Re: [lojban] Re: A (rather long) discussion of {all}

[John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net>]

--- Maxim Katcharov <maxim.katcharov@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 5/19/06, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > MK>
> >
> > <<Yes, though the bounds of this set may vary
> > from
> > > individual to
> > > individual. >>
> [...]
> >
> > I think that this admission is a tactical
> > mistake.  If the set of all bears (actual,
> > possible, past, present and future, etc.)
> varies
> > from person to person, then you have
> essentially
> > conceded xorxes' point.  First, if every
> person
> > has such a set, then there is a maximal set
> which
> > embraces all of these (their union --
> available
> 
> The union of all of these bear sets is /not/
> what I would call the
> "maximal set". The union of what I call this
> set is "everything" (as
> in including pencils), because surely there are
> crazy people out there
> who think/have thought that beds are bears, or
> that knives are bears.
>
Once you have relativized the bear set to
individuals, you  can no longer say (you
especially) that some individuals bear sets don't
count.  Knives and beds are possible bears --
indeed, in your story, actual ones -- since they
are in some person's bear set.  The rest of us
may disagree, but we all disagree with one
another about some cases.  You seem to be working
with two criteria here; pick one.

> Perhaps the /average/ of these sets, and surely
> the /consensus/ of
> these sets would be the very closest we're ever
> going to come to this
> "*ideal* mega-set".

We are not after an ideal mega-set, just the set
of all actual (whenever) and possible bears, and
that is, by you definitions, the union of all the
personal bear sets.  It is also the one
guraranteed to exist (well, the intersection
does, too -- even if it happens to be empty,
though that not for L-sets).  I agree that this
is a reasonable way to go, but not one available
to you starting as you do (which is why I think
itwas a bad move).


> > even for L-sets).  Since, ex hypothesi, no
> one
> > actually has this as his set, then no one
> really
> > means ALL bears when he say {lo ro cribe},
> only
> > "all the things I think of as bears." 
> Further,
> 
> There is no such thing as a universal set "all
> bears". There is only
> what is considered "all bears" by each person,
> and what may be
> considered "all bears" mutually by two people
> when they have changed
> (even in minor details) the bounds of their
> model of what constitutes
> a bear and reached a consensus. Each person has
> a model of something
> like the most ideal or typical bear, and then a
> certain tolerance to
> deviation - a certain bounds at which something
> is no longer a bear at
> all. 

This is psychologically an implausible model for
how we do these things, so it is not a good
rational reconstruction.  It also, of course,
does not fit your earlier discussion about bear
sets in a very clear way.

> My tolerance may be smaller than yours. My
> 'typical bear' may be
> a bit different than yours. This is simply a
> fact, and I'm not going
> to gloss over it by saying "there is one ideal
> of 'bear' that is based
> on the mind of no mortal".

Wise, but irrelevant to where you were the last
time 'round.
 
> > once you allow that what counts as a bear
> varies
> > from person to person, you have to allow that
> for
> > each person it varies with time (as it
> clearly
> > does as the person grows in knowledge, but
> not
> > obviously only that).  And once you do that,
> the
> > step to "it varies with the person's
> interests at
> > the time" is hardly a step at all.  And then
> we
> > are at xorxes' place "all bears" is
> everything I
> > count as a bear at the moment.
> 
> No, you've made a jump from "everything I
> consider a bear at the
> moment" to "those bears that I am referring to
> at the moment". 

My point is that, once you allow that what I
consider a bear may fluctuate from moment to
moment, you have to allow that the reason for the
fluctuation may simply what I happen to be
referring to.  You have built in no way to
prevent this other than *saying* that it ain't
so, which is hardly decisive (or, maybe, even
relevant).

> Both
> can be expressed by the ambiguous "everything I
> count as a bear at the
> moment". xorxes' position is that
> 
> "all bears must be accounted for..."
> 
> refers not to *all* bears, but the bears in the
> X. 

Not quite the point; his bears need not be
restricted in any easily describable way (other
than "the relevant ones," say).

> Now, someone who
> says the above would still
> considers/counts/etc. a bear that is not in
> the X a bear - they're simply not referring to
> it. It doesn't "count"
> as a bear that they're *referring to*, but it
> still clearly counts as
> a bear. The vagueness that I've asserted exists
> is as follows:
>
But as soon as the question about another bear
arises, it becomes a referred to bear, and so
comes to count.  It does not seem that you can
say that something not referred to still counts
as a bear, because it can only be counted by
being referred to.

> Let's say that a hunter shoots an abomination
> of some sort. It's a
> sort of bear-cat looking thing. The hunter may
> not consider this a
> bear. The forest ranger who comes by to check
> may consider this a
> bear. A lab showing that the parentage of this
> thing is two bears (but
> it was furless, skinny, and mutated) would give
> more insight to both
> parties. The hunter may still try to say "yeah,
> but that's not a
> /truly/ a bear", but odds are, this does fit
> his now-current
> perception of what a bear is (in fact, his
> perception/bounds probably
> didn't have to change, if 'through nature born
> of bears' was within
> his bounds).

Yes, the new information may change his judgment
about whether it is a bear even though it still
fails his original test (or, of course, he could
stick to his judgment and reject descent as a
decisive factor in beardom).
 
> In that very contract, there's a definition of
> what a "cub" is. The
> definition of "child" is much more prone to
> having incompatible
> bounds. But they are the speaker, and they have
> set out exactly where
> /their/ bounds for "bear child" are. Now the
> listener knows where
> these bounds are - now they know the model that
> the speaker is using -
> so they really have no argument to make
> regarding "well, these are the
> bounds /I/ thought you were setting out".
> 
> Anyway, point is, the argument is wrong because
> it fails to
> differentiate between "think truly is" and "am
> currently referring to
> as".

Again, the point is that you have not left a
basis for making that distinction.  A person who
is currently referring to something as a bear
currently thinks it truly is one and conversely
and, having relativized what is a bear to this
situation, you cannot not absolutize to some part
of that situation.