yours (quick Find); I'll go with any emendation you want to make and assume that it is more accurate than "generic." I assume that it is not (except accidentally) a picture of a possible boa (it may, in fact, be a good likeness of some real boa, but that is irrelevant to its purpose as a picture of lo'e sincrboa). << >But if any old boa picture will do and we call it a picture of a >generic boa, then, sure, you can picture it. In English, I call it "a picture of a boa". In Lojban, {lo pixra be lo'e sincrboa}. The English is a bit ambiguous, as it could be interpreted as {lo pixra be lo sincrboa}, though that is not always its most natural interpretation. >> In Lojban {lo pixra be lo'e sincrboa} refers to a picture of a typical boa. I don't suppose this gets us much forrader, though a typical boa will probably have specified some properties that a generic (for want of a better word right now) does not. I suppose that, while the English is ambiguous (as it is) and the one we want is vague at best, the Lojban (and yours?) are just vague (that is the Lojban way). The vagueness turns up when we try to figure out what properties really are essential or typical of, in this case, boas. But I think that the right English and so, presumably, your {lo'e} are relatively clear otherwise. But I do think that the picture case is peculiar and is suspect that that is because the object represented is so often behaving like one in an opaque context already, so to add another opacity on strains one's analytic powers. The first intensionality (don't know how to avoid it) comes just from the fact that what the picture is a picture of is an interpretive matter -- in which the artist (even if he is a photographer) has first rights. That is, Of-ness is a matter of the whir of words that surrounds a picture, not a property of the picture itself. Now that is a feature of English "picture of." Suppose that {pixra} was designed so that {ti pixra ta} required a (conventional, probably) correlation between properties of ti and those of ta. Then xorxes {ti pixra lo'e broda} would uncomplicatedly be "if a thing were a broda, then ti would be a picture of it," that is, ti would have the properties which correlated with the properties of the hypothetical broda. It is important to note that both essential properties (what would have to be in the picture for this to work) and the correlation that {pixra} requires, are not a checklist, each member of which has to be 100% present for the requirement (to be a broda, to be a picture of) to be met. More likely, what is involved is a weighted list of quantifiable properties, where the quantity of the property and the weight of the property combine to make a contribution to the final score, which has to reach a certain level to meet the requirement (this all rational-reconstructionist eyewash, of course, but the informal and intuitive version does seem to be what actually goes on). So, the picture might be a picture of two different broda in slightly different ways, but still up to requirement. For the problematic case I keep dragging around, color probably has a low positive weight -- anything in the browns and greens will do --for a boa, for example. So one boa is pictured with the right color, another with the wrong one, but that doesn't matter enough -- even a colorless boa-picture will do, other conditions being well met. On the other hand, color has a high negative weight -- a neon-blue "boa" with chrome-yellow bands would almost ipso facto NOT be a picture of lo'e sincrboa -- or of lo sincrboa altogether. [I throw in for what it is worth that boas are a family, Boides, with at least the subfamily Pythoninae, and the genera Eunectes and Constrictor. The genus Boa is out of favor, most members having moved to Constrictor -- but this is as of maybe twenty years ago.] I think that what was described as possible for {pixra} is close to what happens with English "picture of," if we ignore artists (and promoters and the artsy-fartsy generally): Whistler's Study in Black and White is, after all, a pretty good picture of the artist's mother, what ever he says. Of course, this involves a looks-like correlation (not at all natural, for all that) and the case might be harder with non-representational or differently representational (e.g., cubism) conventions or with non-visual subjects (how did Justice come to be represented correctly in our culture by a woman ins classical dress, blindfolded and carrying a sword and a balance?) But the correlations, whatever they may be, need to be present (and may, of course, be totally ad hoc, if the artist or critic forces them on us). << A picture of a boa that swallowed an elephant may look like a picture of a hat to some people, yes. The relationship "pixra" is rather subjective. It all depends on the context. If distinguishing boas from vipers is relevant, then the same thing won't do as a picture for both. >> Right. But a picture of lo'e since would be a picture of both, qua snake, at least. << << >It is certainly not a no-no! {lo'e} is probably a yes-yes >anywhere {lo} is, though neither entails the other. > >> >My remark was to your claim that {viska lo'e sincrboa} made no sense, I never made that claim. I said that if I told you {mi viska lo'e sincrboa} you could infer that either mi viska lo sincrboa or else I'm having visions. So {mi viska lo'e sincrboa} is perfectly meaningful. >> Since this says that {viska lo'e sincrboa} is such that the utterance of it has to be interpreted as on or the other of two totally different claims -- both from it and one another -- I would take that as implying, at least, that it has no meaning of its own. If it did, it would presumably mean that, not imply something totally different. The expression can be used, clearly, but that doesn't mean that it is meaningful in the usual sense. But, more to the point, you now say that {viska lo'e sincrboa} is meaningful in its own right. What does it mean? Clearly something different from seeing a particular boa, and probably something different from having a vision (? delusion, hallucination, mystical experience of Boa Its Own Self?). If this is a guarantor for the meaningfulness of {pixra lo'e sincrboa}, it fails. I do not either know how to apply the analysis -- which I know you do not agree with -- of {pixra} to this case; the obvious application is clearly totally wrong. << >When looking up "boa," by the way, I did see a picture of one in the >dictionary, presumably meant to be typical, since it had no further >specific >identification. Do you think there is a boa such that the picture is a picture of that boa? There could be, I suppose, though whether there is or not would be fairly irrelevant for most users of the dictionary. >> No, and, even if there were, that would be irrelevant to the use for that picture. << >I was just a black-and-white sketch, so avoided the issue of >color (I don't suppose anyone will thaink that the generic boa is white, >though boas are in an albino sequence, I think). Would you say of it {ta pixra lo'e simcrboa}? >> With some hesitation (because I don't know what you mean by that), I would say what I mean by that in just that way. << >So {viska lo'e boa} does make sense. Different from {viska lo boa}? To the extent that it would allow for personal visions, yes. In normal circumstances, {viska lo'e sincrboa} should require {viska lo sincrboa}. But this is because of the meaning of {viska}, not because of the meaning of {lo'e sincrboa}. >> What are these personal visions? Is this a literal seeing things? I would say that these would never be of lo'e anything -- they are too ambiguous, too freighted with interpretation -- and too far from seeing -- to make that kind of sense. I would say that {viska lo sincrboa} requires {viska lo'e sincrboa} as well, since lo'e sincrboa is present when- and where-ever lo sincrboa is, albeit in a slightly different way. For all that, I don't think they are equivalent in meaning, though they may be in extension. << >(For >either answer, what is special here, since generally they are different and >generally generics are too abstract to be seen). The abstract generics that can't be seen are not referred to here. lo'e sincrboa ka'e se viska, boas can be seen. >> Individual boas can be; but does that decide the issue for lo'e sincrboa? If so, how? Notice that {lo'e sincrboa ka'e se viska} is a much easier case than {mi viska lo'e sincrboa} and the analysis of one does not carry over well to the other. Being inherently visible is not the same as actually being seen. << > How do you know that talk about generic lions doesn't involve >particular lions, at least hypothetical particular lions, unless you know >fairly completely what talk about genric lions does involve? I'm certain that talk about lions in general does not involve talk about particular mosquitoes. I suppose you will agree with me there, even if we don't know fairly completely what it does involve. In a similar way, I'm also fairly certain talk about lions in general does not involve particular lions, even though I can't express fairly completely what it does involve. There is no logical contradiction in being sure that it does not involve something and not being sure in what it does involve. >> Yup. But that still leaves the question of how you know that particular lions ar not involved. Is this simply and intuition? Is it prescriptive -- that you will not accept as giving your meaning anything that involves particulars? Is there some ground, however murky, that supports this claim (hopefully better than "well the general can't be about the particular because the words are opposites")? << Either I'm not hiding any information and I'm just not capable of explaining myself better, or it is all part of an evil conspiracy to make you suffer, but I won't tell you which. :) Touche' I think the jet lag, which I can't seem to shake, has burned out several of my social filters. << >What would you do >with a generic sofa -- you can't sit on it or use if for decor (it has no >color nor pattern nor cushion density). The use of "generic" as an adjective to translate {lo'e} is misleading. Sofas of course have color, pattern and cushion density, even all of them do. >> Good, another point for my analysis. << >In short, this seems no different >from {le nu mi nitcu tu'a lo sfofa cu purci} is it is sensible at all. You >are, apparently, going to say that it is not right because it involved {lo >sfofa} No. I would say it is not equivalent (though it is right on its own terms) because it involves an event about sofas >> Events involving sofas -- claims about them. But {nitcu} doesn't deal with claims and it does involve