| In a message dated 3/28/2001 6:27:17 AM Central Standard Time,
arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: <It seems to me that the discussion has converged on just two rival Caspar here. As I said yesterday in defining {jinvi} and {djuno}, the evidence has to be true in the epistemology and the knower has to believe it is evidence for the conclusion (weaker than entailment, I think) but crucially, the known must be true in the epistemology. Knowledge says there are reasons, but does not put them foreward. It does put foreward a truth claim, however. Depending on how an epistemology is defined, you could hold that the known is entaiiled by the epistemology just because it is true in that epistemology, or you could say that its truth in that epistemology is merely a factual matter, bound in by the strength of evidence. That is not decided in my definitions (and the difference might involve some of residual problems of "know," those cases of jsutified true belief that still aren't knowledge.) |