From nobody@digitalkingdom.org Wed May 31 16:21:27 2006 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list lojban-list); Wed, 31 May 2006 16:21:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nobody by chain.digitalkingdom.org with local (Exim 4.62) (envelope-from ) id 1FlZzw-0006bM-Qq for lojban-list-real@lojban.org; Wed, 31 May 2006 16:21:08 -0700 Received: from mxsf06.cluster1.charter.net ([209.225.28.206]) by chain.digitalkingdom.org with esmtp (Exim 4.62) (envelope-from ) id 1FlZzs-0006bD-S3 for lojban-list@lojban.org; Wed, 31 May 2006 16:21:08 -0700 Received: from mxip09a.cluster1.charter.net (mxip09a.cluster1.charter.net [209.225.28.139]) by mxsf06.cluster1.charter.net (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id k4VNL23Q018841 for ; Wed, 31 May 2006 19:21:03 -0400 Received: from 24-247-28-251.dhcp.bycy.mi.charter.com (HELO [192.168.123.137]) ([24.247.28.251]) by mxip09a.cluster1.charter.net with ESMTP; 31 May 2006 19:21:03 -0400 X-IronPort-AV: i="4.05,195,1146456000"; d="scan'208"; a="196509613:sNHT19240542" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v750) In-Reply-To: References: <925d17560605160731j379ecfdbo42862a88433e112c@mail.gmail.com> <925d17560605291351i15f1def0ocb0e163cb7a6143c@mail.gmail.com> <925d17560605291521s64cb0a2as821eea86d63839b8@mail.gmail.com> <925d17560605291805y7f216d65v33b13eb6741ffda6@mail.gmail.com> <925d17560605300707y79d20b95nd621ac89c5e17215@mail.gmail.com> <925d17560605310741g384f22b1k5b91aba8173006cd@mail.gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; delsp=yes; format=flowed Message-Id: <091DB701-15E0-4D60-A741-7F9993A53228@umich.edu> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: Alex Martini Subject: [lojban] Re: A (rather long) discussion of {all} Date: Wed, 31 May 2006 19:21:00 -0400 To: lojban-list@lojban.org X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.750) X-Spam-Score: -2.6 (--) X-archive-position: 11701 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: alexjm@umich.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-to: lojban-list@lojban.org X-list: lojban-list >> [ li'o ] >> > It's not my point that it matters what someone thinks at some >> point in >> > time. I may as well be stating that all dogs are animals. I don't >> > think of {rokci} when I say {braro'i}. But boulders are rocks, dogs >> > are animals, and human bodies (sans implications of >> consciousness) are >> > masses of human organs. I assume that while you don't have to >> specify >> > in your mind that a pencil is a mass of molecules, you nevertheless >> > would acknowledge that it is, factually, a mass of molecules, or at >> > the very very least a mass of some graphite and wood. >> >> I certainly would, yes. But I would never say "May I borrow those >> molecules, >> please, I need to jot something down", and I don't think anyone >> would. The > > It doesn't matter if you would treat it as such in this situation. > What matters is that it /is/. > >> scientific question "what does a pencil consist of?" is fairly >> irrelevant to the >> linguistic question "how does one refer to a pencil?". >> >> > This applies in the opposite direction. If you wanted to think of >> > molecules arranged pen-wise (assuming your mind was up to the >> task), >> > you could do that without having to think of the concept of "pen". >> >> With some effort, yes. > > With considerable effort. An easier thing to do would be to consider > graphite and wood arranged pencil-wise. > >> >> > However, not having to think of "pen" does not mean that those >> > molecules ("arranged pen-wise") aren't a pen, just as not having to >> > think of "body" does not mean that those organs ("arranged body- >> wise") >> > aren't a body. This is true even if you don't have a word for >> pen or >> > body. >> >> If you are trying to prove that aggregates have linguistic >> existence, you >> don't have to convince me, I'm on your side. I have no ontological >> problem >> with the existence of groups as groups, as I said from the start. >> >> [ li'o ] Let's consider the idea of an object for a moment. Looking at the molecular level, as in the pen example, there is nothing especially special about the border between the pen and the air surrounding it, or the border of the pen and the fingers touching it. There are just two different groups of molecules that have a high probability of behaving the same way. At this level, everything is just a probability. When you pick up a pen, some of the pen molecules are left behind; when you set it down, part of your finger is now part of the pen because of the skin cells and oils that rubbed off. This suggests that there is little physical evidence for the existence of objects. From a different angle, consider the world as it would appear if we could detect the molecules instead of just the light that bounced off them and the vibrations between them etc. The universe is just one very large field of molecules, with different distances between them. What we call solid is just an area of very little distance. Liquid and gas have larger distance. But you probably already know that. However, try to make objects out of this 'solid' world; there's not much to base it on. All an object is is an abstract representation inside the human mind of a set of molecules that usually behave together. When you move part of an apple, the rest follows. When you make a splash in one end of a pool, the other end is effected, but the stones don't ripple (unless you've been taking some interesting medications). In essence, since considering individual particles is beyond the mental capacity of (most) humans, we group them along the important distinctions. But this isn't the end -- we *continue* grouping things as we see relative. Out of many long threads that are woven together, we call cloth. Sew it a certain way, and it's a pair of pants. Add a shirt and some other things and now it's an outfit. Several outfits, a wardrobe. And so on. The point is that while scientifically, everything is composed of infinitely smaller pieces, from a linguistic point of view what matters is how people actually *think* of things. And that is in terms of abstracted objects. To unsubscribe from this list, send mail to lojban-list-request@lojban.org with the subject unsubscribe, or go to http://www.lojban.org/lsg2/, or if you're really stuck, send mail to secretary@lojban.org for help.