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Re: Fwd: Re: [lojban] Random lojban questions/annoyances.



At 06:52 PM 03/27/2001 +0100, And Rosta wrote:
Lojbab:
At 05:00 PM 03/26/2001 +0100, And Rosta wrote:
[....]
#>Whether this means that *I* can truthfully say "ko'a djuno fe homosexuality-
#>is-a-sin fo fundamentalist-jegvo-dogma", I'm not sure. I suppose the answer
#>is Yes.
#
#It seems key to me that ANYONE should be able to say that truthfully if
#indeed ko'a is satisfied with the dogma as a means of establishing truth.

Hmm. So we haven't resolved this after all. If I don't accept that the
ve djuno entails the se djuno, but the x1 does believe that the
ve djuno entails the se djuno, then according to you I can honestly
describe this by DJUNO. How would this differ from BIRTI and
JINVI?

birti requires no epistemology whatsoever. It is, to me, an emotional certainty that need have no basis outside of itself. a predication on birti itself might be a veldjuno.

The difference to me between djuno and jinvi is in the x1s attitude towards the x2. If I jinvi something, I am admitting subjectivity and indeed the possibility of error as to whether x2 is indeed true or whether x2 is justified by x4. When I claim to know/djuno something by epistemology x4, I am not admitting that I could reach any other truth by that veldjuno.

lojbab




#>I should add, BTW, that this conclusion would contradict both Bob
#>Chassell's message on this point & my response to it.
#
#I'm not sure how.

Because I (mis)understood Bob to be saying that the ve djuno is how
the x1 comes to know the x2. How x1 comes to know x2 has no bearing
on whether x2 is true or true if another body of propositions are true..

#>That is, contra Bob, the ve djuno is not how you come to know the se djuno
#>but rather the body of propositions such that their truth entails the
#>truth of the x2.
#
#No, because that would entail only logically consistent
#epistemologies. One of the ways that X can djuno P while Y can djuno not-P
#is to use a logically inconsistent epistemology (which fundamentalist-dogma
#may qualify for %^). Dreams and astrology are both classically used
#veldjuno that yielded differing or even contradictory seldjuno to different
#djuno.

Firstly, the propositions "my neighbour's dog told me P" and "everything
my neighbour's dog tells me is true" do logically entail P, so dreams and
astrologoy could be handled in a logically consistent way -- perhaps.

But, secondly, if they can't be handled in a logically consistent way, how
can I distinguish instances of DJUNO from instances of BIRTI,
or JINVI, or KRICI? (I did venture an answer to this question myself,
while noting that it appears to conflict with entrenched usage.)

#They thus very poorly are communicated through jetnu, which supports no
#observer dependency on the truth. jetnu needs a self-consistent epistemology.
#
#Using krici instead of djuno seems to me to deny that the veldjuno is a
#valid source of evidence for truth or at least admits to skepticism as to
#that claim.

Quite. The question is whether if one is indeed thus skeptical one can
nonetheless honestly use DJUNO. My inclination, given current usage,
would be to use JINVI.

--And.

--
lojbab lojbab@lojban.org
Bob LeChevalier, President, The Logical Language Group, Inc.
2904 Beau Lane, Fairfax VA 22031-1303 USA 703-385-0273
Artificial language Loglan/Lojban: http://www.lojban.org