From nobody@digitalkingdom.org Sat May 20 14:45:31 2006 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list lojban-list); Sat, 20 May 2006 14:45:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nobody by chain.digitalkingdom.org with local (Exim 4.61) (envelope-from ) id 1FhZG5-0002Rv-49 for lojban-list-real@lojban.org; Sat, 20 May 2006 14:45:13 -0700 Received: from nz-out-0102.google.com ([64.233.162.194]) by chain.digitalkingdom.org with esmtp (Exim 4.61) (envelope-from ) id 1FhZG3-0002Rn-FY for lojban-list@lojban.org; Sat, 20 May 2006 14:45:12 -0700 Received: by nz-out-0102.google.com with SMTP id f1so922578nzc for ; Sat, 20 May 2006 14:45:10 -0700 (PDT) DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=beta; d=gmail.com; h=received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=PtHGWNxC08fi1JGwayR03BrNXzuRAjXh+V77bzjvW9zMeVzCQSOEHvCrHK3rAPmIv9PZvgY2sAGe8qZrj2geXpGIqqbZWRLKqITzAi+QOmSw60Ffe+EuhWs3wFLX1NvpgPNavgHrnURncCdvwxqW/7Nsn17kdShCj7MjNikdM6g= Received: by 10.36.220.27 with SMTP id s27mr2024982nzg; Sat, 20 May 2006 14:45:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.153.14 with HTTP; Sat, 20 May 2006 14:45:09 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: Date: Sat, 20 May 2006 15:45:09 -0600 From: "Maxim Katcharov" To: lojban-list@lojban.org Subject: [lojban] Re: A (rather long) discussion of {all} In-Reply-To: <20060520134724.33644.qmail@web81303.mail.mud.yahoo.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by Ecartis Content-Disposition: inline References: <20060520134724.33644.qmail@web81303.mail.mud.yahoo.com> X-Spam-Score: -0.8 (/) X-archive-position: 11639 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: maxim.katcharov@gmail.com Precedence: bulk Reply-to: lojban-list@lojban.org X-list: lojban-list On 5/20/06, John E Clifford wrote: > > > --- Maxim Katcharov > wrote: > > > On 5/19/06, John E Clifford > > wrote: > > > MK> > > > > > > < > > from > > > > individual to > > > > individual. >> > > [...] > > > > > > I think that this admission is a tactical > > > mistake. If the set of all bears (actual, > > > possible, past, present and future, etc.) > > varies > > > from person to person, then you have > > essentially > > > conceded xorxes' point. First, if every > > person > > > has such a set, then there is a maximal set > > which > > > embraces all of these (their union -- > > available > > > > The union of all of these bear sets is /not/ > > what I would call the > > "maximal set". The union of what I call this > > set is "everything" (as > > in including pencils), because surely there are > > crazy people out there > > who think/have thought that beds are bears, or > > that knives are bears. > > > Once you have relativized the bear set to > individuals, you can no longer say (you > especially) that some individuals bear sets don't > count. They factor in minimally in guessing this "average set". "Maximal set" is simply wrong, since the implications appear to be that everything that ever was considered a bear is included. "Perfect set" is also a misnomer. "Average set", or "set predicted to have the most utility in communication" are good terms. When *you* say "bears", *you* have *your* criteria in mind. You have in mind neither someone else's criterea, nor an exact "ideal criterea". You have your own, and if you are a sane person, your brain will automatically do its best to make your criterea match what you *think* the average criteria is - your brain standardizes for you. But your criteria is not the "perfect average criteria", it can't be, because you can't really ever know where /everyone's/ boundaries are, unless everyone has very simplistic boundaries, and "everyone" is only a small group of people (perhaps you're on an island). When listening to you, I attempt to use *your* criteria. The best way for me to try to do this given that I don't know your criterea, is to use *my* criterea. Why? Because I assume that both our brains are standardizing for us. http://www.upa.pdx.edu/IOA/newsom/pa551/venn.gif For "child", our criteria/bounds (represented by circles) probably have a shared variance of 75%. For "future", probably 99.99%. For "bear", 75%. However, since we rarely see bears that deviate much from the center, for all practical purposes our SV for "bear" is 99%. Things that can be referenced as "children" have a near-perfectly even progression out into "not children", so their practical SV is 75%. This uncertainty is not a problem to my model. The uncertainty exists between two people, not within the speaker's own bounds. I can grasp the concept of "all permutations of anything - things/events/feelings". I need not be able to imagine every single of the infinite permutations. When I think of or say "all bears" I have a perfectly definite and exact concept of bears - that is, if I /were/ to think of every single permutation, I could theoretically (if my brain was fixed in time) by my definitions judge everything to be a bear or not a bear. I need not imagine each to grasp the concept of this mega-set. I have very fixed lines at one point in time that determine what is a bear and what isn't. The objection is that people's sets of bears are vague. They are not. People have an uncertain chance of agreeing on fringe cases, and that's the sort of vagueness that I'm asserting exists. > count. Knives and beds are possible bears -- > indeed, in your story, actual ones -- since they > are in some person's bear set. The rest of us > may disagree, but we all disagree with one > another about some cases. You seem to be working > with two criteria here; pick one. If you still think that I have two criterea, what are they? > > > Perhaps the /average/ of these sets, and surely > > the /consensus/ of > > these sets would be the very closest we're ever > > going to come to this > > "*ideal* mega-set". > > We are not after an ideal mega-set, just the set Sorry, subset of the mega-set that is "bear". The bear mega-set. > of all actual (whenever) and possible bears, and Are you looking for some sort of objective criteria for "bear"? Sorry, there's no such thing. There may be one for "future", or for "atom"? I don't know. I don't care about it. I care that the speaker is capable of judging things to be bears/not bears at the point in time that he says the word, and that there is the hypothetical concept of "every permutation