events essentially, so, whatever {nitcu lo'e sfofa} means, it will involve events, something (but you can't, apparently, say what) that a sofa or the sofas or just sofas do/are. <<>byt notice that it does not say anything about an particular sofa(s) >-- even that there are some (well, it says there are some in another world >but it is hard to deal with essential properties wihtout other worlds, so >that can't be the problem either.) Then we agree at least that ther are particular events about sofas that don't deal with particular sofas. >> No, we don't, because I don't think there can be a particular event that does not involve a bunch of particulars -- and them only. The particulars may be in some other word, but no less particulars -- or sofas -- for that. I take {nitcu lo'e sfofa} to be an oblique way of talking about such events, real and hypothetical. << I make a distinction between sofas (lo'e sfofa) and events involving sofas (tu'a lo sfofa). >> So do I. The latter is not a generalization of the same magnitude as the former (I think -- I am prepared to be wrong on this) and probably will work with a much smaller number of properties of sofas being relevant. If I need lo'e sfofa, presumably I need more than a seat or an accessory or ...; I need something that is all of these,s traight through the content of le du'u ce'u sfofa. << When {lo'e sfofa} is used in a sumti place, the resulting claim is not a claim about any thing that is a sofa. >> In the sense that we can meaningfully ask which sofa it is about. So {lo'e sfofa} is something like an intensional use of {sfofa}. Check. << There is nothing originating from that sumti place that is claimed to be in a relationship with the sumti in the other places. >> I don't get this. It sounds like "the rest of the sentence in which {lo'e sfofa} occurs is irrelevant to what the sentence as a whole means. That can't be what you mean, nor the converse (also a possible reading) : that the meaning of {lo'e sfofa} is irerelevant to what the sentence as a whole means. I guess that this just meand "there is no thing called {lo'e sfofa}. If so, check. But I would say that that place does place some role in relation to the other objects mentioned -- and in the usual way -- by reference to things. << The only contribution from {lo'e sfofa} goes to modify the selbri, >> That is(?) {nitcu lo'e sfofa} means the same as {sfofa nitcu}. Or, more exactly, means the same as a particular reading of that tanru (which one left unspecified). OK, but that doesn't help much, since it can be said of any predicate sumti pair (except that it is often easy to specify which reading is meant). << and the contribution comes purely from the intension/ meaning/sense/whatever of {sfofa}, it does not involve the corresponding extension. >> What else can contribute to the meaning of a sentence? The extension contributes to the event the sentence describes, but not to the meaning, the proposition/claim. So this is nothing special about {lo'e}. << The resulting claim is of a modified relationship among the remaining sumti. >> Again, true of any sumti in any place. What is special about {lo'e} -- other than that it does not have a referent? << ><< >I just don't agree that {mi nelci lo'e sfofa} >is equivalent to {mi nelci lo nu lo sfofa cu co'e}. They >are both meaningful, but different. > >> >As always, in what way? I don't see it. If I like doing it on the sofa even though I don't like sofas, then {mi nelci tu'a lo sfofa} is true, and {mi nelci lo'e sfofa} is false. >> And we know this how? What did we check to be sure of this claim. In the {lo sfofa} case the evidence is clear: there is a replacement for {co'e} that makes the sentence true in detail. But that leaves us with the issue of what "I don't like sofas" means (in parallel with what {mi nelci lo'e sfofa} means. Clearly the English does not mean that I don't like anything about sofas, since they make good places for doing it. It does seem to entail that I don't like any sofas. So the problem is apparently inherent in sofas, something like {ni na nelci le nu lo sfofa cu sfofa} or so. But that is restricted to the present sofas -- might there be a hypothetical sofa that you did like and even like that it was a sofa? No, I assume ("I don't like unicorns" makes perfectly good sense). And so we get back to my analysis. Where was the false step (I'd bet on the move to {le nu lo sfofa cu sfofa}). << >But then, I don't know what {mi >nelci lo'e sfofa} means. Just that I like sofas. >> Well, what does that mean? All of them? Anything that could be a sofa? All the sofas I have met so far? The vast majority of those I have met and can conceive of? Choice 1 presumably follows and also a fortiori 3 and, in one sense, 4. So the crux is 2 -- and we are back to my analysis. << For me {tu'a lo sfofa} is much more vague. >> Does this mean that the range meaning of the {lo'e} case are included in the range of meaning of the {tu'a lo} case? Or just that the one has a wider range, but not neccessarily even overlapping ranges? Anyhow, do you understand my reading of your {lo'e}? If so, can you say what is wrong with it as a step toward articulating the correct position? --part1_c1.27009f66.2ab8b28d_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 9/16/2002 10:28:36 AM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes:

