RE: [jboske] RE more true

["And Rosta" <a.rosta@lycos.co.uk>]

pc:
> a.rosta@lycos.co.uk writes:
> <<
> >I'm sorry to have put you to the trouble of writing this, but I
> accept it all as correct.
> >>
> 
> My pleasure, especially since I was not nearly so clear about some of 
> these things before I wrote it. Can you please say something else 
> outrageous sounding to get my head straight on some of these othere critters?
> 
> <<
> Just to make sure we are on the same wavelength here:
> 
> {na ku ko'a ja'a cai bajra} means "It is not the case that he
> is very much running (but he might nonetheless be running to some
> other (lesser? -- details yet to be thrashed out) extent", IMO. 
> That is, the information added by {cai} falls within the scope
> of the negation.
> >>
> Since I am getting a little rattled by a variey of {jVV -CAI/xiPA}, 
> let me set out where I am now and plunk you {ja'acai} in where it 
> fits -- or carve out a new place for it.
> 1. truth values: these are totally metalinguistic and so don't 
> appear in the bridi at all but only in meta claims {li piPA jei [bridi]}.

Okay. (I'm not totally comfortable with your use of "metalinguistic",
but I don't want to get sidetracked by that. I understand the example
of {jei}.)

What we (the rest of us) have been discussing is not (1).

> 2. Expressed meta-comments to the effect that the sentence in which 
> they are embedded has such-and-such truth value. They are separate 
> claims from the embedding sentences, even if the claim is that it is 
> true. As such, they are unaffected by negations in the underlying 
> sentence (I think that {sei}, insofar as I understand it, is just the 
> ticket here.

I understand.

What we (the rest of us) have been discussing is not (2), either.

> 3. Indications of how much of what makes for truth the sentence 
> contains. This also seems to me to be meta and turn up in 
> comment-like parentheses (and in {ni} claims -- unless those are the 
> next thing) but I can see a kind of truth-in-describing role for 
> them, perhaps analogous to evidentials: I am claiming this is an 
> Olympic class F, but on the basis of only 9.75 score (which may be 
> enough, mind you, and is certainly better than 9.70) I think these 
> are inside a negation, making a part of the claim (but I fear I can 
> be argued both ways on this, since this is all inchoate still).

If it's within the scope of negation, then yes, this is one of the
things we have been discussing.

> 4. Indications of how nearly the event described is to some standard 
> for events of this sort. This may be just the projection of of 3 
> into [0,1], though it may be open-ended, too. 

This too, though Jorge/Xod and I were looking at it from different
perspectives. For me the stuff between 0 and 1 is all borderline,
whereas for Jorge, the idea is that for a predicate like {clani}
everything that has can be arranged on a scale ranging from 0
(for 0 length) and asymptotically approaching 1. Note that Jorge
and I aren't disagreeing -- we're just spokespeople for two different
ideas that should be able to coexist so long as they are kept
distinct.

> 5. Modifiers (formerly functions, but they aren't really) which look 
> at the same range of values toward being an F or partial pefection as 
> an F or in-event quantities and then applies a different set of 
> cut-off points and curves. This is predicate modofication and so is 
> at the heart of the claim, under negations and whatever else.

I am a bit lost here; I don't think I can distinguish 5 from 3 & 4.

> 6. (which ended up in {xoi'a} thread) Quantities in events - height 
> in inches, speed in mph or rpm, temperature, and so on and on. In 
> the event so central when mentioned in the sentence.

I think I understand how 6 gets added into the mix. On a scale
from infinitely mutce ja'a to infinitely mutce na, the scale
can be broken down either into regions like "slightly"/"somewhat"/
"very", or points on the scale can be defined in a way appropriate
to the bridi, e.g. inches, mph, giving something like "It is
10 mph the case that the horse is running". 


> Your {ja'acai}: 
> "My preferred scale is "how much the world would have to change for
> p to become false", with all further details of how that is to be 
> measured glorked from context or general cognition."
> sounds closest to 3 or 4, in either case under the {na}.
> 
> <<
> Well, in English, "very true" means pretty much what I want "ja'a cai"
> to mean. That is, "It's very true that she's beautiful" does not
> *encode* the same meaning as "She's very beautiful", but the former
> would tend to be understood as the latter, to an extent that I find
> satisfactory.
> >>
> I wonder if British is significantly different here. I don't think I 
> say "very true" much and then only as part of a formula "That's true; 
> that's very true," a strong (or placating) agreement response, 
> indicating variously that it is true and I wish I had noticed it or 
> that it is true and so boringly obvious as not to be worth commenting 
> on (sincere envy and more sincere irony). 

And you wouldn't say "very much the case", either? "It's very much
the case that people are at their most rebellious when in adolescence"
-- that sounds 100% normal to me, but it might be a Briticism.

> In that context "It's very 
> true that she is beautiful" -- which I don't think I say (a thought 
> which may be totally devoid of reality) -- would mean something 
> between "duh!" (which might indeed imply "She is very -- blindingly 
> obviously -- beautiful" ) to "By George, she is beautiful; funny how 
> I never noticed that those componenets put together they way they are 
> on her would get to beauty." Which still might be a long way from 
> very beautiful still, but over the mark from comely at least. 

Okay. I recognize the English usage you describe, but it is not the
one I meant.

--And.