In a message dated 10/10/2001 10:35:50 PM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes:
la pycyn cusku di'e I don't understand what bamboozlement you are talking about. 'a=b' tells us that the thing called by the name 'a' is identical with the thing called by the name 'b,' that is, that they are the same thing, despite their names. This is a significnat claim and different from the claim 'a=a', which is totally trivial. See, Frege on sense and reference "How is a=b, if true, different from a=a?" The answer, of course, is that the two names have different senses ("morning star", "evening star" are the traditional examples) even though that have the same reference, and it is the senses that guide the selection of references, so, in another world, these two names might attach to different things. Identity, however, is just about reference. As for the case of {le}, this is not a problem only for knowers, but for all reporters -- and even for listeners. It is clear that the speaker has to know whaat he means, and the hearer does too, if the communication is to be successful. No one else does, apparently. But when one reports a person's speech *indirectly* -- or their thoughts -- it is not clear what forms are permitted for the sake of accuracy: should the indirect use the {le} form, even though the reporter does not know what the thinker means by it or must (even "may") the reporter unpack the form in some way? Sticking with the speaker's own form seems safest, but ti is not perfectly clear what the consequences of the alternate approaches are, except that they probably violate intensionality. |