From nobody@digitalkingdom.org Thu Jun 16 12:36:55 2005 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list lojban-list); Thu, 16 Jun 2005 12:36:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nobody by chain.digitalkingdom.org with local (Exim 4.50) id 1Dj0AQ-00051B-Cw for lojban-list-real@lojban.org; Thu, 16 Jun 2005 12:36:46 -0700 Received: from web81310.mail.yahoo.com ([206.190.37.85]) by chain.digitalkingdom.org with smtp (Exim 4.50) id 1Dj0AK-000514-Lr for lojban-list@lojban.org; Thu, 16 Jun 2005 12:36:46 -0700 Received: (qmail 9218 invoked by uid 60001); 16 Jun 2005 19:36:39 -0000 Message-ID: <20050616193639.9216.qmail@web81310.mail.yahoo.com> Received: from [65.69.50.91] by web81310.mail.yahoo.com via HTTP; Thu, 16 Jun 2005 12:36:39 PDT Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2005 12:36:39 -0700 (PDT) From: John E Clifford Subject: [lojban] "a bear runs" (Was; Re: Re: Again {xorlo} and Wiki.) To: lojban-list@lojban.org In-Reply-To: <925d1756050616070125b5cf80@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 X-Spam-Score: -2.6 (--) X-archive-position: 10188 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: clifford-j@sbcglobal.net Precedence: bulk Reply-to: lojban-list@lojban.org X-list: lojban-list Trying to sort out various ways to say "a bear runs" and various things that these might mean -- and various situations in which they might correctly be used. Notes: Remember that {cu bajra} covers the range of tense/modal/whatever and so may mean (by context or in intention) anything from "necessarily always must run" (and/or "always necessarily must run") to "possibly sometime could run" ("sometime possibly could run"), with a tendency, perhaps, to focus on particular tenses of actuality and the modes of generality and ability. Since the modi are unexpressed, their scopes -- over one another and over scoping items in the sumti are also undetermined: "one gnerally" and "generally one", for example, can be sorted at best by context -- and the example is given contestless to allow the full range to be explored. In what follows, I take the predicates applied to {lo} expressions to be predicated distributively, those applied to quantified expressions individually. A. {pa da poi cribe cu bajra} "There is exactly one thing in the universe which is a bear and runs" Assuming the universe is known, this has only the uncertainty of {cu}. It is false if there are no bears, or if none of them or more than one of then runs. B. {(su'o) da poi cribe cu bajra} "At least one thing in the universe is a bear and runs" Like the previous one except that it is true if more than one bear runs as well as when exactly one does. C. {lo cribe cu bajra} "The bear type embraces running" Just what "embraces" means is vague, ranging from "includes as part of its essence" to "does not absolutely exclude." And what even these mean in terms of bear tokens (actual bears) is perhaps even less clear. Toward one end, from "essential" to "includes in it core" (approximately), the sentence would hold even if there were no bears, being entirely a matter of relation between concepts, definable (we can hope) in a suitable system for dealing with concepts without reference to manifestations of those concepts. The same is true at the other end. In between are a number of stations which (so far as I can tell reading up on intensional system) can be adequately defined only with reference to the behavior of tokens (however this reference may be disguised -- as it is very thoroughly in Navya-Nyaya, say). The basic way station is that at least one token actually has the property, one bear actually runs. Beyond that fact, the actual number never seems to matter, but varies pretty freely, often under the influence of the (covert) modi. The typical focuses in conversation seem to be the upper, conceptual, one (which may hold even if there are no bears), generalization, and particular cases, which latter two seem to require bears but no particular positive number that run -- though moore for generalization, generally, than for particular cases. (I know, we have such cases as "Bears generally run and they are now" where the numbers are irrelevant altogether, but generally ...) All of these are false if there are bears but none of them runs, but there being more than one running bear does not falsify the sentence. The above is the xorlo explanation. For CLL and the intermediate position we have slightly different explanations, though almost the same extentional applacations. "Some of all the bears run." In CLL, this is almost directly equated with B and holds in the B cases. In the intermediate position, this reads as "There is a bunch of bears that run" and reduces to B again, though slightly less directly. It also holds in the B cases. In both of these older understandings, there is a stylistic distinction between C and B, in that C is more natural outside the particular cases, for generalities and possibilities and the like. This is partly a matter of scope considerations, I think, although the effect of this can be argued both ways. In any case, this stylistic difference persists in xorlo, with more obvious justification. D. {lo pa cribe cu bajra} xorlo: "The one-bear type embraces running" Most of what was said just above applies here as well. Now, of course, we automatically exclude any property (if there are any) that require two or more bears, say, but, taken distributively, still allows what a bear can do/be alone. This focus on single bears restricts the generalities allowd, then, somewhat: bears run in packs (well, they don't but take this as an example of a pattern) but one-bears do not. That aside, the effect of this is much the same as of C. It would seem that {lo pa cribe} could be used, like {lo cribe} even when there were no bears, though this is arguably misleading. When there are several bears, using this expression does not mean that there is only one bear in all the universe that runs, rather it says that there is at least one instance of one-bear that runs; there may be several such instances without contradicting the extentional part of this claim. CLL: "Some of all the bears , of which there is in fact only one, run" = "The only bear there is runs". Obviously this will be false if there are more or fewer than one bears in the universe. We get to one bear by restricting the number of bears, not by restricting the number of them we pick. This is a very restrictive usage and was a major reason for the (unofficial) change to the intermediate position. Intermediate: "A one-membered "bunch" of bears runs." This reduces to "One bear runs," but without denying that other bears run; that is, it is not A (as the CLL form happens to be). It rather focuses on one of these and ignores what others there may be. That is, it picks out some one-bunch without denying that there are other one bunches that also fit. It also does not restrict the number of bears (except exclude zero). As quantifiers go, the operative one is "some," selecting from one-bunches of bears, not "one" selecting from bears. This is analogous to the way that xorlo works at the intensional level. E. {pa (lo) cribe cu bajra} CLL: "One (token of the type) bear runs" Which comes down to "One (actual -- as determined by context, of course) bear runs." External quantifiers bring xorlo back to extensional talk from intensional, though the extension is still defined as that of the earlier type expression. Notice that this sentence is false or meaningless when there are no bears and false when more than one bear in the whole world runs. That is, this now reduces to A. The CLL version reduces to A also, "One out of all the bears." The intermediate position, however is "One out of some bunch of bears runs," allowing that ther may be other running bears -- in other bunches. That is, there is still a "some" between the one and the all, here. Like, {lo pa cribe}, this also points to a potentially identifiable and thus pronominalizable particular one (and bunch, too). Of course, the other version of E do this as well, but not the other versions of D.