Re: [lojban-beginners] Coining a lujvo: "evidence"

[tijlan <jbotijlan@gmail.com>]

On 30 July 2011 19:01, .arpis. <rpglover64+jbobau@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 30, 2011 at 7:37 AM, tijlan <jbotijlan@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 28 July 2011 03:18, .arpis. <rpglover64+jbobau@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > I, personally, am a fan {au sai} of {facydatci}
>> >
>> > Data that's false isn't data, per se.
>>
>> You can have false data as working data. That's how fraud, delusion,
>> etc. are possible.
>
> I'm tempted to continue differentiating "working data" (i.e. something that
> someone thinks to be data and thus true) and "data" (which must be either
> {lo jetnu} or {lo fatci}, I'm not sure which), but I am beginning to see how
> this can become problematic.

"Working data" is any data that can be actually used, and the
application doesn't require the data to be true / correct. A librarian
could enter a completely wrong set of name, publisher, etc. of a book
into the database by mistake, and that false data could be used by
visitors to the library to search for another book with properly that
profile. If I as a visitor then noticed the data are incorrect, I
would still consider it data, items of information, except that it's
incorrect:

  lo datni cu jitfa
  The data are false.

More precisely:

  lo ca'a datni ca'a jitfa
  The actual (currently used, 'working') data are actually false.

That x1 is jitfa doesn't force it to be na datni (which would
obviously contradict the above sentence). What actually are datni can
well be na jetnu.


>> Consider also this case:
>> A 'color-blind' person goi koha and a non-'color-blind' person goi
>> kohe are looking at an apple and an orange. Kohe says the two fruits
>> have different colors. Koha says they have the same color. Both koha
>> and kohe are truthfully reporting the sense data they each perceive of
>> the fruits. Koha's and kohe's datni represent relative facts. But
>> fatci1 is defined to be 'in the absolute'. Whose sense data should be
>> exclusively referred to as {facydatni}? In other words, whose datni
>> would you consider as being *not* of reality?
>
> If "color" is an abstract notion based on perception (your blue vs. my
> blue), then {ge nai lo datni pe ko'a gi nai lo datni pe ko'e fatci} (could I
> have said {lo datni pe ge nai ko'a gi nai ko'e fatci}?) since neither is
> true in the absolute sense.

Suppose:

  lo datni po ko'a

  --> lo datni be ko'i bei lo nu ko'a ko'i viska
      ( the data about kohi obtained by koha visually perceiving kohi )

  --> lo du'u ko'i blanu xi pa ma'i ko'a
      ( that kohi is blue-1 according to koha )

  --> fo'a

and

  lo datni po ko'e

  --> lo datni be ko'i bei lo nu ko'e ko'i viska
      ( the data about kohi obtained by kohe visually perceiving kohi )

  --> lo du'u ko'i blanu xi re ma'i ko'e
      ( that kohi is blue-2 according to kohe )

  --> fo'e

Foha and fohe represent different color-perceptions of the same kohi
by koha and kohe. I would say foha and fohe are each a
fact-with-a-frame-of-reference, lo fatci be ma'i zo'e.


> If "color" is defined in terms of the wavelengths/frequencies of the photons
> bouncing off of the fruits, then kohe's statement is certainly not fatci and
> koha's statment is probably fatci, but koha can't know that just based on
> koha's observation.

Colors are primarily properties not of photons' wavelengths but of the
interactions between a visual mechanism & whatever effective stimulus.
A particular wavelength can varyingly correlate with different
qualities (or 'qualia') depending on the receptive mechanism. The
colors we perceive of fruits with our human eyes are intrinsic not to
the fruits or the photons bouncing off of the fruits, but to the ways
our organs handle inputs from those environments. To the extent that
reality includes all physical processes whether or not the outputs are
color-laden, the 'color-blind' kohe is reporting an aspect of reality
that is no less actual or truthful than what the non-'color-blind'
koha is reporting. And, to the extent that color-perceptions are
contingent upon the physiological configuration, koha who sees colors
is no less conditioned than those with synesthesia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synesthesia

That is, colors can exist independent of photons' wavelengths.

Subjective / individual views can have their own sort of truth-claim.
Evidence can be subjective. A statement based on subjective evidence
can be a legitimate representation of a truth, insofar as the utterer
is being both internally and externally truthful. In addition to the
synesthesia example, consider this:

  koho: This painting is beautiful!
  kohu: Show me the evidence that it's beautiful.

If koho is being truthful about koho's own perception, koho is
reporting a truth. It's a fact that the painting appears beautiful to
koho. The evidence for the painting's aesthetic value is the content
of koho's direct experience.

Importantly, the truth-claim of a subjective / individual /
metaphysical view is not superior to the truth-claim of an objective /
collective / physical view, or vice versa. Both are compatible and
equal in their representational roles. Subjectivity and objectivity
are different but integral registers of reality. All actual
perspectives bear legitimate truths about reality that is
fundamentally neither mental nor material. This philosophical stance
that I hold is related to:

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutral_monism
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enactivism

, which I think offer valuable considerations to the criteria for
'evidence'. For more about subjective, first-person evidence:

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_of_morality

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