John Cowan wrote:
That's exactly the point I was trying to make about the semantics of "nitcu" and "pendo" being different. You can nitcu something even if that something does not exist, or perhaps could never exist (e.g. I want to do something which requires the existence of the proverbial golden mountain). You cannot be a pendo of something unless there is something to be a pendo of (although it doesn't have to exist in a physical sense - you can still say "I've got a friend in Jesus" even if Jesus never lived, or lived but was not resurrected - the point is that you have some specific entity in mind who is your friend, which is qualitatively different from needing a box which may or may not exist). This has nothing to do with the semantics of "lo".Craig scripsit:Umm... no. "I need a doctor." I have a need which will be filled if I am attended to by Dr. Foo. However, I could equally well accept the services of Dr. Bar, so I don't actually need Dr. Foo. I need a doctor, according to my view of lo, is "mi nitcu lo mikce". However, "zasti falo mikce poi mi ke'a na nitcu" is still true - I don't actually need Dr. Foo since Dr. Bar can treat me.Thinking about doctors, IMHO, just confuses the issue. Take "I need a box with dimensions 2m by 2m by 2cm." You can need such a thing perfectly well even if there is no such box anywhere. This is why needing involves an implied proposition: you cannot, e.g. see such a box unless there is such a box (neglecting visual illusions, where you see the *appearance* of a box but not the box itself).
robin.tr -- "The raisins may be the best part of a cake, but that doesn't mean that a bag of raisins is better than a cake." - Wittgenstein Robin Turner IDMYO Bilkent Univeritesi Ankara 06533 Turkey www.bilkent.edu.tr/~robin