From nobody@digitalkingdom.org Sun Aug 31 21:54:04 2008 Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list lojban-list); Sun, 31 Aug 2008 21:54:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nobody by chain.digitalkingdom.org with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1Ka1QS-0007aL-1Z for lojban-list-real@lojban.org; Sun, 31 Aug 2008 21:54:04 -0700 Received: from qb-out-1314.google.com ([72.14.204.169]) by chain.digitalkingdom.org with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1Ka1QF-0007Zn-R5 for lojban-list@lojban.org; Sun, 31 Aug 2008 21:54:03 -0700 Received: by qb-out-1314.google.com with SMTP id e19so2366798qbe.0 for ; Sun, 31 Aug 2008 21:53:50 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:received:received:message-id:date:from:to :subject:mime-version:content-type; bh=zdiU7RUz6bt/yv5t+VOc87WxloCTyJVoOMhWExlaHTY=; b=xt7xAn3IusEn6Hfk/4AUno2g0G8I+wHl3rPQVhWrj9KkjA42pEZfoGiQkQLFOZYIgM Bge2bj2j+dhY+zDlvabAW+AqZjqpzDYMCV8aeQ6udNkmuM8ltnbxUK8M4SiI8ALvbUSb i7iyrPJcgLRLzQOvM4SBx1yDn6db2VIlVNQP0= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=message-id:date:from:to:subject:mime-version:content-type; b=WlUPlsppR50EHWknEgD2NlyfcgapRn+SdWKSJPEK3U2Tsy9fWZ0mVuLCxI2JeiqDaY Yy6taYzUOVR4l/L97f66aqguIOc/q6jQ/5T74Is0sMkgLrFDIDTyV8bAtEgvqjiq1Qh3 KZs1Xne2ACo5UfAflLElGI24+Z04f4xO84Jgw= Received: by 10.142.212.19 with SMTP id k19mr1961294wfg.13.1220244829965; Sun, 31 Aug 2008 21:53:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.142.51.12 with HTTP; Sun, 31 Aug 2008 21:53:49 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2008 00:53:49 -0400 From: "Brett Williams" To: lojban-list@lojban.org Subject: [lojban] LA/LO/LE: Three Perspectives on Language MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_24129_14392962.1220244829952" X-Spam-Score: 0.0 X-Spam-Score-Int: 0 X-Spam-Bar: / X-archive-position: 14690 X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: lojban-list-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: mungojelly@gmail.com Precedence: bulk Reply-to: lojban-list@lojban.org X-list: lojban-list ------=_Part_24129_14392962.1220244829952 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline LA LA is the easiest gadri to explain and to use. LA isolates one of the most fundamental properties of language: That an arbitrary sound can indicate an arbitrary referent in the world. With LA we have complete freedom to use this power of language. We can name anything any name, even if the thing is already named or the name is already taken. From the perspective of LA, words are just sounds, which anyone can attach freely to anything. With LA, we are each Adam. LO With LO we move into another fundamental property of language: It is spoken in communities, and within those language communities sounds are more firmly associated with meanings. Words have not just meanings to particular speakers in particular circumstances, but meanings which persist stably and are collectively recognized. In the case of LO, what we're talking about specifically is the meanings of the words of Lojban, as agreed by the community as a whole. This pool of shared meanings is the fundamental resource we all draw on in using Lojban to communicate. A word is like a box. Each box has a label on it, such as "plise". Together we form a consensus about what sort of things we expect to be inside of a box labelled "plise" (namely, apples). If you have some apples you want to refer to, you can put them into the box that everyone has agreed about, so that when they see the label on the box they'll know what's inside. Saying LO is thus a promise that what we're referring to really-is the sort of thing we've all become accustomed to putting in that sort of box. Once you've taken it that far, though, you can go ahead and take it to the next level of abstraction: You can manipulate the boxes themselves, without even bothering to put anything in them. That is, you can say "mi djica lo nu mi ponse lo plise" (I want to possess something in a box labelled "plise"), and rather than thinking of a particular apple which you're imagining putting into the box, you're just asking for one of those "plise" boxes, because you want the sort of thing which we all agree is kept in that sort of box. LE However, the truth of human use of language is not quite so simple. For instance, in practice people don't actually have to restrict themselves to putting into boxes what the label says is supposed to be there. The culturally shared meanings that associate labelled boxes with referents in the world can give way in the course of a conversation to immediately constructed meanings; the participants in a conversation can use the boxes at hand to hold whatever needs to be held. When you say LE you are saying what box you are using, but you don't implicitly promise that you'll really put in the box what we've all agreed is the normal thing to put in the box. The perspective of LE acknowledges the reality that socially constructed meanings can be repurposed for immediate ends. The other quality which is often mentioned as part of the nature of LE is that the speaker has a particular referent in mind. They're not using an empty box to stand in for the sort of thing it usually contains; there's actually something in the box. To me this arises inevitably from the fact that a LE box does not necessarily contain the socially agreed contents of a box with its label. Consider what you're saying if you say "le plise ku": It's a box labelled "plise", but you're not promising that there's apples inside, only something which you've decided to put in the apples box. If saying "mi djica lo nu ponse le plise" (I want to possess what's in the apples box) could be interpreted as if it were pointing at a theoretical/empty box, as LO can, then what would be in the box? You'd be asking for a box which contains something which *could* be put into an apples box, but may or may not actually be apples-- in other words, since we've already agreed that anything could theoretically be put into any box, you could get absolutely anything. Since that is uselessly vague, it follows logically that when you say LE you have more of an idea in mind of what you are describing than simply what its label is. For a long time I've been carefully considering these three perspectives of LA, LO and LE and gradually forming my own understanding of them. I'd appreciate any comments on or criticism of this draft essay. mu'o mi'e se ckiku ------=_Part_24129_14392962.1220244829952 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline LA
 