<<
>Sorry, I thought you meant an accurate picture of a generic boa, because,
>once you get away from that, it gets hard to keep up the claim that it is a
>pictue of a generic boa rather than something else that it is an accurate
>picture of.

Right. I don't want to claim that there is anything that it is
a picture of. I don't want to make the claim: {da poi ... zo'u
ta pixra da}. Using "generic" as an adjective can be misleading,
as if boas could be divided into generic and non-generic, which
has nothing to do with what we want here. It is a picture of a
boa, but there is no boa such that it is a picture of that boa.
>>
I agree that "generic" might be misleading.  Is it your term or mine -- or And's?  In any case, can you suggest a better?  It seems to be mainly yours (quick Find); I'll go with any emendation you want to make and assume that it is more accurate than "generic."
I assume that it is not (except accidentally) a picture of a possible boa (it may, in fact, be a good likeness of some real boa, but that is irrelevant to its purpose as a picture of lo'e sincrboa).

<<
>But if any old boa picture will do and we call it a picture of a
>generic boa, then, sure, you can picture it.

In English, I call it "a picture of a boa". In Lojban, {lo pixra
be lo'e sincrboa}. The English is a bit ambiguous, as it could
be interpreted as {lo pixra be lo sincrboa}, though that is not
always its most natural interpretation.
>>
In Lojban {lo pixra be lo'e sincrboa} refers to a picture of a typical boa.  I don't suppose this gets us much forrader, though a typical boa will probably have specified some properties that a generic (for want of a better word right now) does not.  I suppose that, while the English is ambiguous (as it is) and the one we want is vague at best, the Lojban (and yours?) are just vague (that is the Lojban way).  The vagueness turns up when we try to figure out what properties really are essential or typical of, in this case, boas.  But I think that the right English and so, presumably, your {lo'e} are relatively clear otherwise. 
But I do think that the picture case is peculiar and is suspect that that is because the object represented is so often behaving like one in an opaque context already, so to add another opacity on strains one's analytic powers.  The first intensionality (don't know how to avoid it) comes just from the fact that what the picture is a picture of is an interpretive matter -- in which the artist (even if he is a photographer) has first rights.  That is, Of-ness is a matter of the whir of words that surrounds a picture, not a property of the picture itself.
Now that is a feature of English "picture of." Suppose that {pixra} was designed so that {ti pixra ta} required a (conventional, probably) correlation between properties of ti and those of ta.  Then xorxes {ti pixra lo'e broda} would uncomplicatedly be "if a thing were a broda, then ti would be a picture of it," that is, ti would have the properties which correlated with the properties of the hypothetical broda. 
It is important to note that both essential properties (what would have to be in the picture for this to work) and the correlation that {pixra} requires, are not a checklist, each member of which has to be 100% present for the requirement (to be a broda, to be a picture of) to be met.  More likely, what is involved is a weighted list of quantifiable properties, where the quantity of the property and the weight of the property combine to make a contribution to the final score, which has to reach a certain level to meet the requirement (this all rational-reconstructionist eyewash, of course, but the informal and intuitive version does seem to be what actually goes on). 
