Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore

[And Rosta <arosta@uclan.ac.uk>]

>>> <pycyn@aol.com> 10/03/01 03:26am >>>
a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com writes:
#> pc:
#> > arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: 
#> >   "da zo'u There is a proposition p such that p is true just in case da 
#> is 
#> >   extension of tu'odu'u ce'u klama kei and John believes that p" 
#> > 
#> > Well, in one sense it is hard to complain about this, since it covers 
#> > the extension/intension problem nicely.  I am now off again worrying 
#> > about what soert of thing the extension of {tu'o du'u ce'u klama kei} 
#> > is, as a result of a discussion on some other topic. 
#
#My extreme bad!  This turns out to be, on examination, true so long as John 
#has one true belief and one false one, regardless of what the beliefs are 
#about.  If da is the extension of whatever then this claim and the true 
#belief are both true, so the one just in case the other. so there is one true 
#just in case the extension-claim is.  On the othre hand, if the extension 
#claim is false, then it iff the false belief is true, so something iff the 
#extension claim.  But the extension claim is either true or false and on 
#either option, there is something John believes and that is true iff the 
#extension claim is.  So, the claim holds absolutely.  The joys of a logical 
#language!   

I presume then that you no longer consider 

  John believes p such that p is true just in case Tully is a great roman orator

to be unproblematic.

What sort of remedies can you see? My instinct would be to go for
possible worlds (x is a world of which p is true iff x is a world of which y is 
true?), but you're an old hand at this stuff, so I'll wait on your suggestion.

--And.