From lojban+bncCMHEmaCOBhClmbnyBBoE6hcQcg@googlegroups.com Fri Aug 19 04:44:53 2011 Received: from mail-gy0-f189.google.com ([209.85.160.189]) by chain.digitalkingdom.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from ) id 1QuNVI-00066D-3T; Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:53 -0700 Received: by gyc15 with SMTP id 15sf4312290gyc.16 for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:41 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=googlegroups.com; s=beta; h=x-beenthere:received-spf:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:x-original-sender :x-original-authentication-results:reply-to:precedence:mailing-list :list-id:x-google-group-id:list-post:list-help:list-archive:sender :list-subscribe:list-unsubscribe:content-type; bh=dnVBac8zjDAy1X+EXxyUCnSHJ3OPX+q51pSGClpeZtM=; b=12+YoZwULojs32HU2Z1GqR6JXbKUoSlbgB/xTFACq8JMpgypZqsS9FOYsr378iyx+S aJkXpdvBZN22buKiIhqHWitEKJ9cyTf5trN9sN8YRX2y56G+AI9fp4C2R/7IeyXkjzzc UoFphsM5kMTTAZyT2uNWEYEaA5nu9jLrCAXN4= Received: by 10.236.191.38 with SMTP id f26mr595926yhn.16.1313754277874; Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:37 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: lojban@googlegroups.com Received: by 10.90.122.4 with SMTP id u4ls11055423agc.5.gmail; Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.236.80.70 with SMTP id j46mr4848789yhe.5.1313754276187; Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.236.80.70 with SMTP id j46mr4848787yhe.5.1313754276173; Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:36 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-pz0-f43.google.com (mail-pz0-f43.google.com [209.85.210.43]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id j4si9752994pbi.2.2011.08.19.04.44.36 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:36 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of eyeonus@gmail.com designates 209.85.210.43 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.210.43; Received: by pzk1 with SMTP id 1so5033657pzk.2 for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:36 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.142.147.12 with SMTP id u12mr942044wfd.345.1313754275950; Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.142.13.8 with HTTP; Fri, 19 Aug 2011 04:44:35 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <20110811101134.GF10697@gonzales> <1313159555.91794.YahooMailRC@web81303.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20110812152917.GK10697@gonzales> <20110813082934.GO10697@gonzales> <1313242205.82409.YahooMailRC@web81306.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20110813150339.GR10697@gonzales> Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2011 05:44:35 -0600 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [lojban] xorlo and masses From: Jonathan Jones To: lojban@googlegroups.com X-Original-Sender: eyeonus@gmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of eyeonus@gmail.com designates 209.85.210.43 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=eyeonus@gmail.com; dkim=pass (test mode) header.i=@gmail.com Reply-To: lojban@googlegroups.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list lojban@googlegroups.com; contact lojban+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 1004133512417 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: Sender: lojban@googlegroups.com List-Subscribe: , List-Unsubscribe: , Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=000e0cd240b4f0b0d004aada4099 --000e0cd240b4f0b0d004aada4099 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 On Fri, Aug 19, 2011 at 2:45 AM, tijlan wrote: > On 18 August 2011 14:58, Jonathan Jones wrote: > > I do not say that something must have at least a brain and eyes in order > to > > be lo viska. I said that the eyes are not what sees. > > What I will say is that > > in order to be lo viska, the thing in question must be capable of seeing. > A > > blind man has both eyes and brain, but the blind man does not see. > > Right, so the part-whole relation is not essential to the selbri's > meaning. And what ultimately determines what X is, is not what X 'is' > but what X does, how X functions, i.e. what occurs. Something is lo > viska if it represents the event of potential or actual see-ing as a > subject. We don't need presuppositions like "eyes are not lo viska > because eyes do not include a brain". > > > > As to the rest of your arguments, I didn't bother reading them, because, > > quite honestly, I don't care what you have to say on the subject, because > I > > just don't care enough about the subject to waste that much time on it. > I'm > > not going to read that. I'm just going to say this- As far as I'm > concerned, > > you are being way too technical and nit-picky. While such inane > > detail-oriented blather might be relevant in scientific discussions, it > is > > not so in everyday conversation. Apologies for the rudeness of the last > > statement, I'm at a loss for a way to say that more politely at the > moment. > > Distinguishing everyday practicality from physical reality was quite my > point. > > If we literally get down to the bottom of the physical things, we will > see that there is no boundary between anything. But that's not the > paradigm our everyday conversation takes place in. We cannot talk > about things without misrepresenting the undivided as divided things. > We cannot say of physical reality what is X and not Y without a > non-physical framework, without going above the physical into the > meta-physical. Such frameworks are arbitrary and various. Usefully so. > We use different meta-physical frameworks to talk about reality from > different perspectives, to configure perceptions in different ways. > "mi" is sometimes a bag of flesh, sometimes a group of dyes embedded > in a photographic film, sometimes the executive system of a thought, > sometimes a memory stored over a neural network, sometimes a sound > file recorded on a computer, sometimes a cultural icon impersonated by > other people, sometimes a set of impulses causing someone to cry, and > so on. > > What I wanted to suggest is that we could realize and accept degrees > of arbitrariness when we say "X is a brain", "a rhino is X", etc., and > be not too serious about whether the physical reality of a "rhino" is > such that it must be more than a "brain". > > mu'o > No. A rhino is not a brain. This isn't philosophy. And even philosophy disagrees with you anyway. Rhinos and brains have distinct Forms, idealized or actualized. -- mu'o mi'e .aionys. .i.e'ucai ko cmima lo pilno be denpa bu .i doi.luk. mi patfu do zo'o (Come to the Dot Side! Luke, I am your father. :D ) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "lojban" group. To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to lojban+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/lojban?hl=en. --000e0cd240b4f0b0d004aada4099 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Fri, Aug 19, 2011 at 2:45 AM, tijlan = <jbotijlan@gmai= l.com> wrote:
On 18 August 2011 14:58, Jonathan Jones <eyeonus@gmail.com> wrote:
> I do not say that something must have at least a brain and eyes in ord= er to
> be lo viska. I said that the eyes are not what sees.
> What I will say is that
> in order to be lo viska, the thing in question must be capable of seei= ng. A
> blind man has both eyes and brain, but the blind man does not see.