So, the picture might be a picture of two different broda in slightly different ways, but still up to requirement.  For the problematic case I keep dragging around, color probably has a low positive weight -- anything in the browns and greens will do --for a boa, for example.  So one boa is pictured with the right color, another with the wrong one, but that doesn't matter enough -- even a colorless boa-picture will do, other conditions being well met. On the other hand, color has a high negative weight -- a neon-blue "boa" with chrome-yellow bands would almost ipso facto NOT be a picture of lo'e sincrboa -- or of lo sincrboa altogether. [I throw in for what it is worth that boas are a family, Boides, with at least the subfamily Pythoninae, and the genera Eunectes and Constrictor.  The genus Boa is out of favor, most members having moved to Constrictor -- but this is as of maybe twenty years ago.]
I think that what was described as possible for {pixra} is close to what happens with English "picture of," if we ignore artists (and promoters and the artsy-fartsy generally):  Whistler's Study in Black and White is, after all, a pretty good picture of the artist's mother, what ever he says.  Of course, this involves a looks-like correlation (not at all natural, for all that) and the case might be harder with non-representational or differently representational (e.g., cubism) conventions or with non-visual subjects (how did Justice come to be represented correctly in our culture by a woman ins classical dress, blindfolded and carrying a sword and a balance?) But the correlations, whatever they may be, need to be present (and may, of course, be totally ad hoc, if the artist or critic forces them on us).

<<
A picture of a boa that swallowed an elephant may look like a
picture of a hat to some people, yes. The relationship "pixra"
is rather subjective. It all depends on the context. If
distinguishing boas from vipers is relevant, then the same
thing won't do as a picture for both.
>>
Right.  But a picture of lo'e since would be a picture of both, qua snake, at least.

<<
<<
>It is certainly not a no-no! {lo'e} is probably a yes-yes
>anywhere {lo} is, though neither entails the other.
> >>
>My remark was to your claim that {viska lo'e sincrboa} made no sense,

I never made that claim. I said that if I told you
{mi viska lo'e sincrboa} you could infer that either mi viska
lo sincrboa or else I'm having visions. So {mi viska lo'e
sincrboa} is perfectly meaningful.
>>
Since this says that {viska lo'e sincrboa} is such that the utterance of it has to be interpreted as on or the other of two totally different claims -- both from it and one another -- I would take that as implying, at least, that it has no meaning of its own.  If it did, it would presumably mean that, not imply something totally different.  The expression can be used, clearly, but that doesn't mean that it is meaningful in the usual sense.
But, more to the point, you now say that {viska lo'e sincrboa} is meaningful in its own right.  What does it mean?  Clearly something different from seeing a particular boa, and probably something different from having a vision (? delusion, hallucination, mystical experience of Boa Its Own Self?).  If this is a guarantor for the meaningfulness of {pixra lo'e sincrboa}, it fails.  I do not either know how to apply the analysis -- which I know you do not agree with -- of {pixra} to this case; the obvious application is clearly totally wrong.

<<
>When looking up "boa," by the way, I did see a picture of one in the
>dictionary, presumably meant to be typical, since it had no further
>specific
>identification.

Do you think there is a boa such that the picture is a picture
of that boa? There could be, I suppose, though whether there is
or not would be fairly irrelevant for most users of the dictionary.
>>
No, and, even if there were, that would be irrelevant to the use for that picture.

<<
>I was just a black-and-white sketch, so avoided the issue of
>color (I don't suppose anyone will thaink that the generic boa is white,
>though boas are in an albino sequence, I think).

