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RE: More about questions and the like (was:What I have for dinner...")
- Subject: RE: More about questions and the like (was:What I have for dinner...")
- From: "And Rosta" <a.rosta@xxxxx.xxxx
- Date: Sat, 11 Dec 1999 16:46:05 -0000
> From: Pycyn@aol.com
>
> Problem 1: Given "for x, if x went to the party, then
> John knows thatx went to the party" and that Paul went
> to the party, we might infer "John knows that Paul
> went to the party." This sentence is ambiguous and the
> most likely reading (it is usually said) may well be
> false. since John may never have heard of Paul as such
> and may have him under a totally wrong-headed
> description, so that we might never find out from John
> that Paul was there, even though he knows of the man
> who is in fact Paul - whoever John may think him to be
> -- that he went to the party. The set of answers
> solution for questions needs quite a bit of extra work
> work to be addapted to indirect questions (and
> propositional attitudes generally). Like including mappings
> from the world to the belief worlds involved, for this one.
> And several other things for the other ones.
> Problem 2. From "Pegasus was the winged horse captured by
> Bellerophon" being true, it is automatic to infer "There
> was a winged horse" and thence "Winged horses have
> existed." But they haven't. The role of xu'a or whatever
> is simply to prevent these inferences in the cases where
> context does not (and so should always be used, just in
> case). It does not say which performative is involved,
> only that it is opaquifying and that the ordinary rules
> thus do not apply -- in particular, names need not
> denote. The alternatives -- in a logical language --
> are to make obvious truths false or to allow truth value
> gaps or to deny the usual rules; none of these are
> impossible but all are unpleasant.
It seems to me that both problems are avoidable by treating
names as predicates (which IMO is right & proper).
Hence
"Paul went to the party"
= "x is-Paul & x went-to-the-party"
And the formula "for every x, if x went to the party, then
John knows that x went to the party" thus no more entitles
one to conclude
"john knows that x is-Paul & x went-to-the-party"
than to conclude
"John knows that x is-overweight and x went-to-the-party"
on the basis of
"x is-overweight and x went-to-the-party"
Likewise, for the second problem,
"Pegasus was the winged horse captured by Bellerophon"
= "for every x, if x is-Pegasus then x
is-the-winged-horse-captured-by-Bellerophon"
-- and the universal quantification doesn't license the
inferences "There was a winged horse" and "Winged horses have
existed."
--And.