Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore

[pycyn@aol.com]

In a message dated 10/3/2001 11:50:14 AM Central Daylight Time, arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes:

I presume then that you no longer consider

 John believes p such that p is true just in case Tully is a great roman orator

to be unproblematic.

I'd go so far as to say I think it is just flat hopelessly wrong. As noted, under really minimal real-world conditions it is always true.

What sort of remedies can you see? My instinct would be to go for
possible worlds (x is a world of which p is true iff x is a world of which y is
true?), but you're an old hand at this stuff, so I'll wait on your suggest

Alas, all the possible world notions are themselves intensional (they are *possible* worlds after all), so this doesn't help with an extensional reading.  I am inclined at the moment to go with questions as a primitive notion and take two things that successfully answer (are true members of) the same question as being intersubstitutable.  But even as I say this I start seeing problems, so I am gong to pass for this round.