     LA is the easiest gadri to ex= plain and to use.  LA isolates one of the most fundamental properties = of language: That an arbitrary sound can indicate an arbitrary referent in = the world.  With LA we have complete freedom to use this power of lang= uage.  We can name anything any name, even if the thing is already nam= ed or the name is already taken.  From the perspective of LA, words ar= e just sounds, which anyone can attach freely to anything.  With LA, w= e are each Adam.


LO

     With LO we move into anoth= er fundamental property of language: It is spoken in communities, and = within those language communities sounds are more = firmly associated with meanings.  Words have = not just meanings to particular speakers in&n= bsp;particular circumstances, but meanings which persist sta= bly and are collectively recognized.  In the&= nbsp;case of LO, what we're talking about = ;specifically is the meanings of the words of= Lojban, as agreed by the community as a=  whole.  This pool of shared meanings is=  the fundamental resource we all draw on in&n= bsp;using Lojban to communicate. 
     A word is like a box.  Each box has a = label on it, such as "plise".  Together we form a consensus = about what sort of things we expect to be inside of a box labelled "pl= ise" (namely, apples).  If you have some apples you want to refer= to, you can put them into the box that everyone has agreed about, so that = when they see the label on the box they'll know what's inside. &nbs= p;Saying LO is thus a promise that what we're referring to really-is th= e sort of thing we've all become accustomed to putting in that sort of = box.
     Once you've taken it that far, though, yo= u can go ahead and take it to the next level of abstraction: You can manipu= late the boxes themselves, without even bothering to put anything in them. =  That is, you can say "mi djica lo nu mi ponse lo plise" (I = want to possess something in a box labelled "plise"), and rather = than thinking of a particular apple which you're imagining putting into= the box, you're just asking for one of those "plise" b= oxes, because you want the sort of thing whic= h we all agree is kept in that sort of&n= bsp;box.


LE

     However, the truth of huma= n use of language is not quite so simple.  For instance, in = practice people don't actually have to restrict themselves to putt= ing into boxes what the label says is supposed to be there.  = ;The culturally shared meanings that associate labelled=  boxes with referents in the world can give w= ay in the course of a conversation to im= mediately constructed meanings; the participants in a c= onversation can use the boxes at hand to hold = ;whatever needs to be held.  When you say LE&= nbsp;you are saying what box you are using, but you don= 't implicitly promise that you'll really put in=  the box what we've all agreed is&nb= sp;the normal thing to put in the box.  = The perspective of LE acknowledges the reality tha= t socially constructed meanings can be repurp= osed for immediate ends. 
     The other quality which is often mentioned = as part of the nature of LE is that the speaker has a&n= bsp;particular referent in mind.  They're not using=  an empty box to stand in for the s= ort of thing it usually contains; there's=  actually something in the box.  To me t= his arises inevitably from the fact that a&nb= sp;LE box does not necessarily contain the so= cially agreed contents of a box with its label. &n= bsp;Consider what you're saying if you sa= y "le plise ku": It's a box labelled "pli= se", but you're not promising that t= here's apples inside, only something which you'= ve decided to put in the apples box. &nb= sp;If saying "mi djica lo nu ponse le plise&q= uot; (I want to possess what's in the app= les box) could be interpreted as if it were pointi= ng at a theoretical/empty box, as LO can, then&nbs= p;what would be in the box?  You'd b= e asking for a box which contains something which = *could* be put into an apples box, but m= ay or may not actually be apples-- in other words, sinc= e we've already agreed that anything could theoretically be put into an= y box, you could get absolutely anything. &nb= sp;Since that is uselessly vague, it follows = logically that when you say LE you have more of&nb= sp;an idea in mind of what you are describing=  than simply what its label is.



     For a long time I&= #39;ve been carefully considering these three perspectives of LA, LO and LE= and gradually forming my own understanding of them.  I'd apprecia= te any comments on or criticism of this draft essay.

mu'o mi'e se ckiku

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