Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore

[And Rosta <arosta@uclan.ac.uk>]

>>> John Cowan <jcowan@reutershealth.com> 09/26/01 09:42pm >>>
#And Rosta wrote:
#
#> My preferred solution would be to make the distinction on the x2, not
#> on the selbri, but thinking about it, it does seem that we really are
#> dealing with a selbri distinction.
#
#Your examples are thought-provoking, but unfortunately for you
#tend to push me in the other way:  "believe" is just inherently a
#fuzzy notion, I now think, and there's simply no way to draw
#the line between "X believes p" and "X would believe p if he
#had a clue" and "X will come to believe p if jogged a bit."
#
#In short, "{p | John believes p} is a prototypical category.
#Prototype beliefs include "Aristarchus believed the
#sun was at the center of the universe" and "I believe I have
#money in my pocket", but what to do with "Jim (a mouse)
#believes that Tom (a cat) will catch him and eat him" is a puzzlement.

I agree we're dealing with prototype categories, but I think it remains
unsettled whether it remains necessary or profitable to distinguish
some sort of 'intentsional' believing from some sort of 'extensional'
believing. Certainly I think our discussion has shown that although
we cannot neatly define either sort, we can nonetheless with examples
that demonstrate the utility of some sort of linguistic mechanism for
expressing the distinction when we want to.

I think I'm currently happy with pc's:

  la djan krici tu'odu'u la bil klama

versus

  la djan krici da poi go ke'a jetnu gi la bil klama

"da poi go ke'a jetnu gi" could be replaced by a string-substitutuon
zipfer experimental cmavo.

#Dennett makes some distinction between beliefs and opinions,
#which is not krici/jinvi, but if I understand it is about what
#we act on vs. what we are willing to assent to:  

I can recognize the distinction, though it seems not to quite
match up with the distinction dtawn previously in this thread.

--And.