Would you say of it {ta pixra lo'e simcrboa}?
>>
With some hesitation (because I don't know what you mean by that), I would say what I mean by that in just that way.

<<
>So {viska lo'e boa} does make sense.  Different from {viska lo boa}?

To the extent that it would allow for personal visions, yes.
In normal circumstances, {viska lo'e sincrboa} should require
{viska lo sincrboa}. But this is because of the meaning of
{viska}, not because of the meaning of {lo'e sincrboa}.
>>
What are these personal visions?  Is this a literal seeing things?  I would say that these would never be of lo'e anything -- they are too ambiguous, too freighted with interpretation -- and too far from seeing -- to make that kind of sense. 
I would say that {viska lo sincrboa} requires {viska lo'e sincrboa} as well, since lo'e sincrboa is present when- and where-ever lo sincrboa is, albeit in a slightly different way.  For all that, I don't think they are equivalent in meaning, though they may be in extension.

<<
>(For
>either answer, what is special here, since generally they are different and
>generally generics are too abstract to be seen).

The abstract generics that can't be seen are not referred to
here. lo'e sincrboa ka'e se viska, boas can be seen.
>>
Individual boas can be; but does that decide the issue for lo'e sincrboa?  If so, how?  Notice that {lo'e sincrboa ka'e se viska}  is a much easier case than {mi viska lo'e sincrboa} and the analysis of one does not carry over well to the other.  Being inherently visible is not the same as actually being seen.

<<
>  How do you know that talk about generic lions doesn't involve
>particular lions, at least hypothetical particular lions, unless you know
>fairly completely what talk about genric lions does involve?

I'm certain that talk about lions in general does not involve
talk about particular mosquitoes. I suppose you will agree
with me there, even if we don't know fairly completely
what it does involve. In a similar way, I'm also fairly
certain talk about lions in general does not involve
particular lions, even though I can't express fairly
completely what it does involve. There is no logical
contradiction in being sure that it does not involve something
and not being sure in what it does involve.
>>
Yup.  But that still leaves the question of how you know that particular lions ar not involved.  Is this simply and intuition?  Is it prescriptive -- that you will not accept as giving your meaning anything that involves particulars?  Is there some ground, however murky, that supports this claim (hopefully better than "well the general can't be about the particular because the words are opposites")?

<<
Either I'm not hiding any information and I'm just not
capable of explaining myself better, or it is all part
of an evil conspiracy to make you suffer, but I won't
tell you which. :)
Touche'  I think the jet lag, which I can't seem to shake, has burned out several of my social filters.

<<
>What would you do
>with a generic sofa -- you can't sit on it or use if for decor (it has no
>color nor pattern nor cushion density).

The use of "generic" as an adjective to translate {lo'e} is
misleading. Sofas of course have color, pattern and cushion density,
even all of them do.
>>
Good, another point for my analysis.

<<
>In short, this seems no different
>from {le nu mi nitcu tu'a lo sfofa cu purci} is it is sensible at all. You
>are, apparently, going to say that it is not right because it involved {lo
>sfofa}

No. I would say it is not equivalent (though it is right on its
own terms) because it involves an event about sofas
>>
Events involving sofas -- claims about them. But {nitcu} doesn't deal with claims and it does involve events essentially, so, whatever {nitcu lo'e sfofa} means, it will involve events, something (but you can't, apparently, say what) that a sofa or the sofas or just sofas do/are.

<<>byt notice that it does not say anything about an particular sofa(s)
>-- even that there are some (well, it says there are some in another world
>but it is hard to deal with essential properties wihtout other worlds, so
>that can't be the problem either.)

Then we agree at least that ther are particular events about sofas
that don't deal with particular sofas.
>>
No, we don't, because I don't think there can be a particular event that does not involve a bunch of particulars -- and them only.  The particulars may be in some other word, but no less particulars -- or sofas -- for that.  I take {nitcu lo'e sfofa} to be an oblique way of talking about such events, real and hypothetical.

