From a.rosta@lycos.co.uk Wed Oct 16 12:54:19 2002 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list lojban-list); Wed, 16 Oct 2002 12:54:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mailbox-7.st1.spray.net ([212.78.202.107]) by digitalkingdom.org with esmtp (Exim 4.05) id 181uFD-0003Hd-00 for lojban-list@lojban.org; Wed, 16 Oct 2002 12:54:16 -0700 Received: from oemcomputer (host213-121-68-67.surfport24.v21.co.uk [213.121.68.67]) by mailbox-7.st1.spray.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1BB932672F for ; Wed, 16 Oct 2002 21:48:40 +0200 (DST) From: "And Rosta" To: Subject: [lojban] Re: brivla for 'intend' Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 20:50:25 +0100 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: <3DAD6AC9.6060104@bilkent.edu.tr> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 X-archive-position: 2217 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: a.rosta@lycos.co.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-to: lojban-list@lojban.org X-list: lojban-list Robin.tr: > And Rosta wrote: > > {djica} is pretty good, but I think it makes sense to say "I wanted > > to go to Paris but I didn't intend to go", and "We intended to > > execute the prisoners because we had to execute them, even though > > we didn't want to execute the prisoners". > > > > So there is still the gap in the vocab, even if zukte and djica can > > fill much of it. > > I would view intention as a species of desire, but then I tend to view a > lot of things like that (need, will, obligation etc.). As Harry > Frnakurt (I think) pointed out, intention adds a level of commitment to > a desire, so "I wanted to go to Paris but I didn't intend to go" menas > something like "I had a desire to go to Paris, but other factors (e.g. > the price of the plane tickets) meant that I had no plans to act on that > desire." > > The prisoners example is trickier. I would argue that with the possible > exception of unconscious reflexes, it is impossible to do something > without wanting to do it, but that's a controversial position. I would > argue that the people in question have a desire to shoot the prisoners > AND a desire not to shoot the prisoners. It's tricky because the second > desire is the one which would take precedence under normal > circumstances, while the first is the consequentce of another desire > (e.g. to avoid getting shot by your commanding officer). Even if intention is a species of desire, it would still be nice to have brivla for the different species of desire. The prisoners example is some sort of other-things-being-equal or if-I-had-my-way desire, or rather the contrary of that desire. The Paris example is some sort of raw desire unmixed with any decisions about how to influence the course of affairs. --And.