In a message dated 9/25/2001 12:02:12 PM Central Daylight Time, arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes:
First Oh ho! (what is Lojban for "taxicab rejoinder," ?"l'esprit de l'escalier"? or some such). I now see the point. John has never considered the question whether Bill is the king of France let alone formulated the belief that he is not. So, on the intensional view -- what I take the lojban {la djan jinvi le du'u ...} to mean, it is false that John believes/opines this (though this might make an interesting case to rpovide some separation between these two other than just the evidentiary one). On the other hand, John may well have beliefs that entail that Bill is not the king of France and the entailment may be one that John could work out easily -- even unconsciously -- were he to direct his attention to the matter. So there is a sense in which John does already believe that Bill is not the king of France (he believes, for example, that France does not have a king). I don't see exactly how this is an intensional-extensional problem; it seems to be more a problem about how to say the latter case -- something like {ka'e} or some stronger for: "doesn't but should to be consistent and complete." I don't think there is directly a sense of "believe" or "opine" or {krici/jinvi} that directly allows the claim that he does belive this to be true. But, again, this is not intensional-extension, since there is no claim to the effect that Bill is not the king of France such that John believes it either. |