<<
I make a distinction between sofas (lo'e sfofa) and events
involving sofas (tu'a lo sfofa).
>>
So do I.  The latter is not a generalization of the same magnitude as the former (I think -- I am prepared to be wrong on this) and probably will work with a much smaller number of properties of sofas being relevant.  If I need lo'e sfofa, presumably I need more than a seat or an accessory or ...; I need something that is all of these,s traight through the content of le du'u ce'u sfofa.

<<
When {lo'e sfofa} is used in a sumti place, the resulting
claim is not a claim about any thing that is a sofa.
>>
In the sense that we can meaningfully ask which sofa it is about.  So {lo'e sfofa} is something like an intensional use of {sfofa}.  Check.

<<
There
is nothing originating from that sumti place that is claimed
to be in a relationship with the sumti in the other places.
>>
I don't get this.  It sounds like "the rest of the sentence in which {lo'e sfofa} occurs is irrelevant to what the sentence as a whole means.  That can't be what you mean, nor the converse (also a possible reading) : that the meaning of {lo'e sfofa} is irerelevant to what the sentence as a whole means.  I guess that this just meand "there is no thing called {lo'e sfofa}.  If so, check.  But I would say that that place does place some role in relation to the other objects mentioned -- and in the usual way -- by reference to things.

<<
The only contribution from {lo'e sfofa} goes to modify the
selbri,
>>
That is(?) {nitcu lo'e sfofa} means the same as {sfofa nitcu}.  Or, more exactly, means the same as a particular reading of that tanru (which one left unspecified).  OK, but that doesn't help much, since it can be said of any predicate sumti pair (except that it is often easy to specify which reading is meant).

<<
and the contribution comes purely from the intension/
meaning/sense/whatever of {sfofa}, it does not involve
the corresponding extension.
>>
What else can contribute to the meaning of a sentence?  The extension contributes to the event the sentence describes, but not to the meaning, the proposition/claim. So this is nothing special about {lo'e}.

<<
The resulting claim is of a
modified relationship among the remaining sumti.
>>
Again, true of any sumti in any place.  What is special about {lo'e} -- other than that it does not have a referent?

<<
><<
>I just don't agree that {mi nelci lo'e sfofa}
>is equivalent to {mi nelci lo nu lo sfofa cu co'e}. They
>are both meaningful, but different.
> >>
>As always, in what way?  I don't see it.

If I like doing it on the sofa even though I don't like
sofas, then {mi nelci tu'a lo sfofa} is true, and
{mi nelci lo'e sfofa} is false.
>>
And we know this how?  What did we check to be sure of this claim.  In the {lo sfofa} case the evidence is clear: there is a replacement for {co'e} that makes the sentence true in detail.  But that leaves us with the issue of what "I don't like sofas" means (in parallel with what {mi nelci lo'e sfofa} means.  Clearly the English does not mean that I don't like anything about sofas, since they make good places for doing it. It does seem to entail that I don't like any sofas.  So the problem is apparently inherent in sofas, something like {ni na nelci le nu lo sfofa cu sfofa} or so.  But that is restricted to the present sofas -- might there be a hypothetical sofa that you did like and even like that it was a sofa? No, I assume ("I don't like unicorns" makes perfectly good sense). And so we get back to my analysis.  Where was the false step (I'd bet on the move to {le nu lo sfofa cu sfofa}).

<<
>But then, I don't know what {mi
>nelci lo'e sfofa} means.

Just that I like sofas.
>>
Well, what does that mean?  All of them?  Anything that could be a sofa?  All the sofas I have met so far? The vast majority of those I have met and can conceive of?
Choice 1 presumably follows and also a fortiori 3 and, in one sense, 4.  So the crux is 2 -- and we are back to my analysis.

<<
For me {tu'a lo sfofa} is much more vague.
>>
Does this mean that the range meaning of the {lo'e} case are included in the range of meaning of the {tu'a lo} case?  Or just that the one has a wider range, but not neccessarily even overlapping ranges?

Anyhow, do you understand my reading of your {lo'e}?  If so, can you say what is wrong with it as a step toward articulating the correct position?
 --part1_c1.27009f66.2ab8b28d_boundary--