In a message dated 1/31/2002 3:33:48 PM Central Standard Time, araizen@newmail.net writes:Is there another way that truth conditions can be affected? The usual one is that they are eliminated. {ka'o klama} says that ka'o comes sometime to where we all understand (here, typically). It is false if ka'o never comes. But {a'o [or au] ka'o klama} expresses a hope or desire that ka'o comes and is not falsified by his never coming, nor, of course, by my being insincere about my hopes or desires. It has no truth value at all and is at best sincere or not and appropriate or not (the latter if the hoped for thing is known to have occurred already). <Also, I consider 'sei cumki mi klama' to be the same as 'le nu kau mi klama cu cumki' (using 'kau' for the focus-marking UI), at least until someone objects or comes up with something better.> I get the idea, but the focus job is explicitly limited to indirect questions -- in fact, using {kau} make this an indirect question, in spite of not having any other of the marks of one. Is the absence of cognitive predicates and {le du'u} enough to warn of some other special usage her? Maybe, but I expect someone to come up with a destruvtive counterexample. |