From lojban+bncCOjSjrXVGBDj29jhBBoEGfOcaQ@googlegroups.com Thu Jul 08 12:58:50 2010 Received: from mail-qw0-f61.google.com ([209.85.216.61]) by chain.digitalkingdom.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1OWxF1-0006Ab-VN; Thu, 08 Jul 2010 12:58:49 -0700 Received: by qwi2 with SMTP id 2sf355569qwi.16 for ; Thu, 08 Jul 2010 12:58:33 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=googlegroups.com; s=beta; h=domainkey-signature:received:x-beenthere:received:received:received :received:received-spf:received:mime-version:received:received :in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :x-original-sender:x-original-authentication-results:reply-to :precedence:mailing-list:list-id:list-post:list-help:list-archive :sender:list-subscribe:list-unsubscribe:content-type; bh=TF2kjY/R6zkuo4NtqBtoeGfx/O8lJNyc7Zeg0iAdcfA=; b=DoPCQTYViAjpZmvpYnAqBI/ERV3HwmJJXocOqFj067+JInmq+elVgjWcQN28UM1f7O nfZ4cI1Ta/MxjHwZe0kvsgq7AXDM+pH0+IsS1A/sia5h71Kk208YWfJvROHCxVfahQf8 SoVZsRyGx9Ss3glrm/1ycpBbtZuaZ9/Ui192Y= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=googlegroups.com; s=beta; h=x-beenthere:received-spf:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:x-original-sender :x-original-authentication-results:reply-to:precedence:mailing-list :list-id:list-post:list-help:list-archive:sender:list-subscribe :list-unsubscribe:content-type; b=L6Vh2QrptIJNLbDzh1OF3p3wDG/JFbgaFHNS7QAvdAdguCTMeJwU1mSJkz6iu3XNH5 g44sxfMjs6mJesFoNz0JuSmN7DMAiVNUlx6DhY7OSIiRWGsfmDAXAzw2pQA9E63rfgsi 3ez0Rx8fo1ozGRswE+3gWFfrzjXtMThMVMffo= Received: by 10.229.216.205 with SMTP id hj13mr1138950qcb.8.1278619107578; Thu, 08 Jul 2010 12:58:27 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: lojban@googlegroups.com Received: by 10.229.248.75 with SMTP id mf11ls3266417qcb.1.p; Thu, 08 Jul 2010 12:58:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.229.218.14 with SMTP id ho14mr683196qcb.21.1278619104596; Thu, 08 Jul 2010 12:58:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.229.218.14 with SMTP id ho14mr683194qcb.21.1278619104485; Thu, 08 Jul 2010 12:58:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-vw0-f50.google.com (mail-vw0-f50.google.com [209.85.212.50]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTP id x40si16766qce.7.2010.07.08.12.58.23; Thu, 08 Jul 2010 12:58:23 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of lukeabergen@gmail.com designates 209.85.212.50 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.212.50; Received: by mail-vw0-f50.google.com with SMTP id 19so1037096vws.37 for ; Thu, 08 Jul 2010 12:58:23 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.220.157.139 with SMTP id b11mr4615031vcx.39.1278619103121; Thu, 08 Jul 2010 12:58:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.220.165.206 with HTTP; Thu, 8 Jul 2010 12:58:22 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2010 15:58:22 -0400 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [lojban] beyond good and evil From: Luke Bergen To: lojban@googlegroups.com X-Original-Sender: lukeabergen@gmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of lukeabergen@gmail.com designates 209.85.212.50 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=lukeabergen@gmail.com; dkim=pass (test mode) header.i=@gmail.com Reply-To: lojban@googlegroups.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list lojban@googlegroups.com; contact lojban+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: Sender: lojban@googlegroups.com List-Subscribe: , List-Unsubscribe: , Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=e0cb4e6ff62971d3be048ae5b596 --e0cb4e6ff62971d3be048ae5b596 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 I hear what you're saying, and I agree with you, but it still seems odd to me. It seems to me like the abstract concept of virtue (lo ka vrude) is fundamentally different from a specific event of something being virtuous (lo nu vrude) which are both different things, I think, from a thing being a virtuous entity (lo vrude). On Thu, Jul 8, 2010 at 3:27 PM, tijlan wrote: > On 8 July 2010 14:56, Luke Bergen wrote: > >> Really? Where do you see that the x1 can be properties? jbovlaste says: >> >> Word: vrude [jbovlaste] >> Type: gismu >> Gloss Word: virtue >> Gloss Word: virtuous >> rafsi: vud vu'e >> Definition: x1 is virtuous/saintly/[fine/moral/nice/holy/morally good] by >> standard x2. >> Notes: Holy/saintly (= cesyvu'e ). Virtue the attribute is "ka >> vrude". >> >> I think we can talk about whether or not the quality of an action are > virtuous: > > lo ka do sidju mi cu vrude > The quality of you helping me is virtuous. > > lo nu do sidju mi cu vrude > The event of you helping me is virtuous. > > Note the "Notes". From what you're saying about the book, it sounds like the title is talking about the ideas of virtue and evil, not people who behave virtuously/evily. >> >> Right, and that {lo vrude} and {lo palci} can mean behaviours is my > opinion. Even in English we can talk about whether or not an abstract > concept such as someone's "life" is "virtuous" (OED has an example of this > usage). > > As I have mentioned on several occasions before, I think a person or > anything we usually consider as 'individual' is fundamentally an > abstraction. We call something "a car" not because it essentially "is a car" > but because things (the steering wheel, the sheets, the tires, etc.) > practically "do car" at certain times; at other times someone might call it > "a house" because the things "do house". So "a car" is a label for an event > or state of things car-ing. The same for persons. {do} in the following > sentences refer to different abstractions: > > do bajra > > do badri > > do bajra je badri > > The first {do} refers to the whole of bones, muscles etc. forming a > run-able physical body; the second {do} refers to the brain system capable > of generating the experience of sadness; and the third {do} refers to both > abstractions. In every case, {do} is not to be found as a concrete > existence. > > Can we think of a person without having an idea of an event/state/property > that formulates that person (including a mere image of their face, which > itself is a state of a nose, eyes, etc. forming a pattern)? I don't think we > can. But we also like to think of each of ourselves as an individual entity > with its own permanent existential center rather than as a phase in the flux > of events. We say "you", not "you-ation" or something like that; "You are > virtuous", not "A you-ation is virtuous". Nevertheless, we cannot say "You > are virtuous" without referring to a particular decision making process in a > brain or to an external action or other modes of event, since these are what > define "you" itself. > > In short, there aren't really "people who behave virtuously/evily" but > "people that are virtuous/evil thoughts or behaviours" (just for now I'm > ignoring the falsehood of the virtuous/evil dichotomy that Nietzche > criticizes). The jbovlaste definition doesn't have to explicitly enforce > this radical perspective, but neither should it preclude it by saying > "vrude"s x1 cannot be a NU sumti. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "lojban" group. > To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > lojban+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/lojban?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "lojban" group. To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to lojban+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/lojban?hl=en. --e0cb4e6ff62971d3be048ae5b596 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I hear what you're saying, and I agree with you, but it still seems odd= to me. =A0It seems to me like the abstract concept of virtue (lo ka vrude)= is fundamentally different from a specific event of something being virtuo= us (lo nu vrude) which are both different things, I think, from a thing bei= ng a virtuous entity (lo vrude).

