Re: [lojban] tu'o usage

[And Rosta <arosta@uclan.ac.uk>]

pc:
jjllambias@hotmail.com writes:
[...]
#<<
#I said that changing inner {ro} to {me'iro} was nonsense, not
#that the passage of a negation boundary did not affect the inner
#quantifier. If the inner quantifier is {ro}, then nothing is changed,
#because {ro} as inner quantifier in fact adds nothing, neither
#claim nor presupposition: {lo'i broda} always has ro members
#by definition.
#>>
#Let's see, negation boundaries do affect inner quantifiers except in the case 
#of the most common one.  That does seem to violate the notion that they are 
#affected -- a rule is a rule after all and the effects of negation boundaries 
#on the universal quantifier is one of the best established of such rules.  

So called "inner quantifiers" should be called "inner cardinality indicators"
-- just as PA does not always function as a quantifier (e.g. in {li pa}), so 
in {lo PA broda} it functions as an indicator of cardinality, not as a
quantifier.

Negation boundaries affect all inner cardinality indicators, but since ro
does not ascribe any cardinality to the set, it is vacuously affected.

#As for {ro} adding nothing, it does at least exclude {no} (I know you disagree, 
#but this is my turn) and, further, as the default, can be stuck in anywhere 
#nothing is explicit (which is why I take it that nebgation does not affect 
#it).  What about {le broda}, where the default is {su'o} : does {naku le 
#broda} go over to {ro le no broda naku}?  If not, why not?

Not. Because *everything* within a le- phrase IS presupposed -- that is
the very nature of le-. 

&:
#<<
#> Even
#> mathematicians and linguists pretty much get this right.
#
#The the confusion may be about what "this" is.
#>>
#That "all" has existential import.   I guess I have to take back "linguists" 
#-- but, gee, my people (Partee, Bill Bright, various Lakoffs) and McCawley 
#had it right.

Does McCawley deal with it in _Everything linguists always wanted to
know about logic_?

I think that perhaps part of the issue concerns whether restricted 
quantification exists in Lojban -- whether {da poi broda cu brode} means
something different from {da ge broda gi brode}.  I suspect you
would say that the former but not the latter entails {da broda}.
If I'm right about this, at least I can understand where you're coming
from, and will be in a position to think properly about the issues.

[...]
#[Calling citation -- or the threat of such -- Argument from Authority is 
#prejudicial, even when modified by "legitimately": loading.]

As I said, I think threatened citation and Arg from Auth is legitimate,
but I don't see much difference between them. 

#<<
#My brand of English has "all" and "every" as nonimporting, and
#"each" as importing, but "each" quantifies over a definite class
#(i.e. it means "each of the"), so the importingness is probably
#an artefact of the definiteness.
#>>
#I'll take your word for it, even though I have found (as have more formal 
#empiricial researchers on the issue) that people are not very clear about 
#this and often display patterns incompatible with their conscious beliefs on 
#the topic.  In particular, though, people who allow both importing and 
#non-importing meanings usually group "every" with "each" (as it is 
#historically as well = "ever each"), so you constitute a group either new or 
#too small to have been noted before.  Your explanation for the position of 
#"each" probably accounts for your case, which is basically a "no importing" 
#one.

Everybody groups "every" and "each" together separate from "all", because
the former are distributive: "Every thing is", "Each (thing) is", "All (things) are".

If you can give me references on the importingness of "all" and "every" I
will go and look them up. I am skeptical about there being dialect differences,
but I shouldn't prejudge.

#<<
#If you have the logical formula:
#
#  P and ASSERTED: Q
#
#how should that be expressed grammatically so that it comes out
#like
#
#  Q PRESUPPOSED: and P
#>>
#I don't follow the formula, I think.  Suppose that P presupposes Q.  Then the 
#whole situation is  "P funny-and Q."  

At a presyntactic/prelexical level I think it is "P and I-HEREBY-ASSERT Q"

#Negating this would be "not P funny-and Q," 

Polishly "funny-and Q not P", not "not funny-and Q P", I take it you mean.

#{na'i}ing it would be either "not(P and Q)" ("and" not at all funny) or (better) 
#"not Q whether P" ("whether" = Lojban {u}).  

The former would Griceanly imply the latter.

#lioNEL:
#<<
#Indeed, I take the opposing views. As xorxes pointed it out, the whole
#issue seems to decide wether the INNER part is claimed or presupposed.
#IMO it is naturally claimed (the ro case being special, see below):
#I would find it very strange, to say the least, to consider something
#explicitly stated as something presupposed.
#>>
#Me too.  But INNER is not stated, merely displayed and, thus, open to a 
#variety of interpretations, of which "presupposed" is one.  "Asserted" is 
#another, but I can't find any cases of it actually working that way anywhere 
#and many cases of the presupposing version, even without {ro}.  

Can you cite some of the many cases of the presupposing version without
ro?

--And.