Re: truth vs. fact

[ucleaar <ucleaar@UCL.AC.UK>]

Lojbab:
> >> What I've been trying to
> >> get at is that for most predications to be true in universe X, their
> >> sumti must also exist in universe X. E.g.:
> >>  Real    Fictional
> >>  false   true         Sherlock Holmes solved many crimes.
> >Agreed that it is false
> I disagree that it is false.  If you can have a statement that includes
> a fictional "Sherlock Holmes", then you can have a statement that
> includes fictional "many crimes".

When I look out of my window I don't see fictional people solving
fictional crimes. I see real people solving real crimes. [This is
rhetorical - what I actually see is a roof and a multistorey car
park. That last sentence is a red herring.]

The proposition "S.H. solved many crimes" is true of the relevant
fictional world and false of this world.

> I think you guys are getting hung up in the difference between "true"
> which has an epistemology place, and "fact", which deals only with
> "reality" in the absolute.  Most language use is about "truth" rather
> than about "facts", and statements about Sherlock Holmes tend to
> authomaticially invoke an epistemology that incorporates fiction.  It is
> my contention that the pragmatic mention of most fictional referents
> incorporates the world where that referent exists into the universe of
> discourse.

I certainly have taken this view all along, as, I believe, has Jorge.
But one of the points I've been trying to make is that there are
certain statements about S.H. that *don't*  "automatically invoke
an epistemology that incorporates fiction" such that this epistemology
applies to the statement as a whole. For example, "I described
Sherlock Holmes" can be true of the real world.

> True:   Sherlock Holmes solved many crimes.
> False:  Sherlock Holmes solved many real crimes.

Both are false of this world and true of the fictional one.

> If "lo" can be used to make statements about fictional unicorns, then it
> can be used to make statements about fictional crimes.

Certainly. If there remains any disagreement on these matters, it
concerns whether {mi te pixra lo unicorn} can be true of this world,
or whether one must instead say {mi te pixra lo dahi unicorn}.
[I go for the latter view, except when the predicate is {nu}.]
We agree that {lo unicorn came up to me in the street} cannot be
true of this world (and nor can {lo dahi unicorn came up to me
in the street})

---
And