On Thu, Jul 8, 2010 at 3:27 PM, t= ijlan <jbotijla= n@gmail.com> wrote:
On 8 July 2010 14:56, Luke Ber= gen <lukeabergen@gmail.com> wrote:
Really? =A0Where do you see that the x1 can be properties? =A0jbovlaste say= s:

Word: vr=
ude [jbovlaste]
        Type: gismu
  Gloss Word: virtue
  Gloss Word: virtuous
       rafsi: vud vu'e
  Definition: x1 is virtuous/saintly/[fine/moral/nice/holy/morally good] by
       standard x2.
       Notes: Holy/saintly (=3D cesyvu'e).  Virtue the attribute is "ka
       vrude".
I think we can talk about whether or not the quality of an action are virtu= ous:

=A0lo ka do sidju mi cu vrude
=A0The quality of you helping me is virtuous.

=A0lo nu do sidju mi c= u vrude
=A0The event of you helping me is virtuous.

Note the "Notes".  From what you're saying a=
bout the book, it sounds like the title is talking about the ideas of virtu=
e and evil, not people who behave virtuously/evily.




Right, and that {lo vrude} and {lo pal=
ci} can mean behaviours is my opinion. Even in English we can talk about wh=
ether or not an abstract concept such as someone's "life" is =
"virtuous" (OED has an example of this usage).



As I have mentioned on several occasions before, I think a person or an=
ything we usually consider as 'individual' is fundamentally an abst=
raction. We call something "a car" not because it essentially &qu=
ot;is a car" but because things (the steering wheel, the sheets, the t=
ires, etc.) practically "do car" at certain times; at other times=
 someone might call it "a house" because the things "do hous=
e". So "a car" is a label for an event or state of things ca=
r-ing. The same for persons. {do} in the following sentences refer to diffe=
rent abstractions:



=A0do bajra

=A0do badri

=A0do bajra je badri

The f=
irst {do} refers to the whole of bones, muscles etc. forming a run-able phy=
sical body; the second {do} refers to the brain system capable of generatin=
g the experience of sadness; and the third {do} refers to both abstractions=
. In every case, {do} is not to be found as a concrete existence.



Can we think of a person without having an idea of an event/state/prope=
rty that formulates that person (including a mere image of their face, whic=
h itself is a state of a nose, eyes, etc. forming a pattern)? I don't t=
hink we can. But we also like to think of each of ourselves as an individua=
l entity with its own permanent existential center rather than as a phase i=
n the flux of events. We say "you", not "you-ation" or =
something like that; "You are virtuous", not "A you-ation is=
 virtuous". Nevertheless, we cannot say "You are virtuous" w=
ithout referring to a particular decision making process in a brain or to a=
n external action or other modes of event, since these are what define &quo=
t;you" itself.



In short, there aren't really "people who behave virtuously/ev=
ily" but "people that are virtuous/evil thoughts or behaviours&qu=
ot; (just for now I'm ignoring the falsehood of the virtuous/evil dicho=
tomy that Nietzche criticizes). The jbovlaste definition doesn't have t=
o explicitly enforce this radical perspective, but neither should it preclu=
de it by saying "vrude"s x1 cannot be a NU sumti.









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