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Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural variable
I think the essential difference between us is indeed the semantic-metaphysics. On one view, the universe comes with a ready-made set of individuals, to which predicates apply; propositions make claims about those individuals. On the other view, the universe is one blob that can be split into uncountably infinitely many subtypes, defined by differentiation criteria.
Here's a solution (v) then: have a couple of cmavo that mark these two views, the Ready-Made and the Blobular. I really think that would work.
Obviously you're a Ready-Madeist, while me and xorxes are Blobularists. Traditional logic (i.e. what John Clifford calls Traditional Western Logic) and formal semantics is Ready-Madeist. Cognitive and natural-language-inspired approaches to semantics are Blobularist.
I was tempted to change the Subject-line, but by now "{zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural variable" has become the inalienable name of the thread, a name to which one has come to attach deep sentimental value.
Further responses below:
Martin Bays, On 05/11/2011 06:12:
* Saturday, 2011-11-05 at 02:36 +0000 - And Rosta<and.rosta@gmail.com>:
As for whether all frenchmen do wear the same beret, that depends on
beret differentiation criteria. By the usual beret differentiation
criteria, they don't wear the same beret. But given that it is
possible to say that we all admire (the same) Obama and that millions
of children each play with (the same) Barbie, I think that it would be
possible to think of a Barbie-like Beret that pops up on the heads of
many different frenchmen. I leave open whether the Barbie-like
Beretrequires a different predicate from the berets that each pop up
on only one head.
Yes, that's exactly the issue. Your Barbie-Beret is a malkind in the
above sense if it satisfies "is a beret".
I understand.
So in the sense that if we would say that one is true then we'd also say
that the other is true, (A) and (B) are equivalent in malkindful lojban.
Do you mean they are truth-conditionally equivalent, or simply that
each, when supplemented by auxiliary assumptions, can be inferred from
the other?
Something like both... see "metatruth" in my reply to xorxes (which is
clumsy, but I don't see a better way to describe the situation).
I understand. It's a useful notion.
If Barbie-like Beret is a malkind, then (B) is derivable
from (A) only if it is also the case that all frenchmen wear the same
beret; if they all wear different berets, you can't derive (B).
Hmm? Doesn't (A) imply that all french people wear Barbie-Beret?
Only metatruly. Under Blobularity, you first have to apply differentiation criteria to the universe before you can make claims about it. One set of differentiation criteria yields a many-bereted universe, and another set of differentiation criteria yields a single-bereted universe. (A) itself doesn't entail or imply that all Frenchmen wear Barbie-Beret. But (A) can be claimed of either the many-bereted or single-bereted universe.
Under Ready-Made, of course, it is as though one set of differentiation criteria was applied to the (Blobular) universe once and for all, and thereafter only that universe gets claims made about it.
So it seems to me that either (A) doesn't entail (B) malkindfully or
that xorxesianism is not malkindful.
I don't see what you've done here.
I hadn't realized you were talking about metatruth rather than truth. Truth would be assessed relative to a post-differentiational universe. Metatruth is assessed relative to the set of all possible post-differentiational universes: claims X and Y are metatruth-conditionally equivalent if there is a predifferentiational Blobular universe such that there are differentiation criteria that yield from it a postdifferentiational universe of which X is true and there are differentiation criteria that yield from it a postdifferentiational universe of which Y is true.
Sure, we know what the difference between one lion and two lions is.
But there are these cases where you can't tell the difference. And
I think that these cases in which the speaker can't tell the
difference should be generalized into a case where for whatever reason
the speaker doesn't tell the difference.
But do we really need to create a new entity to do that? In examples
like the "lion(s) in your garden every day", we can just give a vague
count - {su'o cinfo}, in that case.
Yes, but it looks like one lion, not like a group of one or more
lions.
Then {pa ju'o ru'e cinfo}?
That doesn't sound like a very Baysian solution...
I had been wondering whether to suggest {su'o cinfo pa mei} (disregarding the vagueness that tanru introduce), but I'm not sure whether or not that casts us into an infinite regression, since {PA broda} can always be recast (metatruly?) as {su'o broda PA mei}.
There's only disagreement on beret-counting. Or Obama-counting: if
I don't agree that there is only one Obama, then I'd object to you
claiming that "ro prenu cu prami su'o Obama" and "su'o Obama cu se
prami ro prenu" are equivalent.
If you were happy to choose once and for all whether you want multiple
berets (one for each french person, say) or just Barbie-Beret, there
wouldn't be such a problem. But you want both, in different situations,
don't you? With all of them ransedyta'uing?
Yes. Ready-Made and Blobular give different metatruthful results.
--And.
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