RE: [jboske] Kinds

["And Rosta" <a.rosta@lycos.co.uk>]

John:
> If Kinds are 1-1 with properties, would it not be more parsimonious
> to just use properties, and simply predicate new things of them?
> In particular, if the kind Fat-Snake is a kind of Snake, so the
> property of being a fat snake is a subproperty of the property of 
> being a snake 

But when you treat a property as a Kind, you see that Kind as 
occurring wherever things that manifest the property occur.
Not wrongly, we treat properties as incomplete propositions,
but while you can eat Mr Apple, you can't eat an incomplete
proposition! 

If we were to strive for parsimony we could perhaps do without
properties and make do just with Kinds. But I haven't yet thought
about where relations fit in to this picture.

> Likewise with collectives and sets, for which the gimste provides
> precedent. I am now beginning to swallow the idea that you can
> burn a set. We will see whether I need to be an anaconda or not 

Do you think we can dispense with the distinction between a set
and a collective? My inclination is to think that you can't
burn a set. But I'm not sure whether we need to talk about sets as 
distinct from collectives.

--And.