Right, so the part-whole relation is not essential to the selbri'= s
meaning. And what ultimately determines what X is, is not what X 'is= 9;
but what X does, how X functions, i.e. what occurs. Something is lo
viska if it represents the event of potential or actual see-ing as a
subject. We don't need presuppositions like "eyes are not lo viska=
because eyes do not include a brain".


> As to the rest of your arguments, I didn't bother reading them, be= cause,
> quite honestly, I don't care what you have to say on the subject, = because I
> just don't care enough about the subject to waste that much time o= n it. I'm
> not going to read that. I'm just going to say this- As far as I= 9;m concerned,
> you are being way too technical and nit-picky. While such inane
> detail-oriented blather might be relevant in scientific discussions, i= t is
> not so in everyday conversation. Apologies for the rudeness of the las= t
> statement, I'm at a loss for a way to say that more politely at th= e moment.

Distinguishing everyday practicality from physical reality was quite = my point.

If we literally get down to the bottom of the physical things, we will
see that there is no boundary between anything. But that's not the
paradigm our everyday conversation takes place in. We cannot talk
about things without misrepresenting the undivided as divided things.
We cannot say of physical reality what is X and not Y without a
non-physical framework, without going above the physical into the
meta-physical. Such frameworks are arbitrary and various. Usefully so.
We use different meta-physical frameworks to talk about reality from
different perspectives, to configure perceptions in different ways.
"mi" is sometimes a bag of flesh, sometimes a group of dyes embed= ded
in a photographic film, sometimes the executive system of a thought,
sometimes a memory stored over a neural network, sometimes a sound
file recorded on a computer, sometimes a cultural icon impersonated by
other people, sometimes a set of impulses causing someone to cry, and
so on.

What I wanted to suggest is that we could realize and accept degrees
of arbitrariness when we say "X is a brain", "a rhino is X&q= uot;, etc., and
be not too serious about whether the physical reality of a "rhino"= ; is
such that it must be more than a "brain".

mu'o

No. A rhino is not a brain. This isn'= ;t philosophy. And even philosophy disagrees with you anyway. Rhinos and br= ains have distinct Forms, idealized or actualized.

--
mu'o mi'e .aionys.

.i.e'ucai ko cmima lo pilno be= denpa bu .i doi.luk. mi patfu do zo'o
(Come to the Dot Side! Luke, = I am your father. :D )

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