of anything that could be" (mega-set). These two things I assert are true. > that is, by you definitions, the union of all the > personal bear sets. It is also the one The ideal (most useful) mega-set of bears is most certainly *not* the /union/ of all sets of bears, though it may be the /average/ - "the ideal average set". > guraranteed to exist (well, the intersection Yes, it exists theoretically (as opposed to in full detail of every permutation that[...]) in the mind of the speaker as he concieves of the word. > does, too -- even if it happens to be empty, > though that not for L-sets). I agree that this > is a reasonable way to go, but not one available > to you starting as you do (which is why I think > itwas a bad move). > > > > > even for L-sets). Since, ex hypothesi, no > > one > > > actually has this as his set, then no one > > really > > > means ALL bears when he say {lo ro cribe}, > > only > > > "all the things I think of as bears." > > Further, > > > > There is no such thing as a universal set "all > > bears". There is only > > what is considered "all bears" by each person, > > and what may be > > considered "all bears" mutually by two people > > when they have changed > > (even in minor details) the bounds of their > > model of what constitutes > > a bear and reached a consensus. Each person has > > a model of something > > like the most ideal or typical bear, and then a > > certain tolerance to > > deviation - a certain bounds at which something > > is no longer a bear at > > all. > > This is psychologically an implausible model for > how we do these things, so it is not a good It is a perfectly plausable (and accurate!) model. If you are going to make these objections, please detail the errors. Examples and explanations are always of great aid. > rational reconstruction. It also, of course, > does not fit your earlier discussion about bear > sets in a very clear way. I think it does. Perhaps our definitions of words used went out of tune. > > > My tolerance may be smaller than yours. My > > 'typical bear' may be > > a bit different than yours. This is simply a > > fact, and I'm not going > > to gloss over it by saying "there is one ideal > > of 'bear' that is based > > on the mind of no mortal". > > Wise, but irrelevant to where you were the last > time 'round. It's good that you say this, as it indicates that you believe not in the existance of this sort of set. > > > > once you allow that what counts as a bear > > varies > > > from person to person, you have to allow that > > for > > > each person it varies with time (as it > > clearly > > > does as the person grows in knowledge, but > > not > > > obviously only that). And once you do that, > > the > > > step to "it varies with the person's > > interests at > > > the time" is hardly a step at all. And then > > we > > > are at xorxes' place "all bears" is > > everything I > > > count as a bear at the moment. > > > > No, you've made a jump from "everything I > > consider a bear at the > > moment" to "those bears that I am referring to > > at the moment". > > My point is that, once you allow that what I > consider a bear may fluctuate from moment to > moment, you have to allow that the reason for the > fluctuation may simply what I happen to be > referring to. You have built in no way to That the thing that you're referring to fluctuates? No. The fluctuation is due to your brain trying to constantly adjust to what it percieves the best definition to be. As you make rationalizations for drawing the bounds in this place or that place, your bounds shift. If you froze a person's brain in time and made it not scared of being decisive, and prevented it from constantly rationalizing regarding the bounds, and then made it judge the mega-set as bears-or-not, it would after an infinite amount of time provide you with a group of things that are bears. The referent can't fluctuate (from one moment to the next things change, but when I say "this pen" I mean it 'now'), so I don't think I understand you there. > prevent this other than *saying* that it ain't > so, which is hardly decisive (or, maybe, even > relevant). > > > Both > > can be expressed by the ambiguous "everything I > > count as a bear at the > > moment". xorxes' position is that > > > > "all bears must be accounted for..." > > > > refers not to *all* bears, but the bears in the > > X. > > Not quite the point; his bears need not be > restricted in any easily describable way (other > than "the relevant ones," say). The bears in that contract have a sticky spatial restriction applied to them. I consider that a very real restriction. Even "bears such that are relevant to our conversation" is a very real restriction. > > > Now, someone who > > says the above would still > > considers/counts/etc. a bear that is not in > > the X a bear - they're simply not referring to > > it. It doesn't "count" > > as a bear that they're *referring to*, but it > > still clearly counts as > > a bear. The vagueness that I've asserted exists > > is as follows: > > > But as soon as the question about another bear > arises, it becomes a referred to bear, and so > comes to count. It does not seem that you can > say that something not referred to still counts > as a bear, because it can only be counted by > being referred to. ...I can't communicate without having referents. So, uh, yes, the bears become referents in *our* conversation here. But these bears (mega-set) do not come to count as referents in *that* example. So when I raise the question of this bear-set in our conversation, it makes no sense for you to suggest that it becomes the referent in that hypothetical example. > > Anyway, point is, the argument is wrong because > > it fails to > > differentiate between "think truly is" and "am > > currently referring to > > as". > > Again, the point is that you have not left a > basis for making that distinction. A person who > is currently referring to something as a bear > currently thinks it truly is one and conversely Yes. > and, having relativized what is a bear to this > situation, you cannot not absolutize to some part > of that situation. I don't understand you here. To unsubscribe from this list, send mail to lojban-list-request@lojban.org with the subject unsubscribe, or go to http://www.lojban.org/lsg2/, or if you're really stuck, send mail to secretary@lojban.org for help.