Re: RE:sumti raising

["Adam Raizen" <araizen@newmail.net>]

la pycyn cusku di'e

> I think that the cases cited are not real problems for sumti raising
as they 
> stand.  It is probable that, if someone's acts deceive you that
someone 
> exists and that, therefore, there is someone who(se act) deceives
you.  The 
> problem comes when the place of the predicate moves into another
world, 
> whether of dreams or hopes or literature or what have you and the
person 
> whose acts are involved may not exist at all in the outer world of
discourse. 
>  Then you don't want to be able to go from the fact that you dream
of 
> someone's acts to you dream of someone  to there is someone you
dream of.  
> So, here sumti raising has to be marked.  Then, for logical
consistency, it 
> has to be marked in other places where it occurs.  But, as somone
(&? xorxes? 
> that kind of mind anyhow) has pointed out, it is hard to know where
to stop, 
> for it is not someone's acts that deceive me but my interpretation
of that 
> act and so, ought the {le nu ko'a zukte} be flagged as raised.  And
so on 
> forever.  In practice, we mainly flag  references to concrete
individuals 
> (abstract ones seem to exist whether or not they occur) and we
don't 
> criiticize the absence of {tu'a} except where it makes a difference
of the 
> logical sort (individuals are events after all, though real only
when they 
> occur).

The point I was trying to make is that deception by someone with a
motive is inherently different than deception by an inanimate event.
After having looked at the place structure of "bapli", I don't think
it has anything to do with coercion anymore. Maybe it will work as
a word for sufficient condition that I've been looking for.

mu'o mi'e adam