Re: [lojban] xorlo and masses

[tijlan <jbotijlan@gmail.com>]

On 15 August 2011 23:35, Jonathan Jones <eyeonus@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Worse, if you adopt the axiom that a whole satisfies a property if any
>> subwhole does, the referents could also include rhinoceroses.
>
> No, it could not. While it is true that a brain is a mass of neurons,
> it is not true that a mass of neurons is a brain.

A brain generally includes a mass of neurons + other stuff. It isn't
just a mass of neurons, so I wouldn't equate the two. Both statements
seem false to me.


> While it is true that a rhinoceros has a brain, it is not true that a
> rhinoceros is a brain.

The confusion of a part with a whole is common even in Lojban the
logical language. Consider this:

  mi viska gi'e satre gi'e pensi

What exactly does "mi" refer to, such that all the connected bridi
mutually hold true for it? Is it a pair of eyes, an arm, a brain, the
whole body, or something else? If the whole body rather than
particular organs can be said to viska AND satre AND pensi, the same
principle would allow us to say

  A rhinoceros is processing neural inputs and breathing.

instead of

  A rhinoceros' brain is processing neural inputs and its lungs are breathing.

Function-wise at least, then, it would seem ok to think that a
rhinoceros 'does brain' as much as a brain 'does brain'. And, given
that "does X" and "is X" are often interchangeable interpretations of
a predicate in Lojban --

  zo'e rirni
  something 'is a parent'
  something 'does parent'

  zo'e pensi
  something 'is a thinker'
  something 'does thinker'

  zo'e matra
  something 'is a motor'
  something 'does motor'

-- we have to consider whether or not that applies to "besna".
Depending on that semantic arrangement, we could have the following:

  lo besna cu besna .ije lo [rhinoceros] cu besna
  A brain 'does brain'. And a rhinoceros 'does brain'.
  A brain 'is a brain'. And a rhinoceros 'is a brain'.

Should this be not allowed for the concern about the fallacy of
composition, then we would have to pay as much critical an attention
to expressions with such implications as:

  mi se kanla .ije lo kanla cu viska .ije mi viska

If the eyes are part of me, and if it's the eyes that see things, then
to say that *I* see things would be to commit the fallacy in question,
unless we recognized some special equation between the parts and the
whole.


>> So with this meaning of {lo}, how would you unambiguously translate
>> "These brains are conscious", without the possibility of being
>> misunderstood as claiming that their component nerves are, nor electric
>> razors?
>>
>> I can only see {ro lo ti besna poi ro ke'a besna cu sanji}.
>
>
> {lo besna cu sanji} is the simplest way to put it.

I suppose many would agree that {sanji} can predicate a rhinoceros too
or other danlu for that matter. We could have the following
simultaneous statements:

  lo besna cu sanji .ije lo danlu cu sanji

Would you say this is false, confusing a part with a whole?

mu'o

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "lojban" group.
To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to lojban+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/lojban?hl=en.