At 01:23 PM 6/23/2001, Adam Raizen wrote:
la lojbab cusku di'e > What is the relationship between the event and the sentence in the English > phrase "In the event of blah, i will do blecch". There is clearly some > relationship between the event and the rest of the sentence, but it is > vague what that relationship is other than the event occurring is necessary. > > Thus fau associates an event with a bridi and says that its occurrence is > in some way important to the truth of that bridi. Works rather like the > English. At least with the English, the idiom *does* mean at least that if the event occurs, the main sentence also occurs.
This is ambiguous, but it is commonly a statement of intention, not of fact.We do not have a clear modal logic model in Lojban for the meanings of such statements and the evaluaton of their truth. Modal logics study statements about possibility and necessity, probability, intention, permission, belief, and the like. I can dig out an old textbook and post some notes, if anybody thinks it will help.
We also don't have any useful logical model of *impossible* worlds and other weird ontologies. I don't know whether anyone has successfully constructed one, but I could look. Quine wrote about these problems, such as the "square circle" and "Plato's beard" but certainly didn't resolve them.