From nobody@digitalkingdom.org Thu May 18 06:33:35 2006 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list lojban-list); Thu, 18 May 2006 06:33:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nobody by chain.digitalkingdom.org with local (Exim 4.61) (envelope-from ) id 1FgicZ-0004QN-MG for lojban-list-real@lojban.org; Thu, 18 May 2006 06:32:55 -0700 Received: from ug-out-1314.google.com ([66.249.92.173]) by chain.digitalkingdom.org with esmtp (Exim 4.61) (envelope-from ) id 1FgicX-0004QG-39 for lojban-list@lojban.org; Thu, 18 May 2006 06:32:55 -0700 Received: by ug-out-1314.google.com with SMTP id j40so434148ugd for ; Thu, 18 May 2006 06:32:51 -0700 (PDT) DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=beta; d=gmail.com; h=received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:references; b=HTorgmF6AdR1lZrlA2FstlY29z3Z8lCnv6BXqWvmcyY0sPLI6twR/Reu39NZO8nas1KJGpYJFvIRzP/vs83hvT/plVr7ARqpyEfLAUgfRwUGBubEeoSmy1nmLvFaMUkk8cDXsK/YqT7iNDcDp0zOJoUsDhzkn8nA0yMrqNgoeKU= Received: by 10.78.47.9 with SMTP id u9mr338285huu; Thu, 18 May 2006 06:32:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.78.14.9 with HTTP; Thu, 18 May 2006 06:32:51 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <2d3df92a0605180632u101fda50t8739325b1fca7fd2@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 18 May 2006 15:32:51 +0200 From: HeliodoR To: lojban-list@lojban.org Subject: [lojban] Re: A (rather long) discussion of {all} In-Reply-To: <20060517223915.14619.qmail@web81302.mail.mud.yahoo.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_2658_31494297.1147959171705" References: <2d3df92a0605171008g7e953a6ag2501fc9c09d813a8@mail.gmail.com> <20060517223915.14619.qmail@web81302.mail.mud.yahoo.com> X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) X-archive-position: 11611 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: exitconsole@gmail.com Precedence: bulk Reply-to: lojban-list@lojban.org X-list: lojban-list ------=_Part_2658_31494297.1147959171705 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline > [...] That is, he deals with the ordinary world like > an ordinary person, but, if you ask him, how it is > that all these things are bears (and those over > there aren't), he will say something like "They > look enough alike that conventions allow us to > call them all by the same word." But, he would > add, that doesn't mean that there is any real thing > they have in common. Right. And that's why I said some axioms or written conventions would be needed to describe something precisely and concretely, or else we should recline upon the intuitive use of those unwritten conventions. (Because of the lack of a world looking the same from all viewpoints. Nor You neither me can help it if I insist on what You call a bear is just a moving rock.) > > How do You explain what You > > have in mind? > > Assuming that I have bears in mind, I wouldn't > need to explain, if our nominalist knows about > bears. If he does not, I would draw him a > (visual or verbal) picture. Being a nominalist > doesn't make one stupid. "Bear" vs. "You mean that thing over there? That's only a moving rock" situation again. Suppose I know what people usually call bears, but I keep insisting that they ought to have another name. (Still, I'm not stupid because of that. I have an alternative viewpoint and belief about the question.) > > I think the differences of personal > > point-of-views prevent us from > > talking about one "objective reality". > > This is another metaphysical point: is the world > that I experience the same as the one you do, > given that my experience of the (or "a") world > is different from yours? It is not. Talking in any language people talk about (and compare) Universes in their minds - they talk not of an actual world (if there is such a thing...). Was this not what I said? :) And that we cannot actually compare our experiences even, except verbally (and visually) where we cannot check that we mean the same things by what we say. Of course we can talk about objective reality -- to question whether there is such a thing, if nothing else. The problem is when we think there is such a thing and someone asks us what it is (or even is like). I think we agree. In the light of this, are things describable? (I don't see the conclusion.) > > However, I agree with the rest of the proposal. > > Only some intuitive use > > of the rules should be presumed, or axioms > > should be settled about > > the perception of "reality". > > I am not sure how this fits in with MK's > proposal, which seems to be almost entirely > linguistic, making vanishingly small metaphysical > commitments (beyond what might be involved in > using a certain language, if any are). Well, just a basic affirmation like "Using the rules below we assume that we can name and categorize the entities in every person's mind, and talk about them thatwise." Or if You aren't fond of it, forget what I said. mi'e darves. ------=_Part_2658_31494297.1147959171705 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline
> [...] That is, he deals with the ordinary world like
> an ordinary person, but, if you ask him, how it is
> that all these things are bears (and those over
> there aren't), he will say something like "They
> look enough alike that conventions allow us to
> call them all by the same word."  But, he would
> add, that doesn't mean that there is any real thing
> they have in common.
 
Right. And that's why I said some axioms or written
conventions would be needed to describe something
precisely and concretely, or else we should recline
upon the intuitive use of those unwritten conventions.
(Because of the lack of a world looking the same
from all viewpoints. Nor You neither me can help it
if I insist on what You call a bear is just a moving
rock.)

 
> How do You explain what You
> have in mind?

Assuming that I have bears in mind, I wouldn't
need to explain, if our nominalist knows about
bears.  If he does not, I would draw him a
(visual or verbal) picture.  Being a nominalist
doesn't make one stupid.
 
"Bear" vs. "You mean that thing over there? That's
only a moving rock" situation again. Suppose I know
what people usually call bears, but I keep insisting
that they ought to have another name. (Still, I'm not
stupid because of that. I have an alternative viewpoint
and belief about the question.)
 
> I think the differences of personal
> point-of-views prevent us from
> talking about one "objective reality".

This is another metaphysical point: is the world
that I experience the same as the one you do,
given that my experience of the (or "a") world
is different from yours?
 
It is not. Talking in any language people talk about
(and compare) Universes in their minds - they talk
not of an actual world (if there is such a thing...).
Was this not what I said? :)

And that we cannot actually compare our
experiences even, except verbally (and visually)
where we cannot check that we mean the same
things by what we say.  Of course we can talk
about objective reality -- to question whether there
is such a thing, if nothing else.  The problem is
when we think there is such a thing and someone
asks us what it is (or even is like).
 
I think we agree.
In the light of this, are things describable?
(I don't see the conclusion.)
 
> However, I agree with the rest of the proposal.
> Only some intuitive use
> of the rules should be presumed, or axioms
> should be settled about
> the perception of "reality".

I am not sure how this fits in with MK's
proposal, which seems to be almost entirely
linguistic, making vanishingly small metaphysical
commitments (beyond what might be involved in
using a certain language, if any are).
 
Well, just a basic affirmation like "Using the rules below
we assume that we can name and categorize the entities
in every person's mind, and talk about them thatwise."
Or if You aren't fond of it, forget what I said.
 
mi'e darves.
------=_Part_2658_31494297.1147959171705-- To unsubscribe from this list, send mail to lojban-list-request@lojban.org with the subject unsubscribe, or go to http://www.lojban.org/lsg2/, or if you're really stuck, send mail to secretary@lojban.org for help.