| Good exposition and nobly motivated. But I'm keepin' m'seegar still.
{djuno} can't, of course, do the work of {jetnu}, since it involves in addition belief and evidence, neither of which apply to {jetnu}. In every epistemology worthy of the (misapplied) name, there are truths that no one even believes, let alone knows, and ones that they believe but lack evidence for to know. But in the case of knowing, the truth of the claim must be in the same epistemology as the knowing, for it is the truth (and the evidence, of course) that add the epistemology to the bare belief. And so, if the epistemology in which x knows that p has implicit or explicit reference to x, so must the corresponding truth, even if x is not mentioned in a separate place -- he is then mentioned or implicated in the epistemology place. In short, x can't know that p in e and p be false in e. BTW hearsay evidence is the report of someone else's claims, that someone else not being available, and not one's report of one's own experiences, which are perfectly admissable and indeed primary evidence (what else could be?). The sequences {fatci jetnu} and {krici jinvi djuno} are very nice and do much of the work whicvh led to them, but they can't be pushed too far (actually, I suppose there should be an observer form parallel to {jinvi}, with the two threads reuniting in {djuno}). It is, however, useful to have them brought out into the open (again?) to remind us of what the facilities of Lojban are |