From sentto-44114-16721-1034783095-lojban-in=lojban.org@returns.groups.yahoo.com Wed Oct 16 09:26:09 2002 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list lojban-list); Wed, 16 Oct 2002 09:26:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from n22.grp.scd.yahoo.com ([66.218.66.78]) by digitalkingdom.org with smtp (Exim 4.05) id 181qzk-0002dA-00 for lojban-in@lojban.org; Wed, 16 Oct 2002 09:26:04 -0700 X-eGroups-Return: sentto-44114-16721-1034783095-lojban-in=lojban.org@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from [66.218.67.201] by n22.grp.scd.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 16 Oct 2002 15:44:58 -0000 X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_2_2_1); 16 Oct 2002 15:44:54 -0000 Received: (qmail 24264 invoked from network); 16 Oct 2002 15:44:53 -0000 Received: from unknown (66.218.66.217) by m9.grp.scd.yahoo.com with QMQP; 16 Oct 2002 15:44:53 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-d03.mx.aol.com) (205.188.157.35) by mta2.grp.scd.yahoo.com with SMTP; 16 Oct 2002 15:44:55 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-d03.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v34.13.) id r.198.f14f079 (3980) for ; Wed, 16 Oct 2002 11:44:37 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <198.f14f079.2adee364@aol.com> To: lojban@yahoogroups.com X-Mailer: AOL 7.0 for Windows US sub 10509 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Profile: kaliputra MIME-Version: 1.0 Mailing-List: list lojban@yahoogroups.com; contact lojban-owner@yahoogroups.com Delivered-To: mailing list lojban@yahoogroups.com Precedence: bulk Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 11:44:36 EDT Subject: [lojban] Re: brivla for 'intend' Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_198.f14f079.2adee364_boundary" X-archive-position: 2215 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: pycyn@aol.com Precedence: bulk Reply-to: lojban-list@lojban.org X-list: lojban-list --part1_198.f14f079.2adee364_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Oh, goodie! A real philosophical problem! 1. "Intend" is often an excuse word: "I intended to do it, but...." or "I ended up doing that, but I intended to do tother" (Often also said as "meant to"). This is mainly in the past tense, although there is a present tense use to explain why I haven't done it *yet*. I don't suppose this is a sense we particularly want in Lojban -- except incidentally to some better meaning. 2. This, incidentally, is partly the intersection of {zukte} and {gasnu}: I zukte this to achieve that, but I gasnu the other, see my old request for the ut verb: x did y to achieve w but got z -- where y is something "under x's control" and w and z are consequences that involve other factors. Most of the motivation the twitch actions that I talked about earlier (something about {cmila}?) lies in trying to work out what *is* under the agent's control (and even these require functioning plumbing -- but that is internal to the agent, even if not part of his "will"). 3. Where "intend" is not an excuse, it is directly a commitment ({nupre}? with a blanked x3?) and, somewhat less directly, a plan ({platu}, but I am not sure just what goes into x2 and x3), though explicit details ({platu2}?) need not be forthcoming. The commitment is conditional, at least in the sense that circumstances can override it even when it is still technically possible to fulfill it. And, of course, attempts to fulfill the commitment may end in failure and achieving quite the opposite results (see 1. 1 and 2). 4. It is independent of wanting and wishing and desiring, except in so far as it is goal-specifying and many (most?) goals are wanted or wished for or desired. As cases have shown, something can be intended that is not w/w/d (or, at least, not directly -- another notion fraught with muddles: how distinguish direct w/w/d from indirect, when most w/w/d are wanted (etc.) as means to some further w/w/d: happiness, if nothing else). 5. Most of this is separate from the notion of doing something intentionally. Doing what one intends to do is usually acting intentionally, but not all (maybe even very few) intentional acts are doing what one intended. Acting intentionally requires only being aware of what one is doing and of (cripes, here come the load again) willing to do it (or, at least, consenting to its being done thus: the monothelite problem). Thus both acts of a somnambulist while somnambulating and of a person whose muscle activity is being controlled by a machine somewhere are excluded from "intentional acts." Nor are unknown factors to count: Oedipos intentionally slew the haughty old fart at the crossroads and did not intentionally slay his father. Of course, he did not intend to slay the old fart either -- it either all happened too fast to form plans and commitments or at least he just meant to teach him a lesson in civility. 6. Note how "intentional" slides in and out of "intensional." Goals, purposes, and even the ways in which acts are mentioned are intensional contexts (as all of the potential Lojban gismu show -- calling for a {nu} phrase), involving objects only as under some description, not per se. --part1_198.f14f079.2adee364_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Oh, goodie!  A real philosophical problem!
1.  "Intend" is often an excuse word: "I intended to do it, but...." or "I ended up doing that, but I intended to do tother" (Often also said as "meant to").  This is mainly in the past tense, although there is a present tense use to explain why I haven't done it *yet*.  I don't suppose this is a sense we particularly want in Lojban -- except incidentally to some better meaning. 

2. This, incidentally, is partly the intersection of {zukte} and {gasnu}: I zukte this to achieve that, but I gasnu the other, see my old request for the ut verb: x did y to achieve w but got z -- where y is something "under x's control" and w and z are consequences that involve other factors.  Most of the motivation the twitch actions that I talked about earlier (something about {cmila}?) lies in trying to work out what *is* under the agent's control (and even these require functioning plumbing -- but that is internal to the agent, even if not part of his "will"). 

3.  Where "intend" is not an excuse, it is directly a commitment ({nupre}? with a blanked x3?) and, somewhat less directly, a plan ({platu}, but I am not sure just what goes into x2 and x3), though explicit details ({platu2}?) need not be forthcoming. The commitment is conditional, at least in the sense that circumstances can override it even when it is still technically possible to fulfill it.  And, of course, attempts to fulfill the commitment may end in failure and achieving quite the opposite results (see 1. 1 and 2).

4.  It is independent of wanting and wishing and desiring, except in so far as it is goal-specifying and many (most?) goals are wanted or wished for or desired.  As cases have shown, something can be intended that is not w/w/d (or, at least, not directly -- another notion fraught with muddles: how distinguish direct w/w/d from indirect, when most w/w/d are wanted (etc.) as means to some further w/w/d: happiness, if nothing else). 

5.  Most of this is separate from the notion of doing something intentionally.  Doing what one intends to do is usually acting intentionally, but not all (maybe even very few) intentional acts are doing what one intended.  Acting intentionally requires only being aware of what one is doing and of (cripes, here come the load again) willing to do it (or, at least, consenting to its being done thus: the monothelite problem).  Thus both acts of a somnambulist while somnambulating and of a person whose muscle activity is being controlled by a machine somewhere are excluded from "intentional acts."  Nor are unknown factors to count: Oedipos intentionally slew the haughty old fart at the crossroads and did not intentionally slay his father.  Of course, he did not intend to slay the old fart either -- it either all happened too fast to form plans and commitments or at least he just meant to teach him a lesson in civility.

6.  Note how "intentional" slides in and out of "intensional."  Goals, purposes, and even the ways in which acts are mentioned are intensional contexts (as all of the potential Lojban gismu show -- calling for a {nu} phrase), involving objects only as under some description, not per se. 
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