| In a message dated 10/6/2001 10:15:49 PM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes:
<> > Would not those that are > > equivalent always be rephraseable so as to fit the matrix? > >Yeah, but they might not be the one he knows, thinks of, etc. etc. The >intensional problem that extension-claim theory has. Almost every answer >actually has an extension-claim equivalent, which somebody might think of, >so >set-of answers covers that case, but is not restricted to it. Weare ready >for a wide range of possibilities in each case, not just the one. I would still like to seean example. How could {la djan djuno le I suppose you mean in a case where ko'a ca'a broda. What propositions have the property {du'u makau broda} ? Certainly {du'u ko'a broda}, but also {du'u ko'a cmima le extension of zo broda} , maybe even {le extension-of zo broda cu pamei ko'a} and, of course, any other names or descriptions that fit ko'a in context in {du'u ... broda} and any properties equivalent to broda in {du'u ko'a ...} <But it doesn't involve kau. Is {la djan djuno le du'u xukau do co'u darxi le do speni} true when you have never beaten her and John knows it? I think "Does John know whether you have stopped beating your wife?" has the same failures as "Have you stopped beating your wife?", so {na'i} cannot be part of the set of answers covered by the indirect question. It will also be answered with {na'i}, not with {go'i}.> Actually, it probably does involve {kau} because the best way to treat direct questions is as special cases of indirect ones, subordinate to {ko xusra}. Putting the indirect question within a direct question does not seem to mess things up much. Sticking with the assertive form, "John knows whether you have stopped beating your wife," would, in the case where the presuppositions are not met, mean that John knows that the presuppositions are not met, that the correct answer is {na'i}. So, thetotal senstence is simply true or false, not itself in violation of a presupposition (well, those presuppositions, anyhow). <Well, at least I agree with him that it is not the knower/believer/opinion-holder that has to agree. It is no-one within the text that uses the {le}-description. It is the speaker and to some extent the listener.> OK. But if it is only the speaker, then he can build in the completeness. |