Re: [lojban] Re: A (rather long) discussion of {all}

[HeliodoR <exitconsole@gmail.com>]

> [...] That is, he deals with the ordinary world like

> an ordinary person, but, if you ask him, how it is

> that all these things are bears (and those over

> there aren't), he will say something like "They

> look enough alike that conventions allow us to

> call them all by the same word."  But, he would

> add, that doesn't mean that there is any real thing

> they have in common.

 

Right. And that's why I said some axioms or written

conventions would be needed to describe something

precisely and concretely, or else we should recline

upon the intuitive use of those unwritten conventions.

(Because of the lack of a world looking the same

from all viewpoints. Nor You neither me can help it

if I insist on what You call a bear is just a moving

rock.)

 

> > How do You explain what You
> > have in mind?
>
> Assuming that I have bears in mind, I wouldn't
> need to explain, if our nominalist knows about
> bears.  If he does not, I would draw him a
> (visual or verbal) picture.  Being a nominalist
> doesn't make one stupid.

 

"Bear" vs. "You mean that thing over there? That's

only a moving rock" situation again. Suppose I know

what people usually call bears, but I keep insisting

that they ought to have another name. (Still, I'm not

stupid because of that. I have an alternative viewpoint

and belief about the question.)

 

> > I think the differences of personal
> > point-of-views prevent us from
> > talking about one "objective reality".
>
> This is another metaphysical point: is the world
> that I experience the same as the one you do,
> given that my experience of the (or "a") world
> is different from yours?

 

It is not. Talking in any language people talk about

(and compare) Universes in their minds - they talk

not of an actual world (if there is such a thing...).

Was this not what I said? :)

> And that we cannot actually compare our
> experiences even, except verbally (and visually)
> where we cannot check that we mean the same
> things by what we say.  Of course we can talk
> about objective reality -- to question whether there
> is such a thing, if nothing else.  The problem is
> when we think there is such a thing and someone
> asks us what it is (or even is like).

 

I think we agree.

In the light of this, are things describable?

(I don't see the conclusion.)

 

> > However, I agree with the rest of the proposal.
> > Only some intuitive use
> > of the rules should be presumed, or axioms
> > should be settled about
> > the perception of "reality".
>
> I am not sure how this fits in with MK's
> proposal, which seems to be almost entirely
> linguistic, making vanishingly small metaphysical
> commitments (beyond what might be involved in
> using a certain language, if any are).

 

Well, just a basic affirmation like "Using the rules below

we assume that we can name and categorize the entities

in every person's mind, and talk about them thatwise."

Or if You aren't fond of it, forget what I said.

 

mi'e darves.